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SUMMARY 
This thesis discusses the relationship between philosophy and psychoanalysis. It takes the 
\\ork of Freud and Lacan as a primary reference, and implements it in the reading of the texts of 
Nictzsche, Heidegger and Blanchot among others. The relationship is pursued along the lines of the 
problems originally posed by the philosophical writers and concerning the theme of subjectivity, 
idcntification, image fonnation and loss in order to punctuate the difficulties and aporias as 
articulatcd in and by the psychoanal)1ical questioning. The discussion aims therefore to demonstrate 
hm\ the problems raised by philosophy can, but also should, be addressed by the psychoanalytical 
thcory_ and to what extent the fonner mishit, in the very way in which they are raised, by virtue of 
ignoring the discussion of the "fundamentals" of psychoanalysis, namely the status of the 
unconscious, the subj ect and the object in the human discourse. My strategy to address the 
philosophical readings begins in each part of this work with an analysis of the psychoanal)1ical text 
follo\\cd by the effects and implications_ as they are imposed on the reading of philosophy/literature. 
This lack or insufficiency, as emerging in such an encounter, and operative in such a 
problcmatization, is thus given a certain psychographic attention which does not merely represent a 
psychoanal)tical "viev;poinf' but rather involves a shift in the strategy itself. This shift questions the 
status of the subject in the production of discourse, while deploying the subject as a lack in such a 
qucstioning, and its relation to the real (object). It is in accordance \\11th such an approach that I have 
di\ ided this work into two parts, each attempting to address in the way described above the following 
i~sues. On the one hand, the analysis revolves around the problems of narcissism, specularity, image, 
ego and -I' fonnation. and the symptom, and in this respect discusses the texts of Freud, Lacan, Rank 
and Nietzsche. On the other hand. it touches upon the work of "sad passions" or passions o.ldeath as 
opcratin~ in the production of the letter, and apparent in what could be called fictional theorisations in 
thc tcxts of N. Abraham, Torok, Blanchot and Heidegger. Such tactics, again_ take us beyond the 
mcaning caught in the reaL tm\ards the way in \\hich the problems of philosophy can be, again, taken 
lip by psychoanalysis. To this extent, the second part has been devoted to the discussion and analysis 
of melancholia, mOllming, loss, voice and guilt. 
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INTRODUCTION -
FREUD, LACAN AND PHILOSOPHY 
In this thesis I will attempt to fathom the anxIous relationship between 
psychoanalysis and philosophy. I will take the Freudian and Lacanian perspectives as a 
guide to lead us towards the themes which constitute the borderline between 
psychoanalytical theory and philosophical writing, especially that of Nietzsche, Heidegger 
and Blanchot. On the one hand, our investigation will point to the problematic which has 
always unfolded under the name of philosophy - subjectivity, identity, specularity, death -
to open a psychoanalytical perspective from which these questions can be approached. 
Such a strategy would already lead us to raise some preliminary questions. To what extent 
have the problems of metaphysics posed by such writers as Nietzsche or Heidegger been in 
fact the problems of and for psychoanalysis? How and in what way do the fundamental 
problems of metaphysics reflect the key points which the analytical theory marks as 
signposts in the dynamic of the unconscious, namely transference, identification, 
subjectivity, death drive, knowledge, symptom? If the reading of the texts we still insist on 
calling philosophical can punctuate the foundations of psychoanalysis, is not their 
metaphysical "status" or "origin" brought into question? And if so, would this tend to 
reveal an incompatibility between metaphysics and psychoanalytical theory as two separate 
and autonomous guidelines for theorising both rooted in what? In the case of 
psychoanalysis the theoretical is always tethered to an empirical discovery, a shift in 
perception effected in time and by way of repetition returning as theoretical reflection to 
the future. Such a procedure is characterised by a heterogeneous relation, difference and 
insatiable mobility. Metaphysics, and its sister ontology, are by contrast bound to the debts 
of origin and priori sm. But this debt which always already sends them back to seek more 
and more originary premises, more and more fundamental presuppositions - where the 
question of the father and the phallus already begins to transpire - must sooner or later 
come to reflect upon its movement as generated by the guilt and desire to return its 
irreducible surplus. To whom? This is no longer a question for theory via theory but a call 
... 
. ' 
of analytical experience that resonates in the subject as the call of the Other. 
On the other hand, what needs to be examined is some of the strongholds of 
Lacanian theory, their limits and implications, the genesis and power of attraction which 
they exert on, echoing at the same time, philosophical tradition as writing. The 
revolutionary turns in Lacanian theory that draw our interest in this respect concern the 
imaginary character of the ego and the linguistic structure of the unconscious, the problem 
of the subject and the signifier, the death drive, the status of the object, the problematic of 
loss and guilt. This is how Lacan laid them out after Freud bringing to the fore the host of 
problems that could not have been posed without Freud. For Lacan this meant that the 
structuralist psychoanalysis brings out with it a hiatus in favouring certain concepts. These 
include the Oedipal structure, the phallus as the "transcendental" signifier, the imaginary 
character of the relation to the other, the place of truth as presence, full speech, etc. To 
this extent a storm of criticism has been blown against the Lacanian perspective and we 
must allow here for at least some of the winds to move the sails of criticism against the 
currents of Lac an's doctrine. 
Let's now take an overview of what is called Lacanian doctrine, although teaching 
would be a more appropriate description, and introduce some of its keypoints. Lacan is a 
reader of Freud. His both formal and strategic commitment to read through the Freudian 
text makes him an adamant interpreter and translator, an operation that at every tum 
returns to the analytical experience, articulates the experience of the subject, plumbs the 
structure of subjectivity. The effect of such writing has produced in the case of Lacan an 
utterly original texture of insights and formulations which can no longer be placed in 
Freud's mouth. Although Lacan constantly emphasises the place of experience in analysis, 
i.e. experience of the subject, thus allowing for it to run full force into and permeate the 
theory, he, and to some extent Freud, nevertheless remains in some vicinity to 
philosophical tradition. This tradition has been called "metaphysics of presence" and at its 
heart can be found a mutually unsatisfactory relation between the empirical and the 
rational, between the return of and to experience and the significance of metapsychological 
theory. In short, the subject is always caught in the relation to the Other that preexists the 
subject. It is towards these two terms that psychoanalysis as both clinical practice and 
practice of theory is oriented. It is also within this field, the relation between the subject 
and the Other, that one could situate philosophical texts, notably those of Nietzsche and 
Heidegger, although for different reasons, as giving a thought-provoking impetus to the 
itineraries taken up by psychoanalysis. I will come back to this. 
Lacan's contributions to psychoanalysis have taken on the form of a gauntlet 
thrown in the face of the fundamental questions of philosophy. These, as I have said above, 
include the problematic of identity or identification with the specular image and its 
narcisstic charge as underlining the orientation of intuitive and speculative philosophy, the 
place of the phallic function in distinction to the mOther's jouissance, the epistemological 
problem of "the subject supposed to know" (sujet suppose savoir), and a renunciation of 
the imaginary ego in favour of the symbolic order (drive, desire). The imaginary (specular) 
character of the ego is perhaps best illustrated by Lacan in his famous mirror phase. 1 
Briefly then. Situating the child before the specular image, the mirror which is discovered 
before it is invented, Lacan speaks of the egotistical tendency to seek unity with the body-
image that is split off, separated from the subject. The ego attempts to incorporate the 
specular other into a wholeness which would stabilise its position in relation to the Other, 
the Name of the Father, the texture of language, the desire which only as a lack can 
emerge in the subject's I. Thus the ego being a product of a succession of identifications 
with what it takes for its integral part becomes subject to separation anxiety, or anxiety in 
a more "general", Heideggerian sense, of slipping from Being into nothing. 
The loss of wholeness and unity, on the imaginary plane, can only, however, be 
marked by the entrance of the desire of the Other, the subject's birth into language, as 
naming what this desire of the Other is lacking, which in turn finds support in the signifier 
as constitutive of structure. In M. Bowie's words: "a theory of language and a theory of 
interpersonal perception are taking shape; another order of experience is emerging over 
and against the order of imaginary identifications which the 'specular' moment 
inaugurates". 2 The ego, without delving too deeply into the problem to be discussed in 
chapter 3, appears as an imaginary presupposition, the centre soon to be decent red in 
"another order of experience". But although the ego is divested of its imaginary claims for 
\\; holeness and self-identity, the I, standing for the subject's place in the symbolic order, 
will nevertheless stamp its presence in the textual narrative that is so characteristic of 
Nietzsche, and of Lacan for that matter. It remains to be examined how, and by what 
criteria, the imaginary ego becomes, indeed, is succeeded by, the I of the symbolic order. 
This brings us to the next problem, that of the unconscious. But before we look at 
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what Lacan has up his sleeve let's return to the relation between the subject and the Other 
which will serve as a preamble to the question of the unconscious. Between the subject, 
understood as a divided subject, divided in the transferential relation to the Other, there is 
a specular other, the image, which tends to seduce every symbolical relation to a specular 
identification. It is as if the Lacanian mirror stage has always been on the track of a 
recourse to support the fundamental inadequacy of the subject's relation to language, be it 
speech or writing, installing an image in the narrative, an image to which he assumes to 
have a free access. This image, by and large the imaginary phallus, can take on a particular 
form of, for example, the vocal image of hearing-oneself-speak, and would have as its 
purpose to fill in the temporal gap that separates the I from the alterity of signification, and 
bring the effects of subject's speech, or writing, into a closing whole of the specular 
relation that the mirror stage exemplifies. 
What disrupts the continuity of such narcissistic functioning is what might be called 
the economy of time, the emptiness of a subject's speech which falls on its imaginary 
constructs thus opening the yawning abyss of his being that is lost or deadened in this 
imaginary identification: 
Docs the subject not become engaged in an ever growing dispossession of that being of his, 
conceming which - C.) - he ends up by recognising that this being has never been anything more than 
his construct [ceuvre] in the imaginary and that this construct disappoints all his certainties? For in 
this labour [travail] which he undertakes to reconstruct for another, he rediscovers the fundamental 
alienation that made him construct it like another, and which has always destined it to be taken from 
him hyanother.3 
The image which in Lacan's vocabulary stands, in the visual field, for the lack of an object, 
a little object a, appears as a loss, a dead image detached from the subject yet in some 
sense still orienting the ego's identifications. Not only is the image a construct of the 
speaker or looker but it also fails to render the subject a consistent whole. The image is 
dead as a deadened fragment of the subject because the speaking subject is always ahead 
of time. If the lost object were to return to that of which it is an effect, jouissance, it 
would find nothing there, no subject which would receive it in the temporal repetition that 
makes him absent in the time of his desire. There is no reciprocity between the subject and 
the image even if the image as an object is always of the subject, of his tmagmary 
construction that is left behind in the course, or rather dis-course, of time. 
6 
The specular relation made Lacan introduce the notion of labour into the subject's 
precarious position in the world of others. The lost object which has been left behind 
neither speaks back nor looks back at what caused it for it has no life with which to 
dispatch itself back to its father. Lacan reserves a central place in his discourse for the 
symbolic father, or the punitive father, thus echoing Freud's primordial Pater who has been 
silenced for millennia but who none the less returns as a myth of patricide and, most 
importantly, the symbolic function. In so far as the subject recognises in his own image the 
shadowy presence of the threat of castration and the residues of the yber-Ich (ideal I), his 
relation to the image falls within the master/slave dialectic, the debt to Hegel no doubt, 
restored by Lacan to its morbid function in the analysis of obsessional neurosis. 
It is in the narcissistic relation to the imaginary other where Lacan finds the source 
of aggressivity, not "the animal aggressivity of the frustrated desire", but "the aggressivity 
of the slave whose response to the frustration of his labour [travail] is a desire for death".4 
Somewhere between ceuvre and travail, between the effect of his work as the empty and 
unreciprocated gift for the master, and his incessant toil for the jouissance of the master, 
the desire for death marks its origin. The slave, or the obsessional neurotic, defies time, 
that temporal movement which always shifts his desire ahead of its reflection tailing him as 
his double, the spectre of the master he is unable to destroy in the empty repetition of his 
action, empty in so far as it is devoid of that difference that originally placed him there. 
The existence of the obsessional revolves around waiting and waiting for a moment of 
emergence that would liberate him from the revolutionary struggle against the Other to 
whom he is destined in his work and who, as a dead Other, holds him hostage of his 
identification. The slave's time is nontemporal, his existence nonecstatic: 
The obsessional thus ,vaits because he has entered time that is non-existent, predicated on the non-
happening of an event that did happen: he has entered an impossible world, and, just as any number 
becomes infinite when divided by zero, any time becomes empty, becomes pure duration, when it is 
deprived of anything that has actually happened. This time of pure duration is the time of the pure 
object: the object defined by nothing more than its duration~ 
In analysis, time is inaugurated, if I can put it this way, in the relation to the Other as it 
cuts in the narcissistic dialectic of waiting and postponement at the moment of death. Cuts 
in, that is to say, is raised, in the time of reflection, as an excess of desire-to-signify which 
separates the subject from its object. 
In analysis time has a beginning as a nontemporal time. To the extent that in the 
analytic discourse time is energised in the operation of punctuation, "calculated delay" and 
syncopation which interferes in the rhythm of jouissance, repetition reveals the "other" 
side of the death drive, the lack and desire. In chapter 8, I will consider the death drive as a 
kind of passion that is at work in the writing of mourning and melancholia, and its relation 
to loss. 
Theoria appears as a variation of the celebrated passion in a relation to the spectral 
object that as a lack provokes the desire of the Other. This will take us to a reflection on 
death as an existential phenomenon as described by Heidegger. On this occasion it will be 
worthwhile to look at Heidegger's strategy regarding his existential analysis of death and 
his insistence on interpreting the encounter between Dasein and Thanatos as preceding any 
other, be it biological, psychological, or scientific in general, type of analysis. 
In the first chapter I will look at the death drive as that work of excess that cannot 
be reduced to the primary state of inorganic matter - the concept Freud wrestled with - for 
it is already included in the circulation of signifiers. Any attempt at an effacement of the 
signifier, whether in repression or foreclosure, inevitably amounts to nothing else than 
executing of the power of the drive. To have a fuller grasp of the function of the death 
drive one must therefore trace its work elsewhere, namely in relation to the imaginary, 
which is where Lacan located it. 
Lacan's general claim that "the unconscious is structured like a language" appears 
as a particular elaboration of Freud's theory and rests on the latter's topographies. Lacan's 
debt to linguistics (Saussure, Jacobson) is matched by his debt to Levi-Strauss for whom 
language, in the first instance that of myth and music, unfolds in time only in order to 
replace time with space.6 
From the start, Lacan, following Levi-Strauss's topological arrangements of the 
mind, adopts constructs and formulations to provide the necessary criteria for explaining 
the unconscious structure. On this occasion Lacan takes a decisive step towards "modern 
science not to trust the phenomena and to look for something more subsistent behind them 
that explains them,,7 The fervent pursuit for essence behind appearance, being behind 
e'\istence, that characterises Lacan's discourse places him in relation to the history of 
\\' estern thinking which according to such critics as Derrida always favoured one term 
over its double, spatial organisation over economy of time, cause over eflect placing 
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desire for presence at the fore of this orientation. The concept of structure seems to fit the 
bill of the orthodox strategy and means used for appraisal of the nature of the unconscious. 
Does the structuralist approach then do justice to history and time? Does psychoanalytic 
debate as taken up by Lacan reopen what could be called the closure of time? Or does his 
emphasis on the relation to science whose foremost duty is to ex-plain or reveal essence 
under the veneer of appearance, and save the object at the price of the unquestioned 
subject, sail towards the rocks of metaphysics where it is likely to be crushed into pieces of 
drifting debris which it had already gathered for making this ship? What Heidegger found 
discrediting in science and as science, 8 Lacan seems to attempt to rehabilitate into a new 
structuralist creation with the old name. How does this work? 
Lacan's pronouncement implies that there is room for two structures here, one of 
the unconscious and the other of language, both being linked up with each other by way of 
a certain resemblance. Why structure then? What does Lacan do when he appeals to a 
spatial organisation that underlies the temporal historization of the subject or the 
performative dimension that makes language ex-ist in the signifying relation to the Other? 
For Lacan the structure of a language refers to a set of signifiers that predetermine 
human relations moulding and forming them according to these structures. In short, I am 
counted, included in the operation of counting others, before I recognise myself as the one 
who counts. 9 This is what I mean when I say that the Other as symbolic order preexists the 
subject. Secondly, armed with an arsenal of contemporary linguistics, Lacan directs his 
interpretation of the unconscious beyond the notions with which the traditional 
interpretations of the analytic theory try to describe Freudian unconscious, namely as the 
dynamic seat of mnemic traces to be unfolded, or a reservoir or receptacle of affects, the 
forgotten desire censored and repressed under the repetitively neurotic vigil of 
consciousness. Lacan veers away from such symmetrical arrangements, already a construct 
of speculative thought, urging us to rethink the unconscious. He thus proposes that "the 
unconscious is the whole structure of language". 10 Since the unconscious exists as an 
effect of the subject's division Lacan introduces "the law of the signifier" into the gap 
\\hich emerges as another speaking. The subject is divided in the sense of a persistent 
duality whose fundamental dissymmetry is the immediate effect of a transferential relation 
to the Other. And in so far as the subject is represented by a signifying chain his speech is 
constituted by a gap between the signifier and the signified. 11 The gap \vhich is on the one 
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hand the bar separating the former from the latter, represents for Lacan the locus of the 
discovery of the unconscious, and, on the other hand, the site of an error produced, the 
other speaking in the gap: 
ll1crc, something other demands to be realised - which appears as intentional. of course, but of a 
strange temporality [errange temporalite]. What occurs, what is produced, in this gap [beance]. 
presents itself [my modif.] as adiscovery [fa trouvaille].12 
Since the signifying slip or lapse appears as a surprise "this discovery is at the same time a 
solution - not necessary a complete one". In dreams and parapraxes we are constantly 
surprised by something other emerging in the locus of the gap which is not to say that 
suturing it can lead to the cure of neurosis. The gap could be located somewhere between 
cause and effect; it "reproduces" the cause on the level of the truth of the signifier, that is 
to say it names the lack at the time of a fall or fracture, given that the cause is what Lacan 
calls the real, a notion to which I will return shortly. 
All this can only make us think that the crack in the unconscious, the crack as the 
unconscious, which allowed us to introduce "the order of the non-realised", produces an 
effect of the discontinuous character that cannot be measured against some consistent and 
total Other, because the Other as a desire is always, although not in psychosis, 
characterised by the lack. It is this lack in the Other that is the condition of Lacan' s notion 
of structure pointing to an always already silent moment in the signifying chain. But that 
which does not emerge in the structure, again with the exception of psychosis, what 
remains unsymbolised, is the master signifier, the signifier of the desire of the Other. Its 
condition is what Lacan calls "the letter in the unconscious". What is the letter, then, and 
how does Lacan account for its existence? 
The lettre is not to be taken metaphorically, at least not as a metaphor that is aware 
of itself as a metaphor. It is not some essence or nature of things, as one used to say in the 
traditional language of philosophy, displaced by a symbol, nor indeed a letter of law or the 
letter of the text. The letter is to be taken "quite simply, literally" (Tout uniment, B la 
iellre).1.' The lettl'e is a literal, self-identical and self-referential, medium or agency 
(ills/alice) of an alphabetical letter which, following Lacan's interpretation of Freud, gives 
an image a value of a signifier. The letter then is one, and designates the mark as a 
condition of structure in which it alone will not be spoken. The letter, say aleph, has 
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nothing to do with the signification of the animal species, as they appear in the Egyptian 
hieroglyphics, but already designates a "form of the verb 'to be"', or a form of being that 
functions in language as a signifier. 14 Thus the signifier appears as an indivisible linguistic 
monad indicating an absence of what it names (the animal) and a presence of the acoustic 
image. It has no quality except for the relation of difference to another signifier. For Lacan 
this difference has a structural value; the signifier differs from another signifier not by the 
meaning but by the way it is uttered. There are therefore no two identical signifiers. It is in 
the linguistic functioning, or malfunctioning which is more obviously the case, of signifying 
chain founded in the instance of the letter that Lacan sees the structure of the unconscious. 
But is it really possible to even approach the question of the structure of a 
language, any language, language as such? Would not such a pursuit prompt us to seek 
the essence of an interlinguistic difference, that jouissance which remains sensu stricto 
unsignifiable save for the phallus which is the Outside of the signifying chain7 Thus the 
letter is not a "universal" letter of a language, but already an operator in a particular 
phonemic system that falls short of freedom to be transported into another system without 
translation, as such operation would bridge the interlinguistic gap that makes translation 
possible. In which case should we not leave it untranslated? Lacanian lettre is always 
written as a fundamental irreducibility of that which metaphorically resonates as l'etre and 
as a letter that is sent to whoever finds it readable, that is to say decipherable. Is it not the 
case that, given Lacan's insistence on the predominance of speech in human discourse, the 
letter is what cannot be spoken precisely due to this ambiguity but only written, which 
makes it subject to and the condition for dispatching a signifier that does not come back 
other than to another signifier. 15 
I will not pursue these remarks any further as their sole purpose was to introduce 
us to Lacanian thought. It is now time to return to the thematic of my thesis, sketch out its 
general strategy and give a brief outline of each chapter. Let me say from the start that 
nothing is further from my mind than to contribute to a prejudice that the notions we will 
encounter in this study reserve the right to be used solely in the analytical practice, or, in 
more general sense, which I have already signalled, that this practice at any point abstains 
from the "metapsychological" considerations and theoretical commitments to which this 
\\ork will hopefully testify. In fact, the Lacanian clinic is theoretical, and in its elaborations 
can be heard as an echo of metapsychology. There is no room in psychoanalysis, I believe, 
1 1 
for such a dogmatic monopoly which, it seems at times, bears some favours In the 
Lacanian circles. 
This distinction, which is always arbitrary, is not without significance for the 
present study as it aims to put into question the view that Lacan, in contrast to Freud, was 
not a writer but a speaker. Just as the relation between Plato and Socrates demonstrates 
the importance of writing as veiling/unveiling of the Socratic truth, so the Lacanian theory 
which has been bequeathed to us chiefly as a transcription, and therefore written text, 
should influence us in our reading and rereading of his text irrespective of whether we are 
in the clinic or at the university. But does it? If it can be said that Socrates was a 
.lOll is . ..,ance of Plato who devoted himself to the practice of the letter inscribing the voice 
which knows nothing, it is not entirely beside the point to pry into a debate about 
jOlli.\sance that accompanied the transcription of Lacan's Seminars. This, of course, is not 
to say that there is no difference between the Ecrits and the Seminars. It is simply that the 
difference of this kind will always be left out slipping away from the presentation that 
spaces the signifiers in time, thus giving this space not only a structural but also a historical 
dimension, unlike speech which intimates them in the nontemporal intimacy of the voice. 
In the view of the above the title of the present study - psychographies - is no 
longer accidental. The term was introduced by Freud 16 who referred to it as a form of 
psychological biography17 What interests me here, however, is not so much an analysis of 
a sequence of events in the psychical life of a person, as a particular attention we should 
pay to the signifying events that testify to an interest or concern, whose conceptual status, 
at the same time, testifies to the subject's singularity that these signifiers represent. And 
this means that a pursuit of a problem or question is always reflected in the specificity of 
style and presentation. To reformulate, then, what the psychographic practice involves -
\vhat it does not involve - would be first of all to say that it recognises the concerns (not in 
the Heideggerian sense of Besorge) as satisfactory/unsatisfactory and symptomatic 
attachments to objects, attachments that are already constituted in transference and 
identification. With respect to writing, and in particular to Nietzsche, Heidegger and 
B lanchot, this will amount to a rereading of a patheme or a host of pathemes that 
recurrently cement the corpus of their work. To this extent representational projections, 
mimetic identifications and imaginary speculations are constitutive of the discourse and 
serve as an example of psychographic strategies of avoidance, resistance, insistence. 
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concealment, generated by a libidinal economy whose work, as it gives rise to anguish and 
"sad passions", as Spinoza called them, to melancholic passions over the loss evoked in 
writing, is tied to the "law of the signifier". These metonymic displacements of desire and 
metaphorical combinations of the drive, as Lacan following Freud and Jacobsen formulated 
them, can only be guided, or misguided, by transference that is a condition of reading as 
such. 18 
Needless to say, if analysis of a text produces another text, its structural 
vacillations cannot be determined in advance or captured with some supreme vision or 
knowledge. Such structuring always involves, and the shifts and changes it propels, a 
subjectal position, that is to sayan elusive presence of the Real. 
The unmasking of concepts, or reading of them as signifiers, "translates'" them into 
symptoms, which in turn reveals another stratum of the text, of the unconscious whose 
linguistic operations such as desire, death drive, loss, pivot around the symbolic term 
returning to the impossible, the trauma as real. Subjecting a particular patheme (identity, 
temporality, myth, death, repetition, anguish, conscience, guilt) to a psychoanalytic 
scrutiny reveals an epistemological gap, a lack of knowledge which a writing subject 
nevertheless supposes. If, on the other hand, a particular term can be analytically examined 
as to what it, in the face of its history and originary alterity, attempts to conceal as its 
symptomatic double, then, the effect would be what this work aims to produce. In short, 
my strategy is concerned with the impossibility of the real as undercutting the project of 
reciprocity and resemblance whether in terms of the imaginary (mimesis, specularity, 
identification) or the symbolic as naming. The patheme then relates to both the subject and 
the object, for it is the real of the object that the subject, barred in this very operation, 
attempts to excavate. 
Such mirroring would doubtless show to what extent this strategy is itself a hollow 
- a hole-owed to the originary traumatic event - were it to attempt to introduce and 
smuggle into the discourse a third and neutral term. In its absence the psychographic task 
,vill from beginning to end be nothing but an operation stemming from the lack, that is 
endowed with the meditative force capable of showing the operations involved in the 
creative discourse, whether it unfolds under the name of philosophy or psychoanalysis. I 
\\ill now outline briefly the chapters in this work. 
In chapter 1 Freud's Narcissus I will discuss Freud's paper on Narcissism (1914). 
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It provided Freud with a platform to declare his libidinal credo and divorce himself from 
his opponents, notably Jung and Adler. In doing so he presented and analysed his libido 
theory, and situated it as a foundation of psychoanalysis, from which the above fled and 
others began to borrow. In this chapter I will examine the status of libido, love, object, self 
and ego-ideal in their relations in Freud's topography. This will provide me with the 
starting point to stress the importance of the imaginary relation that founds Freud's 
critique of philosophical speculation, in which the superego agency of self-observation 
plays a crucial role thus bringing to light the notion of imaginary identification. It seems to 
me that Freud's examination of narcissism, its validity and its honesty, should be taken as 
representing a position of the subject, which in this case is highlighted by both 
semibiographical motifs and the fact that its main object remains concealed and 
unthematised . 
In chapter 2 Death in the Mirror I will focus on what remained occluded in 
Freud's study, and what is nevertheless its principal theme, namely the place of the death 
drive in narcisstic - used here as an analytical concept - formations. In Lacanian terms, the 
narcisstic relation can only be approached in imaginary terms, for it concerns those libidinal 
attachments to an object, which aim at totalization of the image of the body. Thus 
narcissism as a particular form of attachment to the body becomes a playground for the 
death drive to cement, in a growing regression and fixation to the body, what is never 
whole. This brings into an analysis of Freud the study carried out by Otto Rank, Freud's 
contemporary, whose discussion of narcissism is solely devoted to thanatophobia. If the 
self is divided due to the loss of the maternal imago, in narcissism this crack is glued in a 
particular attachment to death as a phantom partner, a double. This ambivalent relation to 
death, which is an effect of an ambivalent status of the object both lost and clung to, will 
take me at the end to an overview of Heidegger' s analysis of the "ontological meaning" of 
death, e.g. an impossibility of dying with the Other which for Heidegger will be associated 
\\ ith the masculine pronoun, the death of the father. 
In chapter 3 The Body Image and the Origin of Specularity I will present a 
detailed reading of Lacan's mirror stage. Lacan showed that the ego has an imaginary, or 
a specular to be more specific, function whose sole aim is to give a child, in his relation to 
mirror image, a sense of wholeness and completeness. Thus what is unrepresented, i.e. 
libidinally not invested, in the body, is patched up by an imaginary-specular form only to 
l-l 
close the picture of the self. I have followed Lacan's analysis of what is called imaginary 
identification in examining the role played by the gaze that aids identificatory 
constructions. This will take me to the point at which we could see that the totalizing 
(;estalt of imaginary identification, or the imaginary phallus, is responsible for the 
philosopher's attempt to find the meaning of Being. Such a search for the "meaning of 
Being" has an upper hand in deciding the status of "being-me", which is an effect of being-
seen or caught in the gaze of the Other. This contrasts with Lacan's notion of "a lack of 
being" that generates desire which orients the subject's relation to the desire of the Other. 
It would therefore appear that the intuition of an ontological analysis of Being borrows 
from what Lacan saw as a child's relation to the mirror, a relation that tries to negotiate 
the fact of being an object of the Other's gaze into an imaginary "potentiality-for-Being-
whole", In conclusion my discussion of Lacan's specular identification shifts to the 
question of how the child's entry into language produces a specifically human aggressivity 
in defense of the phallic image that the symbolical term does not leave intact. Hence 
Lacan's vitriolic criticism of Hegel and Sartre whose concepts of freedom draw from the 
alienation of the ego glued to the image that does not lack. This chapter concludes with 
some questions about the status of the unconscious as a linguistic structure in opposition 
to mimesis, mediatization and philosophical speculation. 
Given the discussion of narcissism above, the place of the image and imaginary 
identification, what interests me in chapter 4 Nietzsche in the Mirror of Narcissus is to 
bring out symbolical relations in opposition to imaginary constructions. I will take up the 
reading of Nietzsche's fragments in order to show the ambivalent status of the self and the 
ideal in his writing. On the one hand, Nietzsche's critique of philosophy could be read as 
an attempt to demonstrate how these imaginary and specular constructions constituted the 
subject's confessions under the veneer of philosophical truth. On the other hand, it is 
always striking to notice how Nietzsche's language itself is immersed in his experiences as 
subject, how they stir his passions in the direction that is not far from a certain ideal. If this 
ideal is a derivative of Freud's conception of ego-ideal, how are we to interpret 
Nietzsche's writing, style and discoveries that, as I have shown, on one side paved the way 
for those of Freud, and on the other, retained the terrain of imaginary identification that 
Lacan understood as a false claim to knowledge. What is at stake here is the difference 
bct\\ een the imaginary ego and the symbolic I, and the function of the sexual drive, 
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indifferent to the object to the extent that it is solely concerned with satisfaction. And 
finally, what interests me here, is the place of the voice in what Nietzsche called "the art of 
hearing". The question of the voice will also be taken up in the concluding chapter in this 
work. 
Chapter 5 What are Philosophers For? further develops the discussion of Freud 
and Lacan above, and examines what it is to philosophise as Nietzsche practised it. I will 
discuss here those elements of psychoanalytical theory that came to playa driving role in 
how philosophy always tackled perception, understanding, cognition, knowledge, 
subjectivity. Nietzsche could be safely credited with bringing to our view the activity of 
sexual drive in philosophy, and with showing how a long-lasting ignorance of the 
unconSCIOUS, although not yet in Lacanian terms, led to numerous misunderstandings. 
Thus it is Nietzsche who opened the discourse of fiction in philosophy but had to pay the 
price of his own declarations becoming subject to analytical interpretation. To this extent, 
as I have developed this theme also in other chapters, psychoanalysis is no longer in the 
position of the master-builder, for it deals with the lack. If Nietzsche aspired to be the one 
to have a final say without saying so, subjecting the "personal", "imaginary", "objective" to 
scrutiny, he also showed what philosophers lack, or, in more general terms, how their 
symptom lies at the very heart of philosophical claims, how to philosophise with the lack. 
Chapter 6 Introduction to the reading of Mourning and Melancholia -
Idl!llt~fication, Incorporation invites us to read Freud's paper on Mourning and 
Melancholia written couple of years after the article on Narcissism. It deals as directly as 
possible with Freud's account of the unconscious structure of language taking as a central 
point the status of the lost object of love. I will take as a point of departure Freud's 
analysis of truth in melancholia and the symbolical status he gives to it. The reading of 
Freud's paper on melancholia urges us to pay some attention to the discussion of the 
difference between neurotic and psychotic structures, a significant distinction in so far as 
the philosophical treatment of psychoanalytical theory has always confined itself to the 
notion of repression (neurosis). Lacan's analysis of psychosis, and his reading of 
Schreber's paranoia, is paramount to understanding his theory of language, especially the 
notion of paternal metaphor and its foreclosure in the discourse of the psychotic. As far as 
paranoia is concerned, such a foreclosure would show a lapse of the imaginary function 
into delusion and hallucination, in which the lack of the mOther as desiring is excluded due 
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to absence of the paternal phallus in favour of the total union of language and body, the 
symbolic and the real. Melancholia, to the extent that it relies on the identification with the 
lost object of love, is more difficult to define in these terms. Hence the discussion of the 
notion of the crypt pursued across to the following chapter. I will also stress here the 
difference between identification and incorporation to return to Freud's relations with his 
contemporary Karl Abraham in whose work on melancholia this distinction is of crucial 
importance. We will likewise examine here Lacan's notion ofjouissance, one of his crucial 
terms that put him at odds with philosophy, and so vital in understanding the shift from 
melancholic identification with the void to the delusional bond with the jouissance of the 
mOther as lost, as well as introductory remarks on both the stabilising and prohibitive 
functions of the Name of the Father. 
As a follow-up to the previous chapter, chapter 7 What is a Crypt? deals in more 
detail with the ambivalence involved in melancholia, and the difficulties in analysing its 
structure in terms of the difference between writing and speech. Hence my attempt to 
introduce the notion of the crypt in contrast and opposition to the fantasmic discussion of 
it by Maria Torok, Nicolas Abraham and Derrida's commentary. If the metaphor of the 
crypt can symbolise the lack of the object thus naming that - the crypt - which remains 
empty, the place of the phallus as removed from the field of perception and a possibility of 
being spoken or written, such a metaphoricity is refused by Torok & Abraham attributing 
to the crypt that which it conceals. What? The "word-thing" or the unity of das Ding and 
the signifier, which, in my view, the crypt precisely disallows. The lack of distinction 
between what Lacan was at pains to delineate, namely das Ding and the signifier, would 
lead us to understand the crypt as a place of double concealment - it conceals, as Derrida 
confirms the steps of Torok-Abraham, the very concealment, the lack. It therefore does 
not allow for the lack (of the object) to function as a lack of the mOther's desire to be 
named. This then will allow me to approach the structure of melancholia once again, and 
also to think the crypt as a place of the letter in the writing, the place, as Lacan said in his 
later work, of the one. 
Consideration of the crypt as a metaphor and mechanism which sustains the 
relation between the voice and the letter, can thus be pursued in terms of encrypture that 
presents in writing what is absent, the object. And it is this that we will approach in 
Chapter 8 A IIlopsies: Blanchol' .... ' ImaginalY Versions. It is the object - present as a 
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"shadow" that can nevertheless be only introduced by means of a symbolical term that 
names what is absent - that remains encrypted in writing to the extent that it conceals what 
allows for the signifying play in writing. In this chapter I follow my study of melancholia 
by taking up the writing of Blanchot, where it remains undetermined to what extent 
identification with the lost object, and the self-accusatory and self-reproachful 
characteristic of melancholia that Freud accorded to it, is constitutive of the melancholic 
discourse in the sense that the phallic signification is operative, but does not allow us to 
subsume it under psychotic structure. In the texts of Blanchot this phallic signification 
remains evident in the form of the prohibition of cohabitation with the dead, which is 
where Blanchot takes his meditation. In it, Blanchot speaks about the registers of the 
symbolic, real and imaginary, which constitute the core of Lacan' s doctrine. He advances 
his meditation on the cadaver - testifying to the impossible real in the confrontation with 
the image - to the point where the desire of the subject gives rise to a fantasy, in this case 
of necrophilia, opening the symbolical dimension of the signifier. Blanchot's signifier 
names the horror of loss in the proximity to the lack of the object. On the other hand it 
reveals that dimension of human desire whose realization remains prohibited "under the 
punishment of death". In my reading of Blanchot' s texts, I will try to show how close his 
writing takes him to the field of the unconscious, and how his meditation on death runs 
into Lacan's categories. 
The final chapter 9 To Conclude: on the Voice, Conscience, Being-guilty and Love 
will be devoted to the discussion of the status of the voice. This will specifically bear on 
Heidegger's analysis of the voice of conscience to show how Heidegger's critique of the 
moral theories aims to give the voice a salvational character. This no doubt would take us 
back to Freud's analysis of the superego of which the voice is an heir and the source of 
hallucinatory self-accusations. This is where Freud placed the discontents of civilisation in 
relation to the superego; it is the source of neurosis not a cure. This will lead me to an 
analysis of Heidegger's notion of Being-guilty against, on the one hand, Freud's 
elaborations on the agency of conscience, the need for punishment and anxiety in the face 
of loss of love, and, on the other, Miller's formulations about jouissance and the barred 
subject. The power of the voice (one can for example think of Blanchot's Sirens) is not 
\\ithout relation to the death drive in which the superego finds its most extreme fulfilment. 
Let's recapture and further our task here. If the problems as posed by Lacan 
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constitute for a critic, and not necessarily for an analyst, an interface between philosophy 
and psychoanalytical theory, thus challenging the traditional way of theorising (concepts as 
symptoms, theory as metaphor) how does the reading of the pathemes affect our relation 
to knowledge? The questions raised by Nietzsche, primarily epistemological, for they 
touch on the possibility of the translation of the language of morality and Aristotelean 
master ethics into the language of psychology that opened the floodgates of psychoanalytic 
theory, can only serve as a preamble. 19 
If the discourse of philosophy were to do justice to the unconscious it would have 
to allow for a surprising gap to lapse into the open to emerge as a lack, a missing 
reference, instead of endeavouring a closure or filling in which is doubtless all too 
meaningful to remain, for some at least, an abyss that lacks rather than a lack of abyss. It is 
precisely at this juncture that Lacan, following Freud, continued to challenge the 
traditional formulations practised by way of phenomenological forays into the "contents of 
consciousness", and where the problems raised by him could find their legitimate place. 
They are concerned with the status of truth in psychoanalysis and the position of 
knowledge as assumed by the subject. In this we must once again articulate that what, 
according to Lacan, gives these problems as they appear in the light of psychoanalytic 
theory a radically different face is what distinguishes philosophers from the analysts, 
namely the real. 
If the writing of this thesis is in anyway to tell us anything about the "what" and 
"how" of the restless relation between philosophy and psychoanalysis, indeed enlighten us 
to the problematic involved it must, in my view, whether this be arbitrary or not, take into 
account the fact that it is bound to the place to which, formally at least, it is addressed. 
This place is called the university and the purpose of addressing it, which will no doubt 
show itself as a place or point of contention, is for the sake of knowledge. I say "point of 
contention" because these are the stakes of the task undertaken here. Where the discourse , 
is practised in the light of the effect it produces the question concerns not so much 
knowledge as such but a particular kind of knowledge. 
On the one hand, what is involved here has its root in what I will call the demand 
for kl1owledge, and, on the other, which is partly a formalization of this demand, the 
strategies of the discourse are in their very premises concerned with satisfying or not 
satistVing the demand. In short, the question is hOlV one arrives at v.hat is called 
. ..... 
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knowledge, theoretical knowledge, psychoanalytical knowledge. I am touching on this for 
at least one important reason which must be emphasised to all those who are engaged in 
the reading of Lacanian text. Reading Lacan sets in motion almost insurmountable 
difficulties regarding his style, his use of language, endless ellipses and puns that slip 
through the pen in the way which is as poetical as it is untranslatable?O To follow through 
his text, to endeavour its critique and to argue for or against its validity whilst, at the same 
time, refraining from random reductions or magnifying universalizations, conceals a danger 
of jumping into epistemological conclusions which the critics are not always in the need of 
avoiding. Hence the problem of the kind of knowledge that is at stake and in question~ we 
are, after all, confronted with the analytic discourse. 
If what separates the discourse of the university from the analytic discourse is, in 
Lacan's formula, an associative chain that surrounds what is at stake in producing it, 
namely the real, the primal wound by which the subject comes to ex-ist as divided and 
supported only by the signifier that is always already severed from that which pro-voked it, 
then, this impossibility as the real occupies the same place in its encounter with discourse 
({/ the university. Having invented the term Lacan needs no longer to concern himself with 
the concept which is equally pervasive in Freud's text (trauma) and in philosophy as that 
which the philosopher does not write about: 
it is not a question of reality, but of truth, because the effect of full speech is to reorder past 
contingencies by conferring on them the sense of necessities to come, such as they are constituted by 
the little freedom through which the subject makes them preseni! 
Realizl' has always been conceived of as an ideal presence, on the one hand that which is 
extraneous to and removed from the subject (imagination, symbolisation), and, on the 
other hand, that which is none the less an object of inquiry, a felos to be attained. If that is 
so, then, Lacan seems to be saying, this inquiry, which is discourse, involves the real, that 
is to say, the real is at work where and when the object of analysis, "reality", is in question. 
But although reality is in question the truth of the subject is at stake. For Lacan, as far as 
the discourse is concerned, and in so far as the discourse in being addressed by the Other 
addresses the other, it is the truth that does not know. 
The concern with the object has, in psychoanalytic terms, an imaginary effect, and, 
it is this imaginary conception that determines the true dimension of analysis. Hence in 
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Lacanian teaching the object is no longer the mental object of psychology or the 
philosophical object of perception, but what he calls objet a, that absence present as a lack 
which orients the subject's fantasmatic itinerary in his experience of the signifier. The 
subject, the divided subject supported by the signifier, to the extent that his desire attempts 
to name the desire of the Other, ex-ists in relation to "his" real object. In other words, not 
only has the subject been at some stage supposed as an object by the Other, but also in 
every object there is something of the subject, the object a. 22 
It is this object a that is dominant in the analytic discourse drawing the divided 
subject to the site of the real as Cause. What interests me is to show how the lack, which 
can only be conceived in symbolical terms, wrongfoots and unsettles the "given" 
significations, how they are shaken by the intervention of the Other. Thus we can position 
psychoanalysis as the Other of philosophy or as the libidinal underside of enunciation of 
philosophical statements. 23 Analytical questioning will therefore derive its force from the 
dynamics of transference and drive. Structurally speaking, to give the naming Other, the 
Name of the Father, time in this respect would be not only to introduce, and for this matter 
inaugurate, time, but also to give it a place in which time could return as a particular 
reversal of its history. To be sure, this reversal concerns the history of a subject, its 
symptom and fantasy, and in terms of Lacanian topology such effect can be achieved on 
the Moebius strip. What then constitutes the analytical experience that is in question here, 
and how does it stand at the university which is where we are? 
This question concerns our arrival at the place where a certain status is given to 
knowledge, to the contribution to "general" knowledge (and further, to transmission, 
teaching, dissemination, etc). For example, how do we situate the unconscious and 
jOIli...,·sollce that produces subject's division but fails to incorporate the lack into the 
discourse? Is it possible at this curve to drive the analytical and philosophical discourses 
into the open, or is it that, as Phillipe Sollers amusingly said, the philosopher always finds 
the stone of the unconscious too difficult to swallow. But then does he not in any case end 
up with stones in his stomach, which, like in the old fairy-tale, have replaced the little red 
riding hood? As for our discourse grinding and chewing are certainly more appropriate for 
'-
the task. 
The analyst comes to know about his desire by way of the loss of narcissism. His 
position, for example Lacan's, as he responds to the demand of the Other, is that of 
unknowledge. The passage - does Nietzsche exemplifY such crossing? - at which he finds 
himself confronting a loss of Heideggerian unity of "being-me", the inadequacy of 
"unified", that is to say supposed subject, would suggest that Nietzsche has given us the 
key to psychoanalysis, namely the split subject, divided by a fundamental incompatibility 
between the body and consciousness. Was not Nietzsche's fondness of Spinoza an effect 
of the latter's pointing to what the body is capable of? However, Lacan, despite being 
influenced by philosophy, not less than Freud, remained intransigent in his rejection of 
what he described, as I have said earlier, as philosophers' ignorance of the real. As we 
shall see, contrary to such generalisation, both Nietzsche and Heidegger preclude a 
possibility of inquiry under the name of philosophy without allowing an affect, an anguish 
of existence already marked by falls, limits, finitude and death to make itself present in the 
text. Although for Nietzsche the therapeutic effect of reading philosophy without 
philosophy remains unquestionable, for Lacan the chief emphasis remains on the real and 
"the subject's solitary relation to the Cause". It is here that we find the basis to speak 
about analytical experience. In this sense the real, conceptually elusive and 
"philosophically" unswallowable, should not, in a more or less awkward way of defining it, 
be reduced to a personal event, say the death of Heidegger's father, or Nietzsche's 
relationship with his sister. We could rather approach it as an emergence of a signifier that 
stamps a name on a certain loss, and, by this virtue, on the inseparability of theory and 
fiction, as they both fumble through repeated attempts to bypass the jouissance of making 
sense, the work of the death drive or echoes of an imaginary identification that alienates 
the subject in his discourse. 
There is therefore no reason why the real of jouissance as manifest as discerned in 
the psychoanalytic clinic should remain confined to it and not help us unravel the confines 
of writing in a philosophical text, which is what I intend to do when inviting Lacanian 
"concept" of it. The real designates a wound or trauma, not the trauma of birth in the 
biological sense, but a signifYing event whose primacy can only be defined as an entrance 
or intrusion of the symbolical Other - the body caught in language - that leaves me 
anxiously trembling in my divided subjectivity. It is the entering of language's alterity as a 
crossing of the path of the so called intention, that leaves an indelible mark of the subject's 
silence of being, the scar, that Lacan called the real. Given its ambiguous relation to the 
symbolic order, the real as Cause in Lacanian sense has to be understood in terms of a 
trauma's vicious circle: the trauma is the Cause which perturbs the smooth engine of s),mbolisation 
and throws it off balance; it gives rise to an indelible inconsistency in the symbolic; but for all that 
the trauma has no existence of its own prior to symbolisation; it remains an anamorphic entity that 
gains consistency only in retrospect, viewed from within the symbolic horizon - it acquires its 
consistency from the structural necessity of the inconsistency of the symbolic fiel(f 
That is why to emphasise its structural importance Lacan said of the real that it "is that 
which is always in the same place,,?5 If the real is, as Lacan claimed, what the philosophers 
have always tried to bypass, it nevertheless speaks in their writing whether they 
associatively poetise through it or proceed with a methodological aplomb. This could be 
read that, as Fink put it 
it is impossible - except in philosophical treatises - to divorce the statement of a moral principle from 
the libido or jouissance attached to its enunciation; it is impossible to divorce a precept taught us by 
our parents (for example, 'Do unto others as you would have others do unto you') from the tone of 
voice in which it was pronounced?6 
That is what I meant by saying that if the real is always in the same place it can also be 
found at the university. Hence my question about the real in the subject's relation to 
knowledge, or, in relation to the demand for knowledge. 
But in saying that such a relation exists do I not already (pre )suppose knowledge? 
Do I not, in bringing the problem of the subject, identity, origin, death into question 
assume even the vaguest familiarity with how these problems make themselves evident in 
the subject's relation with the inconsistent Other? By what criteria and means does a 
writer, an inquirer gauge these relations and assume that reading of text renders them 
known, let alone knowable, in short, that I know?27 To address these questions in relation 
to writing (philosophy, literature) is, we may suppose, to want to reply to the letter already 
received. To know, in saying that which is being said, is to reply to the letter. But to reply 
to a letter is bound to involve the imaginary elements, fantasy, supposed knowledge, or 
fiction in a more general sense, which is an integral part of the formation of the subject's 
discourse. As Lacan formulated it in his early teaching: 
It is in the relation between the subject's me [moi] and the I [je] of his discourse that you must 
understand the meaning of the discourse if you are to achieve the dealianation of the subject. But you 
C~U1l10t possibly achicv~ this if you cling to the idea that the me [moi] of the subject is identical \\ ith 
I · k' 28 th(' presence t 1at IS spca "mg to you. 
Who, then, or what, is speaking, and to whom? If it comes from the letter, as Lacan 
shows, where does it go? For one thing it indicates that the epistemological discourse can 
no longer be conceived of as coming from the masterly moi of Descartes. Lacan will push 
the analysis of the ego to the extreme calling it "frustration in its essence". Not so with the 
I of the symbolic order which, as we recall, emerges when the me of imaginary 
identification is dissolved or surpassed. In a more general sense, for philosophy to reply to 
a question is to respond to the demand for knowledge,29 the demand which comes from 
the Other in so far as the Other has always already left mnemic traces impressed, as Freud 
in his paper on the Ego and the Id showed, on the moi. 
Lacan will confirm this by exerting a further split between being and thought, 
knowledge and object, in a reformulation of the Cartesian formula I am merely an object 
of my thought, or, I am not where I am thought. Being an object of thought, which thinks 
me, I cease to be a subject. I think speaks in the place of the subject with the proviso that 
the place of I think has no room for being. And contrariwise "I am where I do not think". 30 
Consequently, I know appears to be an object of thought. It remains to be asked whose 
thought and whose knowledge are at work in this schema? It can also be asked why I am 
is taken to be an incarnation of Being, as Heidegger initially approached it, and not as a 
temporalization that is gradually stripped of its privileges by I was, I have been and I will 
han! heen? 
We can say in view of the above that the demand for knowledge as posed by the 
Other, is posed by an Other that is incomplete and inconsistent. In other words, the 
epistemological demand comes from what Lacan called the barred Other. The subject's 
reply, too, in responding to the "inconsistency of the symbolic field" of the Other, has a 
lack inscribed in it, a real loss that can only be accounted for in the inconsistency of an 
answer. 
I will try to show how this lack, and this "symbolical inconsistency" operates in the 
philosophical text and how it produces a double effect, that of a recourse to narcissism of 
self-reflection, to which a signifier bears witness, and, that of a reply to the Other to whose 
demand I am always bound in my fundamental guilt, or debt of jOllissance. I \vill try to 
show how writing (Nietzsche, Heidegger, Blanchot) runs into the field where it 
undermines not only what philosophers nostalgically cling to, the master signifier that 
speaks in the empty place of the subject, the symptom,31 but also how the "symbolical 
inconsistency" of the Other permeates the discourse of metaphysics, and, with it, as 
Heidegger pointed out, the discourse of science. It will be through Freud, "a symptom of 
Heidegger",32 and Lacan, that we must see how philosophy, due to the intervention of the 
unconscious, turns into the discourse of non-mastery, the sexed and divided subject that 
supposes knowledge but, in fact, is only supposed in the act of signification, supposed to 
k h·" now not mg.·' 
The epistemological problem which agam and agam brings philosophical and 
analytical theorising into proximity (only the unconscious separates them), confirms in our 
problematization the highly questionable link which seems to pervade the discourse of the 
subject, namely the link between I !)peak and I know. Lacan's answer to the problem is that 
whenever the subject assumes knowledge, what Lacan calls sujet suppose savoir, he is, or 
indeed says, nothing more and nothing less than that he is the subject of knowledge in the 
sense of being an effect by which he is both constituted and divided. Lacan bases his 
formulation on analytical evidence saying that in the subject's supposition of knowledge the 
conditions are given for a premise - in a relation which is both most distant and nearest - of 
the Other in response to which the subject has been brought to existence, or made to ex-ist 
sexually, symbolically as the not-one, the one who, if we recall Aristotle's hupokeimenon, 
lies under or stands-under, in short that he knows knowing nothing. 
Let me therefore conclude these preliminary considerations, and the overview of 
my preoccupations here, with a question that, as far as the epistemological problem is 
concerned, opens a moment of beginning. How does the subject respond to the 
"fundamental" guilt perpetually revived in its claims for "potentiality-for-Being-whole"? 
How does the subject refuse castration admitting its debts to the Other? How does the 
subject's desire come to face the "lack-of-being" as marked by the loss of jouissance that 
renders the subject divided or decentered? And finally, is psychoanalysis a lesson in the 
forgetfulness of guilt by giving oneself a desire of the Other that does not exist? 
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PART I 
TOWARDS METASPECULARITY: 
FROM NARCISSUS TO NIETZSCHE 
How to write Narcissus? How to name narcissus en route of gaze and death? But 
above all, in whose name to write him, and in what person, first, second, third? Is it him, or 
is it me? 
He approaches the pond and leans over the silver mirror. Having been captured in 
his own image he falls in love with himself Economically speaking, this is the story of 
Narcissus and of all stories that speak of the image, the eye, identity, reflection and the 
self. The mythographers such as Ovid, Freud, Rank, Lacan, Girard, Blanchot, to mention a 
few, come within the threshold of narcisstic seduction when they construct a critique of 
what is called the myth of Narcissus. Their reading, whether conducted under the name of 
psychoanalysis or philosophical inquiry or poetic meditation, has as an aim to elucidate the 
intricacies of the relation with the self. Thus the narcisstic tradition is maintained within a 
certain economy of the subject, an ideal economy, in so far as it is concerned with the self-
relation of the subject. In a certain sense, this economy, as Freud showed, could also be 
called the economy of the same; considerations given to analysis of the relation with the 
self capture the reader, and therefore the writer, in their attempt to demonstrate the 
aesthetics of futility of such a relation and such an economy. 
One of the questions that occupies the critic committed to understanding the work 
of the narcisstic relation is this: how to depart from the illusory realm, where every relation 
is both a relation with the self and a preservation of a certain tradition, strategy, economy 
and temporality that is challenged and put into a test in the first place? How to invent a 
difference, or a di-gression, that would point to and perform a transcending passage 
beyond the homogeneous reservoir of narcisstic relations? Having raised the question of 
the possible limit and border another question poses itself: will this awareness of 
transcending, crossing, passing through, or simply, the proposed knowledge of the rites of 
passage, be amenable to our task of reading narcissism if from the start, that is on the basis 
of the premise above, it is destined to failure? Must there not be a grand scheme operating 
for the narcisstic dialectic to be able to maintain itself within itself and to come back to 
itself following the guidance of self-reflection and self-love? How to transcend the 
homosexual boundaries within which the critic of narcissism is bound to return to the same 
dialectic, or the dialectic of the same, namely, to the imaginary construction as generated 
by the reversal of the relation between the subject and the Other into the relation between 
27 
the ego and the specular other? If the image of my body is necessary for concocting an 
identity of my self, as Freud seems to suggest, if I see the specular image as the other of 
me, the other with which I wish to be one, as Lacan will add, what is this relation between 
me and the image of me, or, better still, the assumed relation between the eye and its 
luminous reflection, if not a particular kind of reversal of time, history, libidinal heritage, in 
short, a relation in which the ego has always been an object for the Other, perceived and 
therefore assumed in my existence by the Other? 
But to look closely at this reversal, and examine it under the terms which are here 
In question, is already insufficient to effect a breach in the structure within which it 
operates. Something else is needed, that is to say another kind of insufficiency is in 
operation here. Freud called it the unconscious, the temporal difference that radically 
separates the signifying subject from the Other. Before we get there to put into question 
the temporal simultaneity as an underlying condition on which both relations rest, let's turn 
our attention to the psychoanalytic tradition where narcissism holds a particularly 
pronounced place and where it has even become, at least in the Freudian theory, a 
philogenetic paradigm in the development of the psyche. 
The history of narcissism is a history of repeated attempts to appropriate an 
alterity, that has always come back, or re-turned, to the same. 1 But just as the legend of 
Narcissus has a moment of death inscribed within its itinerary, so narcissism, considered as 
a .\'1asis in the dynamic of the psyche, appears, given Ovid's account,2 as a passing moment 
of identification-formation. Conceived in this way, narcissism serves as a strategy, and an 
ontology, which opens and closes, the pathemes of identity, mimesis, temporality. In each 
case we are dealing with the double, or doubling, of the theme, that has its alleged origin in 
the perspective of the self Thus, the writing of narcissism repeats a series of gestures that 
are said to underlie the structure of the myth of Narcissus as such. What are these 
gestures? 
'-
The term dOlfble immediately assumes here a particular importance, as it highlights 
both the imaginary-projectional relation of the self and the representational framework of 
critical currents in which the former surfaces. In his understanding of narcissism, Rank 
adopts the term double to characterise the root of narcissism as a form of "ambivalence" in 
the relation to the self-' Rank gives examples of the double in literature and anthropology 
to lay the main focus on the psychoanalytic theory. On the one hand, the ambivalence 
includes resistance to "exclusive self-love", "the fear and renllsion before one's own 
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image" and the fear of "the loss of the shadow-image or mirror-image". -l Both love and 
hatred for the self have a share in the anguish that grips Narcissus in anticipation of the 
lack of a fixed and consistent subject. 
On the other hand, there is another aspect of ambivalence which permeates the 
narcisstic discourse of the self It concerns the function and meaning of the self in an 
infinite series of relations starting with self-love, self-destruction, self-affirmation, self-
esteem, self-consciousness, to give a few examples that belong, even found, the corpus of 
narcisstic being. Is the self an object of these relations or is it that these relations happen by 
themselves, the Hegelian way, as if coming from themselves and turning round upon 
themselves? 
The narcisstic subject stays afloat due to, as Freud put it, "the sexual overrating" of 
himself, whilst the self-love is constantly interfered with by the fear of loss of the loved 
image and by the anguish of death, which Rank calls thanatophobia. The self as double is 
an ambivalent object, on the one hand of love, esteem, care and preservation, and, on the 
other, of hatred, fear, contempt and disdain. The narcisstic double is caught up in adoring 
what he at the same time despises, and Rank cites ample passages from Wilde's Dorian 
Grey to demonstrate the character's ambiguous attitude towards his self Here, as in the 
case of classical mythography according to which Narcissus would rather welcome death 
than live in the face of the image's ephemerality, the fear of death has to do with growing 
old, with the coming of death, or dying. The narcisstic persona suffers from the 
persecutory rage against the coming of the future which he identifies with the end and 
termination, his double, thus inflicting upon himself, as Dorian does, the obsessional terror 
of the present: will I live or die? 
The vacillation of polarities at work, however, the love of the beautiful image and 
the anguish in the face of finitude, does not lead to some form of neutralisation of the 
opposing attitudes, on the contrary, the persecutory ambivalence strengthens the position 
of the centre on which they focus and "shows exceedingly strong interest in one's own 
self" .:; Likewise, thanatophobia is paralleled by the strong drive of self-preservation. Rank 
even goes on to say that the anguish of death "has its main root in the self-preservation 
drive, the greatest threat to which is death". 6 Even if this, as Rank admits, does not suffice 
in accounting for the "pathological thanatophobia" caused by that portion of the repressed 
libido which gives rise to Ichtribe, there is nevertheless nothing else within the narcisstic 
passivity that could provide us with the means of crossing its position. The rationality of 
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the narcisstic dialectic of love and hate, self-attachment and the dread over the loss of the 
beloved form, is too remote from the desired transcending moment that can only be found 
in the encounter with the real, the point of departure from the traumatic tum that left 
narcisstic moment revolving around itself in the same time, the present that is silent. 
Rank, whose work on the double and narcissism spans over eleven years from 
1914, the time when Freud published his paper on narcissism, to 1925, the time of 
publication of The l)ouble, seems to borrow a number of terms from Freud not only in 
order to confirm the inherent tendencies of the narcisstic self, notably "the narcisstic 
disposition towards paranoia", "the homosexual aetiology of paranoia", "the persecution 
complex", megalomaniac and projectional tendencies, and "the recurrence of what is 
repressed in that which represses". 7 But, as we will soon see, Rank also discloses those 
workings of the narcisstic position over which Freud remains silent. What are they'? 
CHAPTER 1 
FREUD'S NARCISSUS 
Freud opens his paper8 with the definition of narcissism as a sexual perversion. 9 In 
making this description Freud uses the term already current in the psychological circles of 
his time. 10 But he also refers to the mythical story of a beautiful youth who, having failed 
to speak the difference to another, remains in the custody of an untransformed innocence _ 
untransformed, that is to say, unreflected, but in a different sense than in the case of self-
retlection which, whether speaking or hearing, he is. 11 Perversion being on the one side, on 
the other, as Freud seems to agree with Rank, narcissism occupies a legitimate "place in 
the regular course of human sexual development" .12 Everything that concerns this "regular 
course" with regard to narcissism will revolve around the investment, or misinvestment, of 
the libido. 
It is interesting that in the opening pages of his study Freud unfolds, alongside the 
preliminary remarks about the economy of narcissism, the scene of contention, where he 
plays his views against those of Jung. 13 The kernel of the contlict, which eventually led 
Freud to relinquish his hope for Jung to become his spiritual successor, and to the break 
between two men, rests with the understanding of the libido theory. I will outline it brietly. 
Jung's main objection concerns the "withdrawal of libido", which he calls "introversion", 
from the external world and replacing real objects with imaginary ones. This for Freud is a 
condition for the constrained relation with the world, subsequently leading to narcisstic 
disorders. It also makes impossible for distinguishing psychosis and neurosis in which one 
is only partly withdrawn from reality. Jung identifies libido as a force in itself, or a 
"psychical interest in general", not only defending but also affirming his libidinal elan \ 'i tal 
as that which for Freud constitutes a narcisstic illusion. Without any doubt, and this is also 
one of the cornerstones of psychoanalysis, libido's birth is already its cathexis, \\hich 
summons the Other as a mark of sexuality. There are two kinds of libidinal investment for 
a child "himself and the woman who nurses him".l-t Whether the libidinal attitude is 
narcisstic or fol1o\\s the object choice, human sexuality is from birth, if not earlier, formed 
~ I 
in the relation to the Other, the mother being the primal Other, or, what defines the 
narcisstic bond, to the imaginary other, namely the self. It is only on the basis of exclusion 
of heterogeneity that Jung can by contrast afford to speak of the non-sexual libido. And 
since his theory does not incorporate the object-libido which for Freud constitutes the 
actual dimension of the subject's formation, one could easily say that for Jung there is no 
concept of the Other. 
Having broken off the relations with Jung in 1913, and having been attacked the 
same year by him in his paper Theory of Psychoanalysis, in which the object-libido has no 
legitimate place,15 Freud gathers his theoretical assets to formulate in 1914 his libidinal 
credo. In doing so he distances himself from the notion of the psychical force as such and 
from its espouser who will no doubt come to incarnate the narcisstic spirit of self-
generated and self-sufficient libido whose only "object" can be that of the self. This mirage, 
or as Lacan will call it in Ethics of Psychoanalysis "the ideal of independence", sustains the 
homosexual illusion of a masturbatory generation of the same, throwing Freud in the other 
direction, or in the direction of the Other, which for him is marked as the question of 
transcendence. To accomplish that, or at least to have such accomplishment as a goal, is 
for Freud to move into the inquiry proper of that libidinal territory where the subjects, 
"perverts and homosexuals" enter on the path of "seeking themselves [sich selbst] as a 
love-object exhibiting a type of object-choice [Objectwahl] which must be termed 
. ." 16 narclsstlc . 
Although Freud's clear objective is to move from the I-libido to the object-libido, 
he is far from labelling the former pathological. It is rather that I-libido arises as a 
secondary investment, a displacement (Freud does not use the term) effected by the 
"'damming up' of the libido [libidostauung] " .17 Such libidinal withdrawal to the "subject's 
own self', narcisstic by definition and nature, is also a condition favourable to the 
development of hypochondria, anxiety neurosis, indulgence in sleep and "egoism of 
dreams". Freud bases its appearance on a commonly recognised fact: 
It is uni\ ersally knm\ll. and \\'c take it as a matter of course [selbstverst=ndlich], that a person who is 
tonnentcd by ~rganic pain and discomfort gives up his interest in the things of the c\:tcmal ,.,orld. in 
so tar as they do not concern his suffering. Closer observation teaches us that he also \\ lthdraws 
Illm/inal int:rcst from his love-objects: so long as he suffers, he ceases to lovc. The commonplace 
naturc of this fact is no reason \\}1\ \\C should be deterred from translating it into terms of the libido 
thcor\. \V c should then say: the si~k man "ithdraws his libidinal cathexes back upon his 0\\ n 1. and 
. .. 18 
s~.'nds thcm out agam \\'hcn he rccmcrs 
-'2 
The hypochondriac is not the only one who after experiencing displeasure in the face of an 
object, or anguish in the face of its lack, directs his libidinal resources inwards, a process 
similar, but not identical, to what Nietzsche already called inpsychafio11. The 
hypochondriac has a particular kind of attachment to his body that is left to him as a shelter 
from the outside perils. In particular, in his care of the self there is an organ whose erotic 
significance replaces the real object. This organ is an ambivalent source of suffering as it 
seems to be blocking the outward way of the libido and, on the other hand, accumulates a 
high amount of excitations rendering them pleasurable. The organ in question is what 
Freud calls "the genital organ in its states of excitation", 19 and it is susceptible to a whole 
range of sensations. The genital organ is in fact any organ in so far as it constitutes the 
locus of the stimuli and represents the erotogenic place, heavily charged with the libido, 
which the hypochondriac makes into his narcisstic sanctuary. 
It is the basis of erotogenicity of a bodily part as invested with and objectified by 
the libidinal force, given that these parts are displacements of the genital organ, the 
primary source of pleasurable sensations, that allows Freud to make an inference with 
regard to the I. Just as it is an erotogenic organ belonging to my body that, due to the 
ambivalent jouissance of which it never wearies, attracts me whilst distracting me from 
other bodies, so it is also, as Freud seems to be suggesting, the ego that offers an abode on 
the exiled existence from others. In this respect, hypochondria appears as a relative of 
anxiety neurosis, the distinction being the lack of the object in the case of the latter. In so 
far as the genital organ of the hypochondriac only becomes an object through the 
vvithdrawal of the libido from the external world, it never remains one in the sense of an 
outer object, that which would undermine the narcisstic bond between the libido as force 
and the place of its investment which becomes a seat of excitations. 
This brings us back to the question of the origin of Ii bidostauung. How and why 
does the libido become deflected to stalk the object-libido? The question concerns the 
origin of libidinal attachment which Freud already located in the I. For the libidinal energy 
to be released towards an object, it must in the first place be accumulated in the I. Thus 
Freud seems to have an answer ready at hand. Firstly, the I-libido is a necessary condition 
for further libidinal development. Secondly, the object investment will facilitate 
renunciation of primary narcissism if there is an I effected by it. As yet another circle. 
Now, the "necessity for transcending narcissism" comes from the overflowing of libido in 
the domain of the I which is structurally limited. At the moment when the I becomes 
brimful of libido, its surplus leads on to the development of a certain egoism that serves, in 
particular in the case of the hypochondriac, as "a protection against falling ill". Such an 
erotic shield assumes a narcisstic power to "protect" us from both desiring and loving the 
Other, falling in love and falling, ill being uttered here in one breath: "in the last resort we 
must begin to love in order not to fall ill, and we are bound to fall ill if, in consequence of 
frustration, we are unable to love". 20 But is love understood here as love of the Other. or 
does Freud speak about love of the self thus equating it with illness? Or is every kind of 
love a form of hypnotic malady, as Freud will comment elsewhere? 
Love, called transference in psychoanalysis, carries me over to not myself but to 
another, an object outside myself. And yet without the I-libido such an investment is 
destined to failure from the start; that which loves is also loved (like in the Hegelian 
example above), closing the circle of narcissism and bringing out the illness as a result of 
my inability not to love but to assimilate or appropriate the object within the subject. It is 
only this strange surplus of the I-libido that, while facilitating an object-libido, prevents me 
from giving the whole of the sexual reserve out towards the Other. "I can only love the 
Other if I can no longer love myself", seems to be the only way in which the desirous 
excess can wedge a split between the I as a privileged object of narcissism, that which 
loves itself, and the Other whose love will emerge outside the egotic economy of 
narCISSIsm. 
The patheme of love makes Freud break his investigation. Where does it go this 
surplus which prevents us, indeed saves us, from the extremities of homeostasis, self-
absorption and disappearance? Love, like the drive, is always a partial and fragmentary 
love for there are at play both real and imaginary objects. The object-libido paves the way 
for overcoming narcissism but the fantasmatic object is still there in the background to 
strengthen Ii bidostallung. 
The difference between objects is crucial for understanding the damming-up of the 
libido, but it does not determine the status of the I. The blocking of the desire of the 
object, or an attachment of the libido to the imaginary object, leads to intrO\'erSIOII, a term 
already introduced by lung, but very useful in Freud's narcisstic project ne\·ertheless. 
However, the introversion-based withdrawal of the libido into an imaginary object is not a 
synchronic concurrence to the libido's attachment [An/eh11lIllg] to the I. Introversion does 
not involve the I. Freud presents these two kinds of investment as alternatives, 
distinguishing at the same time his vIews from Jung's in that the latter does not 
acknowledge the second kind of investment. It seems that Freud is extremely careful in 
separating out what he will later call "the narcissistic type" [narziG/tischen ~"PllS]. To the 
extent that it is detectable in hypochondria, which has an erotogenic organ as its object, the 
second variation of the narcisstic attitude falls under the name of megalomania. The term 
designates temporary mastery of the I-libido serving as the "counterpart of the introversion 
on to fantasies that is found in transference neuroses,,?l Thus the libido becomes 
unblocked as soon as the passage has been secured from the imaginary object to the real 
object, e.g. a body of the Other. It will be up to Lacan to demonstrate that Freud's 
epistemological conclusion drawn "from our observations and views on the mental life of 
children and primitive people" offers a slim choice, as the I becomes included into the 
category of the imaginary constructs, whereas the so called real object appears in Lacan's 
theory as a part of the body fallen from it. I will come back to it later in this chapter. 
Megalomania is for Freud a turning point in breaking away from introversion, and 
from lung, and leads on to the formulation of the I-drive [Ichtrieb]. The distinction 
between imaginary and real objects is dropped, whereas the difference between the object-
libido and I-libido no longer holds, as Freud goes on to say that the former is a form of 
concealment of the latter. The problem of narcissism now receives another dimension, that 
of the subject's "experiences of satisfaction". It is also at this juncture where the self-
preservational drives are brought into the scene and, with them, the I -drives, the early 
incarnation of the sexual drives. An encounter with an object, its availability/nonavailability 
is, after all, measurable in degrees of satisfaction which, in the first place, have the I-drives 
as a subject of satisfaction. It has now become clear that the "necessity to transcend" 
narcissism is not so much dependent on the separation of the I-drives from sexual drives, 
\vhich is never achieved completely, but on that on which the drives lean. Now, since 
Freud distinguishes two types of attachment [Anlehnung] of the drives, there must be, 
accordingly, two types of objects for the drives. What are they? In the first 
A II If! hill II1gStyPllS, the drive props itself up on the mother and her substitutes, thus 
appropriating "the persons who are concerned with child's feeding, care, and protection,,22 
into a love object. Thus the I-drive, following Strachey's rendering of the Freudian term, 
leans on, is appended, or even supplemented, to the object al1aclitica/~\'. 2, The 
supplementarity of the drive is a further confirmation of the inseparability of the I and 
sl',ual drives in so far as one is propped on the other, namely the I-drive on the sexual 
drive, Likewise, the love object is in a supplementary relation to the varying degrees of 
satisfaction of the drive. 24 
The second type of love bond is designated by Freud as narcisstic. In this model, 
the I -drive seeks both attachment and satisfaction in the relation to what is not the mother 
but his own self [selbst]. What is this self, given that it is from the start distinct from the 
lchtrieh, the I-libido being directed outward and falling, or attaching itself, just as the 
sexual drive does, onto an object which is obviously not identical with the source of the 
libido? It is not the first time that Freud's structuring of narcissism touches upon the 
structure of the drive in which four components are singled out, two of which are the 
source and the object. Without going into the details of this model, it suffices to say that 
the drive's structure is an accurate representation of what Freud aims to transcend, namely, 
the narcissistic circularity of the libido from its source to the object which in the case of the 
I-drive can only be one, the ego itself. If for the narcisstic lchtrieb the I is the only object 
on the dynamic horizon, what is the object of the sexual drive that could be distinguished 
from the I -drive and its sources? Let's reverse the question before looking into how Lacan 
will attempt to maintain the Freudian structure of the drive whilst situating its object, in 
this instance the I, in the register of the imaginary. 
In Freud's two types of love-relations one rests on the object-choice of the mother, 
the other, on the attachment to the self. These are the two kinds of objects Freud mentions 
each of them resonating with echoes of history of the philosophical object of perception, 
each being summoned by the perceptual, or imaginary, apparatus that renders object 
present, in the sense of perceived reality, even ideally present as its presence presents it to 
the subject, the I - or is it the eye? - which is at the same time, in Freud's model of 
narcissism, the object. I am anticipating here the fate of what will eventually be labelled as 
the object, not that of the mother, as her presence is merely a form of concealment of her 
desire, but that of the I. Also, we must be more alert to the distinction between the self and 
the 1, .\'ich selbst and das lch, the latter taking on a form of the first person pronoun and 
the former designating the auto-reflective function of the ego's relation to "its" image; it is 
this its that for Lacan renders every object imaginary, the object of the subject, the object 
pelil a, 
Given then that the love attachment follows two directions, one moving towards 
the primal Other, Freudian maternal object, the other seeking the self as the object, the 
narcisstic object par excellence, the question is this: are they still ob-jects in the sense of 
36 
extraneous presences, fixed and permanent, and how do they differ, the external from the 
internal, the object-love which women can give to a child, from the one that he creates for 
himself as if out of the lack of such presence, or, already, out of the libidinal remainder that 
goes in neither direction, neither inward nor outward? What Freud calls an object appears 
as a libidinized alterity of the subject, a small and objectified alterity, or better still, an 
infinite and undefinable "otherness" framed, as it were, in an imaginary moment that 
represents a collapse of the narcisstic totality in the process of what Lacan calls 
"differentiation from the external world - what is included inside is differentiated from 
what is rejected by the processes of exclusion, Aufstossung, and of projection". 2S But this 
process could only account for the formation of the imaginary self, heralded by Freud as 
narcisstic to the extent that it does not attach itself to the desire of the Other but stops at 
the object of the drive and jouissance. Thus the choice of the direction of the drive will 
depend not solely on the structural resources of the sexual drives of the subject, which, we 
recall, has both the source and the object inscribed within the same economy, nor on desire 
which is oriented by the lack of an object, but on satisfaction which has Lacanian object a 
on the horizon of the drive. 26 
Freud's inquiry into the typology of love has a number of classifications, the 
narcisstic one being at the forefront of interhuman relations. 27 In his study of narcissism the 
initially defined two types of love bond are characterised further. There are four kinds of 
what can be called imaginary presence towards which the narcisstic ego projects itself in 
love: 
1. the self he is (himself), 
2. the self he was, 
3. the self he desires to be, 
4. that which in the past was a part of himself 
All are imaginary to the extent that the desire to be this or that is not without a relation to 
the mediating image. For the first time narcissism receives a temporal dimension, a kind of 
temporal chart or calendar, which allows Freud to take as yet another step towards "a 
necessity to transcend" the narcisstic "desire". The passage of transcendence is no longer 
represented in solely spatial terms of topography. It will rather be regarded as a crossing of 
time, a temporal difference that separates the drive from the object in its temporal itinerary. 
Accordingly, we have four directions which the drive takes to develop temporal relations: 
the present, the past, the futural-projectional time, and the metonymical time. There is no 
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one time for the narcissist, or narcissism, in which to orient itself and to remain at home. 
There is no one time because the future towards which they are oriented in their narcisstic 
disorientation belongs to no one. And when the promise of homecoming cannot be kept 
there is only an exile and alienation, not only a displacement of uncertain destination but 
also, perhaps, of time itself 
In the present hides the danger of losing that which the narcisstic ego thinks it is, 
or that which one identifies as his, the body with its erotogenic parts, the penis, the clitoris, 
the self which these embody. We should not forget here that for Freud the ego is above all 
the bodily ego. The castration complex, which Freud introduces in the third part of his 
paper, poses the danger of loss of auto-erotic pleasure on the one hand, and, of the image 
of the body identified as mine, on the other. We could say that here the castration revolves 
around the imaginary phallus, the image of a part of the body excessively charged with 
libido. The difference between me and others is at stake, while the threat of loss is 
identified as the lack of self-sufficiency and self-identity, i.e. of being-one-with-self, that 
constantly undermines the ideal economy of narcisstic presence. 
What is lacking is repressed in the present - but not as the present - in what Freud 
calls "self-respect [SelbstgefuhfJ of the I", the sense-of-self In so far as the narcisstic 
subject accepts, incorporates and appropriates the given time in its epistemological and 
cultural dimension, thus submitting to the norms of his Oberlch, he represses other 
"impressions, experiences, impulses and desires" projecting "an ideal in himself by which 
he measures his actual I [actuelles Ich],,?8 It is this ideal, but above all, an identification of 
the ideal as constituting his ego or as arising from his narcisstic self and confirming the 
self-satisfying interest in it, that is to a large extent responsible for repression. Idealisation 
is here to be distinguished from sublimation. The former is one of the concomitants of 
narcissism in that it involves an immobilisation and perpetuation of an object, again, an 
objectification of what can only be the self that one was. The "ideal I [Idealich] is now the 
target of the self-love [Selbstliebe] which was enjoyed in childhood by the actual I" (ibid.). 
In the present, the time in which the self has promoted to that of an ideal, the fonner self, 
indeed, the I was, is reincarnated. The Idealich recovers not only the rudiments of the 
infantile self, but also the lost narcissism thus displacing the primary one into the ideal I. 
Idealisation is a temporal process which brings the actual I face to face with the past. 
Sublimation by contrast directs the libido towards "an aim other than, and remote from, 
that of sexual satisfaction~ in this process the accent falls upon deflection from sexuality" 
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(ibid.). Secondly, sublimation does not involve repression. It is perhaps not possible to 
speak of sublimation in the dimension of love between humans as it excludes not only the 
narcisstic type of attachment, but also the anaclitic one. 29 
The object on whose presence Freud insists in the process of idealisation is what 
we could call a prototype of the Lacanian objet a. It is no ordinary object of perception of 
traditional empirical philosophy nor is it a mental object of psychology. The object veils 
the Other. In one of his lectures, Heidegger captured this moment in the following way: 
"And when man no longer sees the one side as one side, he has lost sight of the other side 
as well. What sets the two sides apart, what lies between them, is covered up .. ,,30 The 
object covers what is absent in them, or behind them, thus taking on a form of a one-sided 
veil that, so to speak, brings us to our senses; one-sidedness becomes totalized into all-
sidedness where the perceptive-imaginary sets the rules. The narcisstic space has become 
one-dimensional but in such a way that it is not evident to the eye. It is only when the 
structure of the eye j s unfolded as an awareness of the body of which the eye is an integral 
part, that the optical illusion of clustering into an undifferentiated totality of that which 
sees and that which is seen can be dispelled. 
The narcisstic object of identification covers that of which it is a mimetic creation, 
namely, the relation between the I and the self. That is why for Freud the object redirects 
the drive back not to its source, which would lead to homeostasis, but to the materiality of 
the o~jet a which veils the Other, this transparent screen being, or rather functioning as 
both the image and the damming up of libido. The image of the self generated in the work 
of mimesis demonstrates how the libido of the drive is blocked and, as it were, returned to 
the space in which time is petrified in the gaze. Narcissus looks, and his look speculates on 
the imaginary boundaries of the self-object with which he both identifies as his and which 
he idealises in the projectional tendency (Rank) to recover the originary past, the I was, or 
should we say, following Heidegger, the has-been. How otherwise could there arise a 
trace of the former or originary self that is loved were it not for the image - for Lacan the 
visual one being the primary one - as the medium in which a reflective spectre assumes 
another, imaginary life imposed upon and alienated from the symbolic order of which the 
image is but a mere shadow? 
And yet Freud does not say, only Lacan after him does, what the object is except 
calling it that which exists "without any alteration in its nature, is aggrandised and exalted 
in the subject's mind".31 He does not say whether the object is imaginary or symbolic, and 
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whether, at the time of libidostauung, it is a fantasmatic construct of traumdeutung or an 
already formed subject of language who, just as Narcissus had done before he was seen, 
speaks to himself. If Freud's investigation leads us to say that the self is imaginary it is only 
in the sense of it being rendered immobile, changeless, and opaque. Not only does it seem 
not to strip the Freudian object of its "otherness", of being other than me, other than the I 
speaking and addressing itself beyond the reflective feed-back, but it affirms it as 
"essentially" other than me. It is just that the little other has to do with the body-image 
which always seems to come back to that of which it is an image, the ego. What comes to 
the fore in both instances is that the other self, the love object of narcisstic desire, exists in 
another time, for example, as Freud already indicated, in the past, which is why the 
libidinal investment in it is also anxiety-ridden. The fact that the "past" is imaginary does 
not mean that its actual translations are "pure" symbolisations. Such adequation is as 
remote from harmonious reconciliation as its constitutive elements are remote from each 
other. In narcissism, however, there will always be an attempt to stabilise this relation, to 
immobilise it, to appropriate its objects, to render it nonrelational and thus to summon the 
thanatos which, like in Ovid's story, emerges as its irremediable destination. Let's attempt 
now to relate Freud's findings and constructions about the narcisstic futility of self-
investment to what appears as a root of speculative philosophy. 
The !chideal is the replacement for the primary narcissism. (In this sense 
idealisation is also a failure of sublimation). The value of the ideal is measured, in relation 
to the "actual I", by the agency on which Freud will elaborate a few years later, the 
Oherich. It is the strangely seductive power of this agent that creates persecutory 
delusions of "being watched'. The agent of Uberich is not without some participation in 
supporting the ideal but, as Freud points out, this support, although it sustains the 
imaginary being as a specular watchman, comes from the presence of the Voice: 
Delusions of being watched present this power in a regressive fonn, thus revealing its genesis and the 
rcason why the patient is in revolt against it. For what prompted the subject to fonn an Jchideal, on 
whose behalf his conscience acts as watchman, arose from the critical influence of his parents 
(col1\cycd to him by the medium of the voice) .. [my ita1.]~2 
There is more to the imaginary presence of the narcisstic object than the specular 
reflection. The vocal image seems to have the same junction in the formation of the ideal, 
even if the Oher!ch comes into existence much later than the relation with the mirror. The 
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emergence of the vigil supported by the specular, and vocal, images puts a clamp on the 
temporal economy of desire enclosing it within a space represented by a set of imaginary-
mimetic relations. How is this structure to be described, given this description is already a 
temporalizing representation? 
The I-ideal is not only an imaginary reincarnation of the former self but also a 
slavish response to the Other, to the Law. Its revolt against the Other, so reminiscent of 
the master/slave dialectic that in Lacan will find a new meaning, signifies the paranoiac 
moment of an attempt to liberate the overburdened libido. The emancipated libido is thus, 
if I can put it this way, homosexualized generating a hostile and aggressive attitude to the 
hetera ... ;. As S. Leclaire commented, the Ichideal is imposed from without "as a 
displacement of libido on to an I-ideal" which satisfies the narcisstic idea1. 33 Satisfies, that 
is to say, retains the self-critical function in the place of the libido, drawing from it the 
ambiguous pleasure of vigilance. But Freud goes further than to describe some infantile 
mechanism that is to be dismantled in adulthood as if these were successive phases.34 The 
agency of conscience in which resounds the call of the imaginary other takes on a form of 
"philosophic introspection" which spreads the wings of critical judgement over the libido 
folding it into an observation of the object that is called narcisstic, what we can refer to as 
the me. For Freud, the narcisstic libido, represented by Selbstgefiihl, which has the me as 
its object, functions as the libido of the same, the homosexual economy of desire, although 
"passion" would be more suitable a term. Homosexuality sustains itself in this ideal form, 
yet charged with aggressive tendencies, because it at the same time wards itself off against 
dangers of loss of jouissance generated in the process of imaginary identifications spawned 
in the speculum of speculation. It is therefore between the little other of homosexuality and 
the Other of heterosexuality, where we must seek the fundamental difference that points to 
the conditions for "transcending" narcissism. 
Philosophical reflection scans what lies at the root of the agency that approaches 
and reproaches the activity of desire, primarily in dreams where it takes on a form of a 
"dream censor", but also in waking states. Leaning on Silberer's observation of the 
"functional phenomenon", "one of the few indisputably valuable additions to the theory of 
dreams", Freud writes how 
\\( can directly observe the translation of thoughts into visual images, but that in these circumstances 
\\( fn .. ~qucntly have a representation, not of a thought-content. but of the actual state (willingness, 
fatigue). 1 .. 1 Similarly, he has Sho\\l1 that the conclusions of some dreams or some divisions in their 
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content merely signify the dreamer's own perception of his sleeping and waking. Silberer has thus 
demonstrated the part played by obselVation - in the sense of the paranoiac's delusions of being 
watched - in the formation of dreams. This part is not a constant one. Probably the reason wh\' I 
overlooked it is because it does not play any great part in my own dreams; [~y ital.l in pers~ns 
\\ ho are gifted philosophically and accustomed to introspection it mav become very evident: 
- . 
There is a state in which representations signifY the actual perception of the subject. The 
philosophical insight, provided it is distinct from the scientific evidence of psychoanalysis, 
and, provided it is subject to the critical agency of the Uberlch which facilitates the 
delusions of vigilance, works as a kind of narcisstic gaze into the work of the I-libido and 
the extent to which a particular perceptibility takes part in the formation of the subject. 
The object of this observation not only structurally belongs to the space of the self but, 
indeed, is the very self in its idealised, i.e. self-investing, self-loving, self-aggrandised, in 
short auto-erotic form. Thus the mode of observation vacillates between the sense-of-self 
[Selbstgefi'ihfJ and self-criticism. The philosopher is the one who, feeling he is watched, 
watches himself The philosopher, or rather, philosophical observation, produces the 
effects of self-observation and self-analysis, given that this "self' is a homosexualized - or 
self-libidinized - Liebeobject which regulates the libidinal balance between the libido of the 
gaze, I watching, and the libido of the imaginary object, the me, the self, the ego being 
watched. I-watching-myself-being-watched is constitutive of an equally ideal and 
paranoiac circuit which is "frequently" accountable for what happens in observation and 
. . ~6 IntrospectIOn. -
The speculative observation is a good example of the primitive temporality which 
relies on its mnemic resources and on the mediatization of its effects. What is missing in 
every narcisstico-speculative elaboration is love for the Other, namely, transference, that 
necessarily relies on linguistic constructions to the extent that its demands can only be 
articulated. Thus narcissism appears as a mute love (infins) , an absence that gives rise to 
self-observation as an attempt to retain the given time and to exhaust its possibilities 
among which the time for love has no place or no time to love. But it will never suffice to 
invite Eros into this path for love to happen. Something else will follow alongside the path 
of Narcissus to facilitate the relation between the sexual drive and the I-drive, and the 
subsequent sublimatory and ideational formations, the two terms whose confusion gives 
rise to the imagil1my o~ject. This something else is what Freud does not mention in his 
"II/'( )dllc/ion 
F or it is only in so far as the subject - being framed in the narcisstico-critical 
observation of relations with what concerns us here, what directs blindly our "passion for 
origin" and the desire for difference - signifies "the desire of the Other", that the movement 
towards realising the truth outside the narcisstic dialectic of the other takes shape in the 
alterity of what is realised. The narcisstic otherness is a kind of desire that is insufficient to 
transfer the libido onto another. If, according with the project of the "necessity to 
transcend narcissism", the imaginary other is to be "degraded" in the libidinal investment 
because of the danger of the illusion of being caught up in the act of the perpetuation of 
the self, or self-perpetuation, how is the Other of love to be addressed and understood? 
Let's rewrite the Freudian narcisstic scene. The formation of the I aims at 
transcending narcissism which is never a pure and simple arrival at a given place. The I 
stumbles on the primary narcissism (the former self, the I was) and the libido is displaced 
on to the I-ideal which is given support by the agency of conscience mediated by a voice 
or, etymologically speaking, vocation. The Ichideal blocks the object-libido from taking, at 
the same time, the place of the "original" object, and idealisation leads to the investment of 
the I-drive into an object within the spatial domain of the 1. However, the love object is not 
a unitary one. It is, as Freud seems to indicate in Narzissmustypus, a multiple object. Its 
presence is fourfold concealing four temporal itineraries: the past, the present, the futural-
projectional and the metonymic object. Likewise, there are four major components of the 
narcisstic space of das Ich, the scene of fusion, and confusion: the I-ideal, the actual I, the 
I-drive, and the temporal image of the I was (visual or vocal) mediated by the critical 
agency of conscience. On the face of it, is not this quadripartite structure a step towards 
Freud's elaboration of the structure of the drive which he will construct a year later? In the 
topography of the drive there are also four elements: the aim, the source, the thrust, and 
the object. To what extent is the hypothesis about a structural resemblance between the 
narcisstic spatiality and the drive's dynamics legitimate, given that it derives from the fact 
that the drive that is present in all other drives is not discussed in Freud's account of 
narcissism? 
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CHAPTER 2 
DEATH IN THE MIRROR 
Not a word of death from Freud concerning narcissism. Neither the anguish of 
death nor any form of deadening threat to the limits of narcisstic postponement is 
mentioned in the Introduction. In fact, in his complex and at times capriciously elliptical 
meditation Freud recognises all facets that are tractable in the mythical story for their 
relevance to the psychic functioning, all but one, the thanatos. One possible reason for 
such omission, such displacement, is that there is no "necessity to transcend" narcissism, 
for it has, as Freud says it anyway, a legitimate place in the course, or rather dis-course, of 
the unconscious formation. There is no transition or passage from the narcisstic to the 
nonnarcisstic, whilst the critical account in the discourse of which the "empirical 
observations" are named, is as much subject to commentary as the experience of the 
narcisstic subject. There is no "necessity" for transcendence, for there appears in the text, 
and I will come back to this, a form of renunciation, even a sacrifice, of narcissism that 
produces nothing but symptoms of abandonment and disillusionment on the side of the one 
who observes them and reflects on them at the same time. Freud or the subject's signifier 
that misses the target? 
That is why the omission of the anguished mortification of the whole narcisstic 
reflection plunged into the moment of death, but, above all, of the thanatophobia that in 
the course of writing presents itself as the power of the death drive already operating in 
the psychographic task as a wasteland, not without therapeutic benefits of course, of 
narcisstic speculation, does not strike us as incidental. That moment of death of the 
presumed imaginary wholeness consummated in the identification with the image, be it 
visual, vocal, or other, is a trembling anticipation of the double, or doubling, that 
reintroduces into theoretical meditation and self-referential signification the symbolical 
insignia of death. Do we not hear in this the echo of Hegel's words that "the word is a 
murder of the thing"? Do we not suspect in Freud's exploration the mark of Lacan's 
"return" to his symbolical father? The Other, that which precedes every imaginary relation 
and construction, is addressed not in the synthesis of narcisstic experience and reflection 
on it, but in a kind of literary or symbolic "experience" which bears the effects of the death 
drive - displacement, effacement, substitution - already inscribed in the signifying act. 
We need not resort to Rank's account which demonstrates the thanatic excesses of 
narcisstic love to notice that the death drive makes its first appearance in narcissism, that is 
to say, in relation to the narcisstic object. It attracts Narcissus to bridge the gap between 
the imaginary and the symbolic, or, as Freud will say in the Beyond the Pleasure Principle 
a few years later, between the inanimate matter and the ecstatic character of human 
sexuality. The ambivalent relation to the image of the I was, to give an example of the 
narcisstic love "object", is resolved in the mythical story as a failure of incorporation 
resulting in the collapse into nonexistence, absence and death. For a human being, as Rank 
shows, there is a form of resistance at work - a resistance that can only manifest itself in 
the symbolisation that erases rather, than re-presents the image. Thus the ambivalence 
reveals a strong self-preservational drive that counterbalances the suicidal tendency of self-
destruction. "To live or to die" is the question that the narcissist fails to answer, not 
because he chooses death, but because he does not choose to listen to the empty echo of 
the question. If he finds himself in a pendular hesitation as to where to go, it is because he 
fails to comprehend the letter addressed to him. 
There are at least two reasons which allow us to reread Freud's letter, and raise 
some ethical questions arising from mythography of narcissism: 
I ) Concealment of the death drive to which there are nevertheless certain indications in the 
Freudian text. These traces derive from various moments of disillusionment that appear 
mostly in the middle of his paper thus wedging a hiatus in its composition - "For it seems 
very evident that another person's narcissism has a great attraction for those who have 
renounced part of their own narcissism and are in search of object-Iove"l - and summoning 
a voice of renunciation that will from now on cry out louder than before. On the one hand, 
Freud will relate the narcisstic object's displacement to the loss of ideal, on the other hand, 
the object of love will be sought outside the dialectic of the ideal. But where is it to be 
found if the sexual beings that are object of psychoanalytical study are narcisstic too?: 
"Women, especially, if they grow up with good looks, develop a certain self-contentment 
which compensates them for the social restrictions that are imposed upon them in their 
choice of object. [ .. ] it is only themselves that such women love with an intensity 
comparable to that of the man's love for them" (ibid.) The abandonment of the narcisstic 
object, in this case that which she is, desire of the m(O)ther, is not replaced with the love-
object which, since it can only love itself, is lacking in reality. Since man's love for a 
woman comes up against her narcisstic inaccessibility, he has to either confront a possible 
renunciation of his vain love for her or contract the narcisstic virus. Finally, there is one 
more sound of disillusionment with regard to children, the moment in which another 
narcisstic object, this time the I was, is called into play. Its presence is its reminiscence: 
"The charm of a child lies to a great extent in his narcissism, his self-contentment and 
inaccessibility, just as the charm of certain animals which seem not to concern themselves 
about us, such as cats and the large beasts of prey" (ibid.). Thus all potential candidates for 
love-objects, namely, women, children, and animals, are disqualified as chief exponents of 
narcissism. Their brimful "self-contentment" and self-sufficiency are effectively a sign of 
our own isolation, perhaps alienation, certainly estrangement from the seductive 
inaccessibility of the object. Growing disappointment, a sense of abandonment and 
desertion by the loved ones, among whom should be included the most promising of 
disciples, and a slim tone of envy of the playful and self-loving ones sets in. Somewhere, a 
dirge of melancholia can be heard. The signs of ageing, and the barrier between himself 
and those around him for whom narcisstic desire provides the source of vitality and 
creativity, grows. 2 And if we add to this Freud's disillusionment with religion, its gradual 
renunciation which lashes him into guilt, and then to obligation to debunk its illusions and 
translate narcisstic sentiments into the truths of psychoanalysis, does it not become 
incumbent on the pursuit of science to sacrifice narcissism? This is no doubt an example of 
the real making itself present, felt, perhaps even becoming Freud's symptom when he 
exposes, with an inseparable honesty, the price and the stake in his encounter with the real. 
And this should include some of Freud's hesitation and indecisiveness about the relation 
between the inside and the outside, the internal and the external "'object". Does such 
renunciation of narcissism become then a renunciation of the thanatos, or is it rather that 
its concealment bestows on the narcisstic moment an uncertain conclusion? For there 
\\Quld be no "necessity to transcend", or duty to sacrifice "a part of our own narcissism", 
\vere it not for the inexplicable presence/absence of: 
2) The object. In relentlessly emphasising the significance of the object, Freud invites a 
paradox. If in his topography the narcisstic subject becomes an object for itself, what is the 
subject, or rather, what comes after its deobjectification? Although narcissism of the 
subject - of the "actual I"? - is defined solely in terms of the bodily object, the latter is 
nonetheless presented as a fragment of the subject who confronts it in place of the absence 
of the Other. Since the Other does not reciprocate the gift of love or answer the demands 
of love, the former.. the subject, becomes the narcisstic object of the Other. It is the 
parents' narcissism that demands of their child to be an object of unceasing delight. The 
subject's imaginary satisfaction consists in fulfilling this demand and being what the Other 
wants him to be. On the second plane then, narcissism raises the question not so much of 
an isolated and mute malady or pathological self-sufficiency fuelled by the moral ought of 
the subject, of which women and children are the most striking examples, but, essentially, 
of the locality and temporality of the object. But if in Freud's account the I addresses the 
self in a loving and sexually satisfying way, it is because in doing so it also addresses all 
other objects, or rather, the other selves, from which it demands love. Now, it is only in 
Lacan's account that the symbolisation of the demand as addressed to the Other stumbles 
upon the lack, the m(O)ther not having it and not satisfying it, that will generate desire 
which ultimately cannot be satisfied. But this already involves the death drive which is not 
mentioned by Freud at this crucial point. It seems that only in addressing the double as the 
other me in so far as this relation is not and can never be transferential, can the Other, what 
Freud designates by the real love-object, be open to desire's address. The me was once the 
addressee of the Other's desire after all. Freudian desire of the mather shows, however, 
not only how the writing of The Introduction wrestles with the relationship that 
throughout his life appeared overshone by the love for his father, but also sets up a new 
route of exploration into the realm of the maternal, taken up, although in different ways, by 
both Rank and Lacan. It can therefore be said that narcissism has to do with the absence of 
the privileged (maternal) object of love,3 that there is no given or ultimately satisfying and 
to be taken for granted object in addressing the demand but an anguishing lack that signals 
arrival of death. Thus, the fundamental ambivalence concerns, on the one hand, the sexual 
drive which allows for the possibility to formulate the demand - Lacanian symbolic - and, 
on the other hand, the death drive that poses a threat to the ego's identification being 
swept into silent chasm beyond signification should the demand fail to become transformed 
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into desire that ex-ists in the face of the lack. Hence the lack of unity with the m(O)thec 
which appears as a failure to incorporate the object, that which she does not have, is also 
what provokes and revokes transference. If the narcisstic object takes precedence over the 
"real" love object, it is because the former forces to implement an impossibility that the 
work of the death drive has already brought to rapturous pinnacle. It is an impossibility to 
transfer libido onto the projected object, and, with it, a disillusionment of the supposing I 
to become the object of transference. Since the object is not really there but is spawned 
into being through the projectional display of the unrepresentable lack, the libido has 
Ilowhere to go. That is to say, it goes to where there is nothing to come back from, 
nothing except for the imaginary resemblance of the flight of love unmatched in a symbolic 
leap, and an autoerotic jouissance that accompanies this no-return. Hence the anguished 
turning away from the unbearable abyss of absence. Hence the relinquishment of what 
seems to offer itself as a projection-based and therefore imaginary identity. Hence the 
withdrawal into sleep, or hypochondriac lament over the punctured body, or into a 
vacuous stare that sees nothing and says nothing. It is therefore not by accident that Freud 
related these despaired moments to the illness of melancholia which I will discuss in detail 
in part II. 
Concealment of the death drive from Freudian writing of Narcissus, and the 
ubiquity of the absent object to which the former nevertheless testifies, open up another 
stratum of phenomena. First of all, the question of the object, the multiple object as it 
appears in Freud's paper, touches upon temporality as temporal presenting that is not 
devoid of a projectional import in so far as this presenting is also marked by and echoes 
the history of discourse in which philosophical inheritance reaches its turning point in the 
psychoanalytic discourse. 4 But before we follow this path to find in the Lacanian 
conception of the mirror-object the "remainder" of philosophical reflection of the past 
ages, a memory of Rank's myth should be evoked again for its particular stress on what 
hides in Freud's exposition, a signifier of death, its looming to be sure. For what seems to 
be covered in Freud's study, bursts out in Rank's into fireworks of the work of death, 
suicide, self-destruction. 
The lack of unity with the mother, the patheme Rank develops in depth, serves to 
underline the ambivalence, the drama of division of life as it is lived, and an extraction of 
death from its history, which has an effect of life turning towards the past, the mother. But 
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it would be a prejudice to assume that for Rank the ambivalent object of fascination is 
nontemporal and empty. (For Freud it is temporal as well as empty). The imaginary self 
begets terror of the end, termination, totality, because the image, the medium in which the 
I is held hostage, holds within its iconomic frame the key to the present, its unrepresented 
anguish. For the subject the projected image is a residence for history, or, to be more 
specific, for the unsymbolized reversal of time. The incomprehensible aspects of this 
history, among which loom unrepresented residues of the archaic unconscious .. e.g. the 
fundamental fantasy of the intrauterine existence, stirs waves of guilt and indebtedness. To 
whom? To that which is imaginary in the sense that it has been given away as jouissance 
and not taken up as representation. The suicidal tendency collides with the anguishing 
emptiness of the unsymbolized, i.e. repressed representative, in a repeated attempt to give 
something back to that which is presumed timeless. In narcissism the suicidal destruction is 
on a par with the projective assumption, for what is to be destroyed is what has been 
projected. And further, what has been projected does not clear the libidinal debt. But is not 
the debt itself, the guilt, a token of the imaginary construction to no less Imagmary 
creditor, where something real is already at work? The suicidee is tormented by 
the conscious idea of [ .. ] eternal inability to return, an idea from which release is only possible in 
death. Thus we have the strange paradox of the suicide who voluntarily seeks death in order to free 
himself of the intolerable thanatophobia: 
Or, indeed, by the image in which lies unrepresented by that which bypasses his desire to 
symbolise, for the simple reason that it is desire itself that is as lacking in the double sense 
of the word. 
The imaginary relation with the double assumes a paranoiac function of the other 
being persecutory and indelible. Not only is the guilt held in abeyance of unpayability, but 
also is the imaginary creditor indestructibly persistent: 
The frequent slaying of the double, through which the hero seeks to protect himself permanently .from 
the pursuits of his self is really a suicidal act. It is, to be sure, in the painless form of sla~ ln~ a 
different ego: an unconscious illusion of the splitting-offofa bad, culpable ego.- a separatlOn.w?lch, 
moreover, appears to be the precondition of every suicide. The suicidal person IS unable to ehmmate 
b\ direct self-destruction the fear of death resulting from the threat to his narcissism. 
Given, of course, that the "self-destruction" has the narcisstic self as an object and that 
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destroying it would amount to destroying that of which it is an object, the I. 
The splitting of the self marks the division within the subject, in the part of which 
resides the imago of the mother. The destructive impulse towards that which has not been 
represented by the love-object relation, Rank continues, but nevertheless remains as a trace 
of some fragmentary portion of it, seems to echo Freud's schema of initially two sexual 
objects, the self and the mother (or her substitute). The other self (the term used by Freud 
is either eigenen Person or selbst), often thought of as an inseparable shadow, is 
represented as a "second body", a dead body in fact, that has to be given an imaginary 
status and rank among the living, so that the symbolic eternalisation of the former may 
subsequently allow to eternalise the latter. Numerous examples of it can be found in the 
funeral rites, burial ceremonies, spiritual exercises, and "cult of graves", as Heidegger 
called it, in general, in the relation to the dead. 
The images of the dead, Rank notes, serve as a protective aegis against destruction. 
But, he adds, in the prehistorical times there was no concern with immortality. The 
concept of immortality is of a recent breed and its origin can be attributed to narcissism. 
The" splitting-off" of the double in the process of immortalization of the image of the dead 
furnishes the other with the capacity to give them both a fixed locus and an iconomic 
meaning. Such economy and such place could then withstand the ordeals of history and the 
structural shifts. Only the dead are immortal. The phantom of the dead is a displace-meant 
of the image summoned to affirm the dialogue with the imaginary other to prolong the not-
coming of the end, the timeless duration which is the living dead. Here, the examples used 
by Rank are similar to Freud's: "For the primitive, as for the child, it is self-evident that he 
\vill continue to live, and death is conceived of as an unnatural, magically produced 
event".7 
Narcisstic disposition pays tribute to the dead giving veneration to death itself. To 
be sure, a meditation on death is a moment of conceptualised mourning over the 
ambivalent object of fascination, the other, displaced onto the image of the dead. "The 
thought of death", Rank confirms throughout his study as if making up for the absence of 
thanatos in Freud's Introduction, in abundance only to be matched by Heidegger, "is 
rendered supportable by assuring oneself of a second life, after this one, as a double". S 
Somewhere in the subterranean time of death, Rank's thanatography runs into 
Heidegger's narrative. Their paths conjoin in the fraternal pact, just like the one D. Farrel 
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Krell signs between Heidegger and Freud of the Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Although 
we live and write in different times, and although there is no one time Jor liS all to live in, 
sooner or later our idioms are bound to be staged up in an imaginary dialogue that, as in 
this case, plays the Heideggerian signifier against the Freudian one. In the case of the 
three, as it is with brothers and their secret pacts with death, their distinct meditations take 
them one by one from the dead to the image of the loved one. 
The harbingers of death like Rank, Heidegger, and Freud of Jenseits, reincarnate 
the narcisstic tradition by invoking the dead, death, death drive, mourning each patheme 
transmitting the traces of a mortified bond with the beloved m(O)ther. The illusory 
investment of desire in the spectral otherness lives on as a reminiscence of the time of 
de.\'ire oj the Other. To this extent the dead are an effect of the imaginary death of the 
other that survived in the emptiness of the Other lacking. Heidegger, for example, does not 
embark upon full existential analysis of death before bidding ontological farewell to the 
dead: "We are asking about the ontological meaning of the dying of the person who dies, 
as a possibility-of-Being which belongs to his Being".9 
Heidegger's move is twofold. Firstly, the site of mourning is designated by the 
notion of the deceased [Del' "Verstorbene'1, severed from the dead proper [dem 
Clestorbenen] , and being the object, the imaginarized object of our preoccupation with 
death. Secondly, the deceased are given a certain status among the living, in the sense of 
both having undetermined end with respect to Dasein, and in the sense of the latter 
commemorating the departure of those who died as "'still more' than just an item of 
equipment". As for the living the essential sense of death is disclosed in the impossibility of 
experiencing the loss-oj-Being of the dying person. The experience [Erlebllis] belongs to 
the living who suffer as those still remaining, to be more specific, who still remain "with 
him", who experience the loss of "the deceased himself,.l0 The deceased will always be 
him, not Heidegger's father, not the real person, but the signifier designating some 
masculine, paternal, fraternal object (of love, hatred) that is reiterated in the son's/brother's 
preliminary remarks on death. The impossibility of being-united-in-death-with-him, the 
impossibility of being one with the other who, even if he "himself is no longer there", 
making him think in anguish and in mourning, becomes the displacement of love of the son 
for the dead father. Or the living mirage that makes thought possible as its retlective 
relation with the mediatory image is always a relation with the unconscious history that the 
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time of reflection both suffers and enjoys. 11 
The loss, the true manifestation of death, is not the loss-of-Being of the Other, the 
father - "No one can take the Other's dying away from him" 12 - but the loss lived by those 
who survived as divided and fragmented. And since the end of the Other is essentially 
beyond our experience, that is to say outside that which the subject can say, barred as he 
is, what remains with us is the "not-yet", the elusive truth of Dasein. To this extent 
Heidegger remains ambiguous about the end of Dasein. The "not-yet" of a particular 
Dasein renders its end undecided and unfinished. It is the living who must bear the 
meaning of the "not-yet" taking it with them to death. With the "not-yet" being beyond our 
grasp and comprehension, the end is equally outside, just like the "ontological meaning of 
the dying of the person who dies". The "not-yet", the never ending end, which belongs to 
Dasein (and is so reminiscent of Lacan's Encore, or, en-corps, in the body more 
jouissance, more jOllissance of mourning!) is a kind of lack, what Heidegger will call the 
"lack of totality". This lack names the breach between the living and the dead - that is to 
say divides the subject - the notorious narcisstic gap which cannot be bridged to the extent 
that the living bear within them that which is still incomplete, albeit not "unfulfilled", which 
pertains to non-human beings like plants and animals. Dasein, being always divided 
between the image of the deceased and the significations of the living who sutTer from the 
real (loss), Dasein as Being-towards-death in that its unfolding carries the anguishing 
burden of the "not-yet", not yet come-to-an-end, "must become - that is to say, be - what it 
is not yet". 13 
Human existence and the lack it becomes, that is to say the divided subject, as 
Lacan elaborated it - the "not-yet", the "lack of totality" - becomes the lack in the face of 
the impossibility to appropriate the death/dying of the Other. This impossibility has a 
bearing on the perceptual grasp, and symbolically impedes what is to come to the place of 
lack, for example, the living experience of the loss of the originary Other, the uncertain 
beholder of the gift of love, gift of death, the primordial father. If anything is to put an end 
to the narcisstic excess of caring for the other self, be it the image of the dead or living, it 
is the lack, the cut, already resident in those who remain, that is to say who speak, or more 
precisely, who give a signifying value to the dead letter. 
The imaginary other, the beholder of mourned passion, is a poor ~'et indispensable 
substitute for the inaccessibility of the Other's death. As Heidegger consoles, the Other is 
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never fully comprehensible except for "the way we get it in our grasp perceptually" (ibid.). 
Is not the lack, then, the absence pro-voked by the distance between the living and the 
dead, which seeks substitutes in the practices of mourning - or in the "cult of graves" or 
funeral rites or, no less, in the meditations on death - a lack of the Othec indeed, a lack ill 
the Other? Does not the lack of the Other render our perceptual grasp inadequate, 
insufficient, discontinuous? It is only the dead Other that can give us the unexpected 
assurance: the Other is only a guarantor when dead. 
But the most thought-provoking instance comes from Heidegger's claim about 
death being in each case mine. It is difficult to concede that the death of the paternal 
Other, or the dying of the maternal Other, discloses death's mineness [Jemeinigkeit] in the 
case of every Dasein, if death/dying of the Other is beyond any possibility of continuation 
or appropriation. Is it not that Heidegger, before turning to the full analysis of death, must 
first render the lack as death phenomenal, indeed, substitute a death for the Other, so that 
the signification of "death" could be masochistically enjoyed in undertaking the task of 
such analysis? What then does such an analysis reveal except for its very impossibility and 
the jouissance it perpetuates? But by doing this, by distinguishing the end of Dasein from 
other kinds of end, he is bound to revert to analysis which is self-relational and not to be 
heterogenized. It is only if death itself is in the place of the Other, as it is for Heidegger, 
the Phallus that cannot be named, that Dasein lacks the end (being the "not-yet"), or simply 
lacks, thus extending and projecting itself, as that which it is not but wants-to-be, Being-
whole, being Nothing. In this identificatory relation with the mourning subject, Dasein 
rises, although Heidegger does not say so, at this Hegelian moment, over and above 
myself, or, what Heidegger calls, "ahead of myself". But since this identification is only a 
prophylactic approximation, never bringing me closer to the dying Other, except for its 
tormentingjouissance, to death that cannot be taken away from him, nor "mine" from me, 
this identification has as its object the mediatory, and mimetic, remainder. What remains is 
not only the living but the spectral sOllvenir that fuels the jouissance of mourning. Such 
object of narcisstic meditation, the present/absent of the past, can only generate dis-cord in 
the form of dis-course that symbolises in the face of the lack and always already returns to 
the impossibility of being one with the Other. 14 
It should not come as a surprise if we conclude, although I \\ ill come back to this 
theme in the concluding chapter, that Heideggerian Being works as such identification. To 
put it more generally, Being mediates, and its mediation links up the moments or stages 
which Heideggerian reflection undergoes: from the real loss of the Other to the mourning 
of the dead to the phantom presence of the deceased to the phenomenon of death which 
becomes an aim of ontological meaning and existential analysis. Being mediates, for in the 
first analysis being is being for the Other. At the same time, its gravitational traction 
translates it into the object of fascination of the living in so far as it names the placeless, 
which is not to say timeless, place of the death of the Other. If no one can take death away 
from me, to render it mine is to erase it, to attempt to separate the death drive from Eros, 
which can only bring the "not-yet" to its suicidal end and conclusion, not to the work of 
death in Dasein, but to its intensification, imaginary no doubt, in the face of the One which 
has at all times been guaranteed to me by the love of the (dead) Other. 
Let's now follow more closely the work of identification and the imaginary 
aspirations it generates. As we shall see, we can find in their formations the birth of the 
very "Being" Heidegger sought to name. 
CHAPTER 3 
THE BODY IMAGE AND THE ORIGINS OF SPECUL"-\RIT\T 
Heidegger's introductory remarks to the meditation on death are caught as the 
moment of mourning. Just like Freud, however, and to this extent Rank, he is involved in 
the relation with the object which guides his discourse. Although the problem of 
fascination with death, to the extent that it is a fascination with the guarantee of love and 
certainty of the object of the Other, the "not-yet" of jouissance that seeks substitutes of 
satisfaction, is far from exhausted, we are, again and again, confronted with the 
reappearance of the object, its repetition, its history, its oblique sources. Freud called this 
object narcisstic but its complex existence calls for more thorough exploration. To begin 
with, four things have to be said: 
1. By distinguishing two sexual objects in the unconscious formations Freud names only 
one of them as narcisstic. The other one, the anaclitic love-object on which the subject 
leans [Ahnlenung] or to which it is libidinally attached, since it is rooted in the bond with 
the mother, will inevitably fall into the category of the mediatory image through which, and 
in which, the relationship with the mother is sexualised. This suffices to say for the 
moment that there is in fact only one object whose complexity transcends the context of 
Freud's Introduction. The itineraries of the narcisstic object and of what Lacan calls the 
"ineffable object" of the Other, the love-object, cross at the juncture where it appears as a 
loss. To the extent that mourning reveals the loss of object, and its presence as lost, 
analysis attempts to "retrieve" it as a lack that generates desire. The lack is in Lacanian 
terms the demand for love hollowed within itself "in articulating the signifying chain". This 
lack is, what Lacan calls, the "cause of desire" 
~. But the object retains an imaginary status to the extent that it remains subject\ object, 
or, to be more specific, the ego's object. The neurotic locates it in the Other, and \\ants it 
back, whereas the analyst is the one who succeeded in refinding it for himself by 
separating from it. Thus the object functions as a transparent sOllvenir or the image of the 
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bond with the mOther (gaze, voice). We have called this object multiple for its 
presence/absence is, as Freud showed at the end of the Introduction, conditional upon the 
temporal mode in which it is retrieved and played out. In other words, the object's 
existence is designated by the when, although for Lacan more stress is put on its "place" in 
the structure of the subject. 
3. The question of the narcisstic relation can therefore be formulated not only in terms of 
iconomic sufficiency of the self, or economy of self-consciousness, but also in terms of 
temporality of the object, its appearance as a lack. Time of the object, which for Lacan is 
the name,l is a history of displacements and a history of failed transferences [ybc'rfragllng] 
or transports to that which is projectional in the "narcisstic folding back of the libido 
[Freud's libidostauung] and a disinvestment of reality [the Other]".2 For Freud the real 
problem is that of the choice and of subject's "preference" for one object (narcisstic) over 
the other (maternal love-object) which leads to the formation of the Ichideal, but also to a 
vicious circle. 
4. Since there is no nontemporal object, as Freud was the first one to point out, there is no 
object in its objectivity as such. 3 The object is caught up in the perception of the self which 
is, for Lacan, the locus of misrecognition [meconnaissance], and, which is subject to the 
structure of the drive where the object is inscribed as a moment of the temporal circuit of 
the libido. There is no object as such - the bastion of the traditional empirical philosophy 
which Freud so carefully avoided - because that which is present can only be manifested as 
the effect of its disapearance/detachment, and involves mediatory requirements of an image 
formed by the eye, the ear, the nose, which is unconscious. That is perhaps why we will no 
longer tInd the concept of "perception" in Lacanian theory but its conceptual inheritor, the 
imaginary, which is always to be found laden with illusions and prejudices that bring every 
object to the realm of the subject and his/her relation with the Other. At this point the 
subject is only left with signitIers and the object a, the name Lacan confers upon the 
interface between the subject and the Other as a "locus of speech" and a "guarantor of 
meaning". The object a both covers the signitIers, covering up their otherness, and causes 
desire to appear in the sexual discourse of the Other. 
The question of identity, as we can see from the above, has to pass through the 
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threshold of identification, which has the real at stake, namely, the unrepresented body 
withheld from the scopic dialectic the child has entered. Thus the question of identification 
appears as a certain staging of subjectivity, which for Lacan is played out in the relation 
between the I and the imaginary other, that is to say, between the object and its 
counterpart, not between the subject and the Other. For Freud the narcisstic myth 
presented itself as an urgency to overcome and transcend its illusions that have not 
necessarily been jettisoned or dispelled because of the intent to do so. On the contrary, 
they have been taken aboard and carried out in the task of psychographic interpretation. 
To this extent the future of Freud's narcisstic mythography remains uncertain. In Lacan's 
return to Freud a gap has emerged to show what has been left outside Freud's own 
conclusions, and it is to this gap that we must now "return". But it is also true that in his 
return Lacan's pursuit of the imaginary relation at the heart of which narcisstic 
identification reigns deep, can be comprehended on another level both in the sense of the 
new insights and the terminology introduced as a further expansion on Freud's 
topographies. 4 One of them, the one which seems indispensable for understanding the 
work of narcissism, is the mirror stage to which I will now turn. Weare at the root of the 
Lacanian imaginary and on the verge of origins of identification. 
In the most general sense the mirror stage is the time of assumption of the "spatial 
identification". It is a drama in which is staged "the succession of fantasies that extends 
from a fragmented body-image [d'une image morcelee du corps] to a form of totality that I 
shall call orthopaedic [orthopedique de sa totalite] [ .. ]". 5 The object of identification 
appears to be an image which the infans takes to constitute the whole it wants to be. 
Lacan is very specific about the moment of specular encounter the child experiences. The 
il?lans, the mute as he might be called instead of enfant, is captured by the image - a 
resemblance assuming, in the moment of looking, an identity - when its body is captured in 
the position amenable to looking. The two are mutually supportive and fall into place when 
the gaze is fixed. To look one has to immobilise one's body if only for a moment and stay 
pill as a "leaning-forward" child does when it pries into the mirror to find within its alluring 
spatiality that which freezes it, the body-image as another. This is not an instance of some 
enigmatic synchronicity of the image looking at that which is looking at it, for it is the 
body itself, with its tendency to stand out and lean forward [pellchee], that is the seeker of 
the self-identical and indivisible whole, namely, itself.6 The captivating lure of the image 
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has the power to present the image as looking like the (fragmented) body that is on the 
lookout for unity. At first glance, the identification with the mother, which Lacan does not 
mention in the 1949 article and which Freud places alongside the narcisstic identification, 
remains hidden from the view and does not constitute at this moment child's relation to the 
mOther: 
We have only to understand [Jl y suffit de com prendre ] the mirror stage as an identification, in the 
sense that analysis gives to the tenn: namely, the transfonnation that takes place in the subject when 
he assumes an image - whose predestination to this phase-effect [eifet de phase] is sufficiently 
indicated by the use, in analytic theory, of the ancient ternimago. 7 
On second thought, the instant of identification can be understood as culminatory of the 
quest for the residue of the imago of the mother which dwells in the specular medium just 
discovered. These two elements, the mother and the me/self, reappear, though not directly, 
in Lacan's amendment to the story of Narcissus. The imago, one of Lacan's key-terms, is 
the host of images and imaginary relations with the outer world, as well as the inner, and 
serves as a primary point of reference, the first exteriority, against which the child can 
begin to learn how to co-ordinate its movements and organise its motor activities. 
The assumption of the image constitutes the primary identity not only because in 
the identical resounds the eidon, the visible, which throughout the history of philosophical 
discourse left the mark of empirical insufficiency and inadequacy answerable for the 
deceptive lures of the eye, but also because the reflection is the first other, something that 
is neither the property of the mother nor properly mine, but something that the subject 
nevertheless imagines to belong and to galvanise the fragmented body [corps morcehie] 
that is in need of a binding agency. The assumption of potentiality for being-whole lies at 
the root of the subsequent discovery of such medium as speculum. That which is missing, 
the hole in the real, can only be imaginarized as the cementing moment in which the 
fragmentation would integrate into a corporeal totality. The uniting "tendency" thus 
requires an exterior mediation that would provide the binding link of such moment. Can 
the image serve as such agency? Can it fill in the invisible cracks? The body lacks when, at 
the moment of "motor powerlessness" [l'impuissance motrice] , to which Lacan does not 
add ... ;rmholic powerlessness, the representation is absent. It lacks when during 
transformatory process the petit homme attempts to append the representation as bodily 
image to the originary lack failing to put the "primordial Discord" and division on the bind. 
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I say "append" in the sense that the child tries to supplement it to the lack leaning on the 
image, leaning-forward and reaching out towards it, like in the Freudian Anlehnung. The 
uncertainty of such moment concerns whether this imaginary propping is effected by a 
failure of the anaclitic relation to the maternal object, which would lead to an emergence of 
the lack "proper", namely a symbolic one, or whether it is already a kind of projectional 
repetition, and imaginary solidification of it in child's own terms. 
The attempt to incorporate the image into the "lack of totality" is as fatal as it is 
inevitable in the face of inaccessibility of other means than those of mimetic reduplication 
of the mother's gaze and voice to the extent that it modulates and directs child's imaginary 
orientation before the mirror ("you are so cute"). But in the untouchable image the child 
sees more than an object of identification, more than a totalizing Gestalt, and more than a 
simple exteriority in which to mimic the movements of the body. The fact that he does not 
pass by the mirror in utter indifference but returns to it, often laughing at what he sees, 
indicates that the other is seen as distorted, disproportional and asymmetrical, the truly 
funny object that can only be found in mirrors. 8 To turn to the other side of the empty yet 
significant laughter, the perceptual experience involves child's temporality of being an 
object, mother's in the first place. As Julien puts it: "The child is constituted in conformity 
to and by means of the image [ .. ]" or as an effect of "transmission by means of 
identification, that is to say, by a passage from the outside to the inside".9 The outside is 
not only the specular image which prosthetically props up, as in Dali's Sleep, the paralytic 
body with the view to integrating the whole corpus, thus allowing the child to move from 
the insufficiency to anticipation (narcisstic self-sufficiency). The outside is the mOther who 
gains her symbolic position in relation to the phallus. 
When the little man sees himself as being seen, and therefore seen as a phallic 
embodiment of her desire, this will suffice for an instant to find in it a dwelling place in 
whose spatiality the dweller assumes his identity as the me. Being me, or having what his 
mother does not, is the first effect of imaginary assumption, the first effect of existing in 
the eyes of the Other. That is why the phallus in question is designated here by Lacan as 
imaginary. It is the not the phallic function as facilitated for the child by the Patronym, 
which I will discuss in the second part. Being me is as primary as deceptive materialisation 
of the subject. The "little other", as Lacan sometimes calls it, is born. The object a comes 
to existence as the interface between the child's body and the m(O)ther. It is just that in the 
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mirror stage that which "corresponds to object a in the visible is the image of the other". 10 
The image conceals the gaze of the Other, or covers it and, at the same time, reveals the 
interfacial veil of the image of the other, the me being-seen, or simply, the being-me. The 
identification is not so much with the visual image in the mirror as with the imaginary 
object covering over the Other's gaze and lashing the child to fascination - being-fascinated 
- with the specular, and spectacular, presence of the corporeal reflection. On the one hand, 
the experience of bodily movements is duplicated, and affirmed, by the moving image that 
"responds" in the form of virtual reality, on the other hand, identification with the imago 
of the mother already carries an effect of the body moving and responding to her desire. 11 
Without the imaginary being seen - of which the identificatory being-with-the-other 
seems to be a correlate - without being the object of the Other's gaze in whose image 
infant's primary relations are formed, the mirror stage would not exhibit the characteristics 
Lacan attributes to it. We find there the terms we have already encountered, the "double", 
"object-projections", "mimicry". Projection, to begin with, seems inseparable from 
introjection which in this case concerns mother's gaze and the history of the Other her look 
seems to transmit. In this respect, the mirror image appears first of all as a projectional 
displacement, that is to say, a narcisstic displacement of the Ichlibido~ it displaces the 
repressed object-libido - which Freud ascribed to the mother, the part of her body that has 
no longer to do with her breast but with her eye and "the medium of voice" - onto the 
image of the me. The projection onto the looking glass is a subsequent confirmation of the 
introjected material that the infant translates from the imago of the m(O)ther into the 
imaginary lack in the scopic form. In so far as this projection echoes the maternal image, 
its specular import is formative of the me assumed in this process. The me, therefore, is not 
a subject, but an object in its eidetic form. 
What Lacan tends to stress over and over again is the aspect of illusory unity that 
the identification aims at: 
The fact is that the total form of the body by which the subject anticipates in a mirage the maturation 
of his power is given to him only as Gestalt, that is to say, in an exteriority in which this form is 
certainly more constituent than constituted, but in which it appears to him above all in a contrasting 
size 11m re/ielde stature] that fixes [fige] it and in a symmetry that inverts it, in contrast \vith the 
turbulent mo\'ements that the subject feels are animating him. Thus, this Gestalt - whose pregnancy 
should be regarded as bound up \vith the species, though its motor style remains scarcely recognisable 
_ by th~sc t\\·o aspects of its appearance, symbolises the mental permanence of the 1 [Ie je L at the 
sam~ time as it prefigures its alienating destination: it is still pregnant with the correspondences that 
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unite the 1 with the statue in which man projects himself, with the phantoms that dominate, or ",ith 
the automaton in which, in an ambiguous relation the world of his own making tends to find 
. 12 ' 
compictlOn. 
This is not the only time when Lacan refers to the realm of the animal to demonstrate how 
the morphic identification conditions the possibility of reproduction of the same 
(species).13 Such identification is an example of a passage from the solitary to the 
communal existence. The little human is no exception when he confronts the reflected 
figure in the tain of the mirror to find in it its imaginary destiny. This is a reintroduction of 
the narcisstic scene in full thrust. Its object is an imaginary construction of the totalizing 
ego or the me, in relation to the imaginary counterpart, the other, on which the fabric of 
child's relation to the outer world could be woven. But although the narcisstic 
identification situates, Lacan following Freud, the narcisstic libido in relation to the sexual 
libido whose object is to be found outside the dialectic of the ego, there is another way of 
describing the libidinal opposition. The emergence of the image has to do with the 
deflection of the libido, following the bodily separation and the anaclitic attachment to the 
mother, in the process of in-divi-duation. As the child leans on the object of the mother, 
the encounter with the imaginary other offers a possibility of displacing the libido and its 
attachment onto the object of its own creation. As this discontinuation is imaginary, the 
identification based on it has to be understood within spatial rather than temporal 
categories. Here, the narcisstic and anaclitic attachments, as I have said earlier, seem to be 
making appearance as epiphenomena. In both cases a being leans forward onto the present, 
on what presents itself before the eye, namely the image. On the other hand, it could be 
said that being the object of the mother, the petit infans seizes the first opportunity of a 
detachment - a temporal detachment that becomes anchored in the spatial identification. A 
primary temporality makes indeed its manifestation here as a movement, around imaginary 
constructions, that is none the less moored to the place of symbolic structure. Freud's 
insight into the narcisstic object testifies to this. It also provides us with the clue as to why 
being for the Other does not translate into being for self. In both instances being is being 
what one is not, on the one hand, the Other's jouissance, and, on the other, fantasy and 
)1 'ish which deals with the lacking object in symbolical terms. Both displacements are yet to 
be subjected to what begins with the mirror stage: the subjectification of the object a to 
\\ hich the infant has been reduced, and which emerges as a remainder of the specular 
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dialectic. In this respect, primary temporality will be spurred by the structural differences 
and the movement of the signifier, in the form of the voice, which, as I have said earlier, 
position the uncoordinated body of a child before the mirror. 
Is the imaginary identification then a prelude to the symbolic tussles which the 
temporality of the petit homme could only enter when the ordeals of the imaginary 
detachment have been surmounted, especially so that in both cases the work of mimesis 
provides the temporal conditions for the difference between the addresser and the 
addressee, given that outside specular relation one of them is not me? Or is an 
identification an hindrance, an impediment to symbolic relations which condition the 
former from the start? Why to identify at all? Why is the general tendency of the libido that 
of the object-seeking? 
In Lacan's discourse the formation of the I - the place from which the subject 
speaks, which is not to say that he knows what he is saying - is inseparable from the body-
image as responding to "the congenital insufficiency" and disarray of the body. As Lacan 
writes two years later in the article Some Reflections on the Ego, narcisstic conflict is 
located at the juncture of the image being a reversal or at least "a metaphorical 
representation of the structural reversal we have demonstrated in the ego [Ie moil as the 
individual's psychic reality". 14 This reversal is akin to Rank's notion of the hostile double 
and sheds some light, or rather casts the shadow, on the self-destructive/suicidal 
inclinations. But, it could be argued, it is also a spatial reversal of time in the sense of 
structuralization of the narcisstic scene to the point of arriving, which seems to be Lacan's 
design, at the project of "structural ontology". This is how Derrida understands or 
misunderstands Lacan's conceptions, and how he renders the latter "metaphysical" in 
Positions. As for Lacan, he takes the reversal in terms of the relation to the real, in this 
early part of his teaching, namely to the body structure: "the cerebral cortex functions like 
a mirror, and [ .. ] it is the site where the images are integrated in the libidinal relationship 
which is hinted at in the theory of narcissism". 15 The sources of the specular identification 
are rooted in the child's "real", i. e. unrepresentable body, to be more specific, in the 
concave shape of the skull which is physiologically responsible for the distortions of the 
image projected before the eye and the nu?connaissance of the ego instituted herewith. 
Although this does not answer the question of the infant's tendency to move its body to the 
position of leaning forward onto the image understood as a counterpart of the fragmented 
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body - rather the contrary is shown in Lacan's example, namely that the reflected image is a 
reflection of the body [cortex, skull] as it really, ontogenetically, is, not as it lacks - it 
certainly points to the formation of the I as rooted in the narcisstic fascination with the 
body-image: 
\\c must place the reversed image in the context of the evolution of the successive forms of the body 
image itself on the one hand, and on the other we must try to correlate with the development of the 
organism and the establishment of its relations with the Socius those images whose dialectical 
connections are brought to us in our experience in treatment. [ ... ] Now the child's behaviour before 
the mirror is so striking that it is quite unforgettable [my ita!.], even by the least enlightened 
observer, and is all the more impressed when one realises that this behaviour occurs either in a babe 
in arms or in a child who is holding himself upright by one of those contrivances to help one to walk 
\\ ithout serious falls. His joy is due to his imaginary triumph in anticipating a degree of muscular co-
ordination which he has not yet actually achieved.16 
On the one hand the "striking" and "unforgettable" image makes up - as the 1949 and 1951 
articles whose main features can already be found in the 1938 Encyclopaedia article on the 
Family Complexes, confirm - for the lack of total being and for the lack of mastery over a 
fragmented body. On the other hand, the image is in itself a reversal, an optical, and 
economically intact, transposition of the essential bodily feature which the child is bound 
to project before himself to see in it the scopic representation of his corporeal form. And it 
is the optical illusion resulting from the concave shape of the "projector" that renders 
impossible for anyone to see himself as he really is. The lack must therefore have to do not 
so much with the chinks in the bodily structure or its physiological function as with the 
.''}ymbolic inadequacy at the level of these imaginary constructions. Thus narcissism is not 
so much a "failure" of the imaginary dialectic, as a lack of a symbolic communion, because 
of an exclusion of the mOther from the subject's position. 
There are therefore alienating effects of the detachment from the maternal object 
in the sense of the imaginary identification barring the access to mother's desire. Now, 
since it is mother's desire where the child's desire originates, the object a marks the 
separating gap that causes the subject's desire to appear as mine. Thus narcissism can only 
be seen as a moment of transition from mother's jOllissance to child's jOllissance, which 
does not touch upon an emergence of desire, understood by Lacan as symbolic, and the 
formation of the I (?f the symbolic that will occupy us later. It seems to me that the 
discontinuity that takes place in the transformatory process from the specular identification 
that assumes unity to the symbolic relation that rests on the lack, concerns the complex 
passage from the imaginary to the symbolic relation, which is also a passage from the 
visual to the assumption of the Human Voice. It is between these where we can seek the 
origins of alienation that is already a derivative of primal aggressivity that Lacan links to 
narcISSIsm. 
Lacan's understanding of aggressive tendencies in humans must be from the start 
divorced from aggression in animals. We have seen that the destructive disposition is in the 
first place a self-destructive one in the sense that its object is either the image of the dead 
beloved or a mummification of the loss of the past image of the me (the I was). In both 
cases, and that goes not only for Rank's conception of the double, the death drive emerges 
as a function of life not only in the subject's internal and imaginary dialogue, but also in the 
relation to the Big Other which for the neurotic is never present enough to help form more 
imaginary support, thus throwing the subject into a deeper and deeper mourning of the 
lack of the object. For Lacan aggressivity will be bound with the presence of the imago 
and its alienating power to the extent that both are concomitants of the Gestaltism of the 
ego: 
There is a sort of stmctural cross-roads here to which we must accommodate our thinking if we are to 
understand the nature of aggressivity in man and its relation with the fonnalism of his ego and his 
objects. It is in this erotic relation, in which the human individual fixes upon himself an image that 
alienates him from himself, that are to be found the energy and the fonn on which this organisation of 
the passions that he will call his ego [e moi] is based. 17 
The libidinal organisation of the ego leads - by virtue of the unitary structure assumed by it 
and imaginary assimilation of every object that, being in the vicinity of the identification-
seeking Ichlibido, is subsumed under the name of the I - to a conflict that "determines the 
awakening of his desire for the other's desire" (ibid.) The desired object, the maternal 
object in the first place, is the object of the other's desire. By opening access to the other, I 
desire the object which is not mine even if it appears to be given to me, laid before me as 
my desire to desire it. This given object of desire is the lack. 
There is a temporal split between the desire and its object, a split which exists even 
when the object a emerges as a split between the subject and the Other. Thus the 
aggressive impulse becomes manifest as a form of rivalry with the imaginary other, the 
object of the Other's desire. This is especially evident in the case of jealousy. 18 Not only 
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does Lacan distinguish human aggressivity from the animal aggression but also does he 
carefully avoid associating the object of the narcisstic/aggressive drive with that which 
threatens imaginary unity or with the protective shield against its collapse or loss. Boothby 
comments that "Aggressivity is a drive toward a violation of the imaginary of the body that 
models the I" .19 Why then is the aggressive tendency not directed outward against the 
potential trespasser of the territorial unity that grants a temporary abode? Why does 
aggressivity not have some self-preservational function like in animals? It seems that the 
answer has to do with the image that mediates between the organism and the body, and 
between the human subject and the animal. It is when the subject, or in this case the I, 
takes the imaginary other for the self that his aggressive impulse turns inward not outward. 
Since the specular unity as formative of the I is the source of alienation, the subject finds 
himself locked out from the original dwelling of the sexual drive, or, in Lacanian terms, 
from the Other's desire. Such is Lacan's answer to Freud's question of the Libidostauung. 
The subject is caught up in the narcisstic/aggressive grip of the ego that alienates him from 
himself, and exacerbates his hostility, at the moment of imaginary confrontation of his 
exact replica, towards his other. Why? Because at this moment the transferential relation, 
namely, demand of Other's love, is "experienced in the form of strangeness proper to the 
apprehensions of the double" rousing "an uncontrollable anguish,,20 on the part of the 
subject. Anxiety is an affective culmination of the alienating process in which the moment 
of nothingness opens up the yawning abyss of origin, "the horror of the ultimate Real 
before which the words stop",21 the signifying act as such. Such is the anguish of the 
analytical transition from the specular to the symbolic or from the imaginary identification 
to the symbolic one. Since "the signifier induces signification in the signified", to signify is 
to separate from the imaginary meaning that was assigned to the signifier in the first 
analysis by the gnawing yet unrepresentable real and to experience the Other of 
signification. 
There are at least two more consequences of the aggressive drive that can be 
observed in the intersubjective relation. One is that of resentment which tips the scales of 
a lJoressive ambivalence in favour of the whole atlas of abusive and destructive behaviour v~ 
towards others, which includes punishment, revenge, magical spells, persecution, 
defamation, etc. all having as an object the alienating other and in effect the paranoiac I. 
But Lacan goes much further in exploring the range of human aggressivity and aggressive 
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negations of the triumphant mirage embraced and cherished by the I as a representation of 
psychic reality and a basis of human knowledge. In this his move takes on a fonn of 
critique of philosophy and ideology reigning in his time. But before we get there let's 
reformulate Lacan's depiction of the iconomy and ethics of narcissism. At least four paths 
could be singled out in passing the scene of Narcissus: 
1. The mirror stage as formative of the I testifies to the congenital insufficiency that 
through the initial stages of the specular identification with the body-image reaches its 
refined conclusion in the "adult" metaphysics of self-consciousness. Such doctrine is an 
expression of a spurious prophecy, as its source lies in the child's relation to his other in 
which he sees the representation of a totality of his body. 
2. Life in the mirror, whether taken metaphorically or not, is generative of two primordial 
affects: aggressivity and jealousy. Jealousy, which Lacan calls "an archetype of all social 
sentiments", commits the subject to an imaginary rivalry with what undermines the ego's 
"specular satisfaction". Such identification breeds competition - "rivalry and agreement" -
with the object that is formed out of the imaginary relation with the other, the object of 
mother's desire. It is in relation to this "third object" that his rivalry is played out while 
ensuring libidinal circulation between the other and himself He thus finds himself in 
relation to the third object as either its imaginary possessor or jealous usurper. 
3. The self-destructive aggressivity is directed towards the imaginary other who is taken 
for the image of the "true and unique self'. Not only does Lacan assign to the aggressive 
drive a tendency to rebel against the imaginary master, the image of the corporeal unity, 
but also he sees in it a spectacle of the "sado-masochistic and scoptophilic drives (desire to 
see and to be seen)". Aggressivity is thus related to "the slave whose response to the 
frustration of his labour is a desire for death". 22 
4. Alienation as central and inseparable from the specular fixation marks the appearance of 
the death drive and pushes the narcisstic passion to the anguishing boundaries of its 
fantasmatic existence. What is alienating is the imaginary unity which, as we will see, has 
\ast implications for the subject's relation to the Other. Alienation is an ambiguous and 
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powerless cry for destruction/preservation of the umon with the specular image and 
tendency to maintain the object of this union as a stable guarantor of meaning. At the same 
time it is an anxiety of separation that can lead to a conclusive emergence of the object a 
as lost. 
Lacan is interested in consequences - symbolic, social, ethical - that the imaginary 
identification engenders in the formation of the subject. These implications extend far 
beyond the analytical context, and Lacan provides legion instances of tensions on various 
levels that seem to be structurally evolving from the narcisstic passion. It is worth noting 
some of these criticisms as they ride dialectically head-on against the masterly 
presuppositions of the ideological constructs experienced in his time. The assumed identity 
of the I is not only epistemologically reductive but also contributes to general 
misorientation of the subject throwing "the whole of human knowledge into mediatization 
through the desire of the other" and turning "the I into that apparatus for which every 
instinctual thrust constitutes a danger, even though it should correspond to a natural 
maturation [ .. ]".23 To this should be added a vitriolic remark that does not spare any of the 
existential advocates, led by Sartre, flouting the customary futility of self-consciousness 
with which, following Hegel, they espouse 
a freedom that is never more authentic than when it is within the walls of a prison; a demand 
lexigence] for commitment, expressing the impotence [l'impuissance] of a pure consciousness to 
master any situation; a voyeuristic-sadistic idealisation of the sexual relation; a personality that 
realises itself only in suicide; a consciousness of the other that can be satisfied only by Hegelian 
)4 
murder. ~ 
This string of fallen ideals, the Golzen Dammerung, that philosophy always hailed, with all 
its anguishing awareness, until Freud's discovery, is thus extended by Lacan's warning 
about the speculum-based origin of the ego, that indeed pervades the history of the subject 
from Descartes to Hegel and beyond, and which the psychoanalytic discourse, as practice 
and theory, must radically work to oppose. The aggressivity "of the voyeuristic-sadistic 
idealisation" degrades every transferential relation to the neurosis of the master/slave 
dialectic until "the satisfaction of human desire is possible only when mediated by the 
desire and the labour of the other. [ ... ] The problem is knowing whether the Master/Slave 
conflict will find its resolution in the service of the machine". 25 
Such machine, according to Lacan, names the narcisstic spatiality of the order that 
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rests on the '''geometrical' structure" of the specular field of the other. This kal-eido-scopic 
organisation gives support to the "narcisstic tyranny" of the ego-based I, while the 
imaginary shifts and shuffies of forms create illusion of "the universal ground". The I, the 
visual image, the narcisstic iconomy of space form a delirious alliance that drives us - but 
who are we?- deeper into the alienation of the care of the body which subordinates and 
represses the death drive. Lacan's ordering is an exclamatory onslaught on space and 
spatial domination which 
reveals, right down to the depths of his [man's] being, a neurosis of self-punishment, \\;th the 
histerico-hypochondriac symptoms of its functional inhibitions, with the psychasthenic forms of its 
derealisation of others and of the world, with its social consequences in failure and crime. It is this 
pitiful victim, this escaped, irresponsible outlaw, who is condemning modem man to the formidable 
social hell, whom we meet when he comes to us; it is our daily task to open up to this being of 
nothingness the way of his meaning in a discreet fraternity - a task for which we are always too 
. 26 . 
mad equate. 
Not "even" psychoanalysis with its discovery of the unconscious, "the law of the signifier", 
and "the instance of the letter", seems adequate to redeem the "modern man", his cure 
being all too short of the pharmaceutical means to point the way to the future of "discreet 
fraternity". But what is this "modern man"? Is there one? Is there the one who, from 
Descartes to Hegel and beyond, succeeded in maintaining the wholeness and unity in his 
posture to spur the attack and critique that by this virtue remains bound up to the 
dialectical law of negation, even if the space of synthesis has been "replaced" with the time 
of analysis? How long has it been by now since the notion of "the modern man" remained 
exposed to a radical reformulation, beginning with Nietzsche, of which only the concept, 
and the spectre, survived haunting our ideological abodes? What we are faced with here is 
not only the question of the subject and the "formidable social hell" that he brings with 
him, when he comes "to us" with his suffering perversely clothed in the imaginary 
pretences, and the one who listens to the anguishing horror of "the ultimate Real" that 
speaks of the Other. It is also a question of a certain retro-spection, a temporal 
reprogression of the much discarded by Freud inclination towards intro-spection, that 
retrieves the history of critique of the subject to give it a distinct, yet not quite dissociated 
from the theoretical insights of the past decades, footing of analytical experience. Does 
Lacan's criticism of the pseudosocial forms that have orbited around the symptom of the I 
coincide \vith what he credits himself to discover, namely the mirror stage with all its 
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epistemological and historical aspects? Or does the Cartesian narcissism come as a result 
of a certain representational doubling understood as a resurrection of the infans playing 
before the mirror-image of his history? Are we not confronted here with the theoretical 
heritage - thus faced with its distribution, dissemination - when engaged in the task of 
interpreting the narcisstic iconomy as spatiality of forms and ontology of subjectivity to 
which Lacan wants to provide an answer that would transcend what it ineluctably re-
collects? Finally, what kind of repetition is at work here, what kind of death has already 
heralded the arrival of the kal-eido-scopic machine? 27 
Lacan's mirror stage stands out in his discourse as a unique moment. Firstly, in the 
general sense, it brings to mind all those subjects who, like "children and primitive people", 
are assumed as silent yet linguistically capacitated objects of analytical study. Secondly, the 
mirror stage, just like Freud's observation of the child playing the presence/absence game, 
is the only instance, except for Lacan's, and Freud's likewise, interpretations of the text, 
whether scientific, literary or philosophical, which does not involve the speaking subject. 
The signifier in analysis. It is not the status of the symbolic order that is in question here, 
but the silence of the first person of the petit homme, silence of the symbolic I, that 
assumes other, i.e. nonsymbolic, although, as it appears from Lacan's depiction, not 
symbolically meaningless, means of representation. These have to do with mimesis, and 
Lacan limits his account of the place of mimesis in psychoanalysis to alluding to it as a 
faltering alternative between "homeomorphic" and "heteromorphic" identifications to 
which mimicry [mimetisme] offers no future. This of course does not mean that we should 
situate the imaginary as in some sense inferior to the symbolic order of social relations. 
N or does it mean that by devaluing it, which is already a wish, perhaps even an 
"idealisation" of the symbolic, we are on the way to reduce or dissolve it. After all, it is the 
melancholic position, as we shall see in chapter 6, that the imaginary as informed and 
motivated by mimesis is underplayed and lapses to stagnation. 
Moreover, one need not equate the imaginary with the specular, the point to which 
I will come back, or imaginary with the identificatory, to give mimesis time to play out the 
vanishing objects in the discourse of the subject. It is a question of Being as essence raised 
to the point of self-reflection that worries Lacan, not the mimetic operation in the dialectic. 
It is only in so far as the refusal of castration plunges the subject into the deep sea of 
identifications that one is led to construct an image of totality and wholeness. Is it the case 
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then that the narcisstic position works as a postponement and impediment to the work of 
the sexual drive as initiating subject's symbolic relation to the Other? 
If what the specular stage misses out is the fact that there is more to the body than 
what can be speculated on, and that it is this nonidentificatory lacuna which drives desire 
to its "authentic", i.e. symbolic existence, the relation of the observer to the child has a 
peculiarity that deserves more attention. As Lacan stated some time later the child in , 
analysis is treated as a subject, not as an object. There is no doubt that the object of 
interpretation, such as the mirror stage for instance, is already within the textual narrative 
of the observer. In other words, given that "the unconscious is structured like a language", 
observation is inseparable from signification in the sense that only that is observable what 
is sayable. Thus the commentary on the play of the child is always already grounded in the 
signifying capacity of the language that works as an instrumental medium of commentary. 
The "striking" and "unforgettable" spectacle of jubilation of the subject before the mirror is 
perhaps not without traces of the observing subject testifying to some degree of 
celebration over the discovery of specular dialectic. Lacan must have been aware of a 
certain weakness of his discovery, which, in this respect enjoys a different status, and 
perhaps different place, to the Freudian discovery of the unconscious. That is why we 
could call the observation of the "subject" playing before the mirror as in some sense 
standing out from the rest of Lac an's work. Its outstanding feature will no doubt dominate 
his account of the imaginary as a mimetic construction that opposes the work of the 
signifier which guides specular meditations. It is not difficult to deduce that Lacan's early 
preoccupations with psychoanalysis bear marks of echoing philosophical imports that 
would reach him from all directions. It is perhaps also in response to these that he 
attempted to stake out the imaginary and specular traps awaiting those who immerse 
themselves in the study of language. 
For many of Lacan's critics, this would doubtless give an ample opportunity to 
take up narcissism once again, to rehabilitate and promote it as a some "neutral" 
relatedness, not devoid of the mediatory traits, to the other not in the sense of the fixed 
body-image of perfect unity, but to a temporal image that Freud constructs in the 
concluding remarks on Narcissmllstyplls. In other words, the narcisstic phase unfolds in 
the most radical sense a scene of mimetic production in which the I-libido imitates, that is 
to S(~\', forms a mediatory relation with that which it -was, that which it is, that which it 
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desire.\' to be, and that which it was once a part of Finally, such perspective would also 
bring to focus the origins of the object autre as temporalized out of the imago of the 
mother, or more precisely, out of the I was which bears witness to it. 28 
Lacan was attacked for confusing the imaginary with the specular and this is the 
second criticism that could be directed against his conception. 29 Not only could the 
imaginary and the specular be understood on separate planes and not only can the 
imaginary "free the I from the fixed figures of the specular, from the alienated images that 
it creates for itselfbut that are also created for it".30 Linking the formation of the I through 
the specular impression to the economy of narcissism, as Lacan does, also reinforces a 
prejudice that the image is always visual and related to the eye, gaze, and scopic field in 
general. In my approach, I think of the image more in terms of Freudian Bild, a "form", an 
"image". Such understanding brings the "image" closer to a form without essence, which 
in terms of the auditory field and its unconscious memory, is a neighbour of Lacan called a 
"signifier" . 
The imaginary is indeed to be linked to the mediatization, but it is only as an effect 
of the mythical legacy of Narcissus that such mediatization has subsequently become fixed 
to the visual medium, and by turn prioritised over, for example, the auditory function in 
the first years of human life. If the visual takes over child's early relations with others, it is 
perhaps because the visual does not demand from the child to speak back. Speech, by 
contrast, asks for an answer. It is this prejudice of reducing the image to the visual that 
urges us to seek the conception of the imaginary in other fields, as for example auditory 
one. Subsequently, has not the visual, the eidetic become the closest possible ally of the 
sIgn as letter, and further, of meaning in which the eye and the "object" come into 
agreement of code, contract, regulation, ideology, etc? Has not such bias been supported 
by philosophical archives in which can be found the first attempts to account for the 
concept of deception in terms offallacy of the visible, the eidon, which paradoxically arises 
as a specular ground for Plato's invention of Forms, not as marie but as idea? Lacan's 
limitation in his understanding of the imaginary is therefore not without amplifying the 
etfects of the ancient echoes in which reverberate not only the imaginary dialectic with the 
Similar but also the metaphysical, and political, tones of exclusion of mimesis as an ec-
static temporality of representation which will create the horror of resemblance. 31 
It is for the reasons that should be left aside that mimesi."; did not earn respect 
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among the Ancients like Plato, and for the same reasons, that deserve to be mentioned, 
that mimesis appears as utterly marginal in Lacan's discourse. Is it because mimesis leads 
to an increase of jouissance of the body, or is it because it represses the signifier of the 
subject leaving it alienated from the sexuality of the Other? For Lacan the mirror stage is a 
mark of "organic insufficiency in his [man's] natural reality". The specular other is a 
response to his fundamental deficiency, his holeness, which still seems insufficient and 
inadequate as it allows him to perpetuate the interactive mimesis to grapple with the 
strangeness of form without god. In the anxious encounter with the other the I erected in 
the mirror reflection remains a mistake. And yet it is the work mimesis, whose object 
remains concealed from its function, that will nevertheless reappear in the discourse of 
Plato commenting on the philosopher who does not write, and in Lacan who remarks on 
the infins who does not speak. 
Lacan's movement beyond mimesis and representation in his presentation of the 
mirror stage seems then, the view I will challenge later, to constitute a step towards 
ontological transparency, a structure that in the rhythm of elaboration testifies to the 
narrative and drama of the subject. The truth of mimesis would be the imaginary conduct in 
which resemblance and difference are played out in the face of the other that is already in 
me yet outside me. The mimesis of the object a, the analytical object par excellence to the 
extent that it is extimate, neither inside nor outside, the true resemblance of loss and a 
temporal remainder of desire, "the object in its original reality, the object whose role would 
be to enlighten the other sciences - science itself - about their own objects", 32 is the 
meta.~peclliar Real that binds the Borromean triad of the imaginary, symbolic and real. But 
it is the object a that in his later works Lacan calls the semblant. Should we not link here 
the jOlfissance of the mimesis as an imitation of the semblant to the object a of 
representation that is already manifest in the primary relations with the other? Mimesis 
then would be a construct of re-semblance of the other in whose image (Bild) the lack 
remains to mark the insufficiency and inadequacy of any identification, because it is the 
Other that is lacking in it, does not have or is a phallus. 
Such identification would already be seen in the Oedipal triangle, which Lacan will 
rewrite adding to it the phallic component. It is this signifier of desire of the Other that will 
open a relation to the Other's demand and desire, where the semblanl a comes to manifest 
the lack, the shadow of the object lost/reassembled at stake, the faeces and breast in 
72 
demand, as Lacan elaborated them, and the gaze and voice in desire. If mimesis is at work 
in the drive whose sexuality is animated by language, specularity appears as neither its 
condition nor effect. This is no doubt a view espoused by Borch-Jacobsen who notes that 
the object little other (which Lacan insisted on being left untranslated) is not the object of 
knowledge, not 
the ob-ject in which a subject would pose himself before himself in order to retrieve himself in it, [ .. ] 
Not that Lacan really rejects the possibility of the 'object' of desire's being the subject himself (or, if 
you \\iIL of the subject's being transcendence, exit-from-himself); on the contrary, the subject actually 
continues to desire himself(to transcend himselj) in his "object" [ ... J But so completely is this subject 
transcendence that he can no longer find or recognise himself in any object except by abolishing what 
he lacks - as what he is in terms of ' lack-of-being', want-to-be [manque-a-etre], and ek-sistence 
without essence. The 'object' of desire is therefore not symmetrical with the subject, not the specular 
and imaginary object of (,paranoiac') knowledge. It is the 'lack of object' in so far as the subject finds 
himself in it as the object he isnot - that is, as a desire.33 
Here then, we have an example in which Borch-Jacobsen shows us clearly that the subject 
transcendence and narcissism are not mutually exclusive. In fact, the transcending, the self-
sufficiency crossing and going beyond its speculum, which is insufficiency and lack, is the 
becoming outside of the self. The passage points to the subject's exclusion from the object 
and to being excluded from it. In some sense the subject is ahead of its object, the object 
being ahead of desire. The temporal difference puts the desire on the track of the Other, 
which is perhaps the transcending moment of narcissism that forbids appropriation. The 
subject transcendence remains in the mimetic relation to the object, and it is this mimetic 
movement that restitutes his desire as desire of the Other. 
The mistake of narcissism can therefore be taken as a tragedy of appropriation of 
the cause of desire, object a, which is in fact "that most unreal and most impossible of all 
'objects', death". To identify the object as absent, as "word without the thing", is to sign a 
pledge of the death drive. That is why signification, understood as a temporalisation of 
discourse of the subject, whether through the medium of speech or as writing, is always 
already committed to the thanatic erasure which reinscribes the radical impossibility of 
absolute identification and appropriation. The mimetic drive is the imaginary spring of 
symbolisation, "before the intervention, at the moment of the Oedipal comple:\. of the 
paternal function, and the support of the law, of language, and of social values" .~~ In the 
Lacanian sense, the symbolisation is the flash of the signifier, the other signifier of the 
chain, were it given that death is the master one. 
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If we agree that Lacan's move is to link, indeed to identify, the imaginalY with the 
specular, and mimesis with the homeomorphic identification, does this amount to the 
rejection of mediatization in general? 35 The formal gesture of subordinating the mediating 
other to the symbolic order, would more or less secure an immediate access to the signifier 
of the unconscious, that the imaginary mediatization hinders. Even if that is not to say that 
Lacan tries to exclude the imaginary, which he certainly does not, knotting it as that which 
gives consistency to the symbolic and real of the topological triad, the attempt to melt 
down the mediatory function of the image is tantamount with a certain prohibition of 
mimesis, which as Plato's project of the State shows, can only be executed if, to use 
Derrida's expression, a "theontological" agency is set up - an agency that mediates without 
mediation. For the work of mimesis has to do with narcisstic overvaluing of the sexual 
object immobilised into a dead passion for a beautiful form. Only the renunciation of the 
specular identification in its mute character could render the mimetic drive not reducible to 
a harmonious symmetry between the miming and the mimed, as Derrida has already 
shown. 36 Thus mimesis would serve as a preliminary step, in its imaginary function - the 
immediate a/the mediatory - to institute differentiation of the symbolic, and open up, from 
within the anguishing lack that generates it, a symbolic dialectic that testifies to the division 
of the subject. 
In the following chapter we are going to discuss the work of mimesis in relation to 
the proximity of the letter and visual form, namely writing. 
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CHAPTER 4 
NIETZSCHE IN THE MIRROR OF NARCISSUS 
I am going to devote the last two chapters of part one to Nietzsche. Let's begin 
with the following questions: given that narcisstic relation aims at idealisation of the 
"former self' it recovers (Freud), that it is concerned with the image of the dead other 
(Rank), and that it is constitutive of the imaginary identification understood as a dialectic 
that sustains the inseparable pair of the I and the other (Lacan), to what extent is 
Nietzsche's discourse a reply to the question of narcissism and subscribes to the narcisstic 
economy of self-love and self-reflection? Does it at all? Where are we to place the 
notorious and ubiquitous I that identifies Nietzsche as a subject in the reflection of the 
fabric of his thought, namely, the language of writing? And secondly, how do Nietzsche's 
criticisms of philosophy and philosophers translate his psychological insights to what was 
later to become the language of metapsychology and psychoanalysis? I am interested in 
Nietzsche's use of what Lacan calls "the I of the symbolic" and its relation to its 
counterpart, the little other, and, on the other hand, in the route by which Nietzsche arrives 
at the "discovery" of prejudices, lies, falsifications, and self-indulgent confessions of his 
predecessors. These two pathemes are not unrelated. 
It has been said that the phenomenon of identification is an effect of the libido 
passing through the imaginary mediatization which, to the extent that for Lacan to identify 
is to lean on a bodily image of specular sort, assumes a position of totality and unity. But 
we have also said that such inquiry into spatiality of narcissism should take into account 
the image that is not only visual, e.g. voice, as well as the temporal difference which allows 
the unconscious to be staged as an effect of a time delay or deferral that becomes manifest 
in the task of interpretation. The symbolic relations are in this sense not distinctly opposed 
to the imaginary or mimetic constructions, but rather inseparable from, and eyen interlaced 
vvith them. Mimesis reiterates both the lacking object, the division of the subject, and 
opens a possibility of signification as nonnegation. 1 If writing is a task that insists on 
maintaining a relation to the letter, and therefore the visible, and, if it affirms the letter of 
the subject as an object as at the same time veiled from the signifying chain, then. this 
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object remains at the core of the mimetic drive. It is therefore in the mimetic, in so far as it 
is also symbolically retrospective, relation to the temporality of I was, as singled out by 
Freud, that the specular dimension has been provoked, this provocation being already a 
species of symbolical translation. In other words, it is in relation to the operation called 
writing as tracing, marking, re-marking and re-iterating of a texture of signifiers that the 
imaginary emerges in plurality of forms - forms that are nothing else than mediatory 
passages of retrospection that can be found in both Plato and Lacan alike. 
What I am suggesting from the above is that in so far as Nietzsche 'writes his , 
writing does not make a distinction between the imaginary/specular me and the I of the 
narrative. He only attempts to describe such difference when the Cartesian equivocation of 
the subject of thought (signification) and the subject of knowledge (being) come under the 
pen of his critique. But the extraction of the unconscious subject (das es) from the subject 
of discourse (Ich) still says very little about the imaginary relation between the me writing 
and its love-object that his writing raises to the point of the I-ideal. In the autoerotic 
relation that sustains Nietzsche's task as a writer, indeed, finds his self in play of 
absence/presence, "nothing represents the Other", as Lacan sums up the narcissistic 
position, "the radical Other, the Other as such". 2 
Nietzsche does not speak about the imaginary other he addresses in the midst of a 
series of luminous insights. Perhaps that is his secret just as the subject in analysis has 
secrets. But for Nietzsche, the secrecy of analysis is the secrecy of self-analysis conducted 
against the backdrop of philosophy. Of course, in the former case of analysis the Other has 
a function and place occupied by the analyst, whereas the self-introspection does not 
distinguish the Other from the other, which is, as we recall, what Freud said about 
narcisstic investment without necessarily relating it to the task of writing. But the 
important question here is whether the writer like Nietzsche addresses the demand of the 
Other or desire of the Other. In this, and Nietzsche knew it all too well, the Other, the 
dead God is not so dead after all. If the letter we receive from Nietzsche tells us 
, 
something about the subject of discourse, it must by this stroke also tell us a thing or two 
about the suffering subject, as "flesh and blood". Thus writing becomes inseparable from 
self-introspection and this one in turn from self-knowledge. However, the subject of this 
knowledge is not the speaking I, not the conscious I, against which he was wan1ing us in 
his \\ork, but the I of enunciation, the spoken me ofjollissGnct!, the effect of the primary 
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love bond that is now addressed in the act of doubling as writing. This "spoken me" which 
in its passivity nevertheless speaks as active I, this infins of Nietzsche is an object of 
psychographic reflection and awaits a touch of awakening. It will tell us something about 
Nietzsche's symptom andjouissance. 
Weare not interested in the specular dialectic of the mirror stage in terms of a 
historical moment in the philogenetic development of libido. 3 Rather its performative 
presenting as writing will touch upon the experience, analytic throughout, of the subject 
who in the process of psychographic interpretation stumbles upon the latent cosmos of the 
"former self' whose primacy he initially ascribed to the object of his illumination. That is 
why we should make a distinction between two subjects, the subject of suffering or the 
subject as pathos of the real, and the subject of discourse. Only the latter one unfurls open 
to reading, deciphering. But if so, how are we to separate the projectional drive of 
narcisstic existence from that doubling that always already intervenes in the process of 
reading which is writing? But must we? Is not Freud's urgency to cross the territory he 
found himself trudging through already an echo of a demand of the Other - a demand that 
he renounced in favour of desire of the Other? Did not Nietzsche, Freud's most admired 
writer and philosopher, know it all too well to ever attempt to separate the imaginary plane 
of self-inquiry from the so called "explanation of reality" that found his predecessors in the 
maze of mythology? Did he not voice this difference? 4 
Nietzsche's reflection opened a possibility of philosophy that for Freud constituted 
a certain ideal. Psychoanalysis was merely to pave the way.. It will perhaps remain 
paradoxical that the objections Freud brandished against philosophy will eventually be seen 
as the very goal he wished to accomplish. Also, that his pursuit of knowledge, later taken 
up by Lacan, points to the sources of the unconscious which Nietzsche's critique of 
philosophy hoped to inaugurate. Two paradoxes then. Both Freud and Lacan owe, with so 
little acknowledgement, the debunking of philosophical prejudices to Nietzsche, and 
secondly, the epistemological "ideal" of psychoanalysis is, as if ahead of its time, the very 
object of Nietzsche's critique. 
The whole series of misrepresentations of the subject, mentioned by Nietzsche in a 
fragment I will shortly tum to, represented by 5-,'elbstbekenl1tni .... ', Erkelllltllis and 
l'erkellll/nis testifies to the unknown division of the subject and to a disastrous in 
consequences favouritism of conscious apparatus. Such fa\"ouritism, already a sort of bias 
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in epistemological claims, supports another prejudice that "being-conscious" opposes or 
contradicts the unconscious drive. Or that the imaginary me, the being-spoken, is opposed 
to the symbolic matrix which for Lacan constitutes the fabric of signifiers (the symbolic 
Other) as pre-existing the relation between the I and the other. Not so for Nietzsche for 
whom the matrix of language is nothing more, and nothing less, than the matrix of the 
mother tongue in which hysterization allows him to capture the imaginary (me) at work as 
the object of misunderstanding. In other words, the object, for example the object in 
fantasy of the uterine existence, is always misplaced. It is not the "real" object of desire -
the mother as object, or, the mother tongue as the object of meditation on language - but 
an imaginary one, perhaps a specular one, certainly the lack of the real object. To the 
extent that it is misplaced from the position of the object of the drive or desire, it generates 
misunderstanding, that is to say, produces Selbstbekenntnis. If the object of desire could 
be changed - one of the aims of analysis - that still would not guarantee some unerring 
"objectivity" of knowledge but rather the lack of knowledge of objectality, to use Lacan's 
term, the lack as operative in discourse. Nor would the production of truth take a form 
other, than that of self-confession or of a lie that tells the truth. On the contrary, this would 
merely show to what extent conceptual theorising is rooted in the analysis of desire, in the 
object of fantasy, in misrecognition, in short, in the symptom. Such lack as operative in the 
philosophical task of introspection, reflection and conceptual construction, would merely 
stress, such is Nietzsche's wish, perhaps a more honest and truer style of interpretation of 
the object of subject's desire as it lacks (lack of totality, of absolute knowledge, death of 
God). 
The imaginary object is the lure by which a philosopher becomes seduced to allow 
himself to think that he deals with concepts and explanatory discoveries that, in so far as 
he speaks to himself, prevent him from telling lies about himself and his discourse which, 
as it were, speak "through" him. Such delirious practices are not foreign to philosophising, 
for the philosopher is spoken before he has begun to speak, or write, supposed by the 
Other before he stands his own suppositions, the mark of a philosopher, on the heavy feet. 
There has always been multitudes of reactionary thinkers in whom Nietzsche recognises a 
contemptible part of himself and therefore a first rate material for self-criticism. He 
recognises a thinker by virtue of his confession or confession-like conceptualisation. But 
he also does so using the first person, EyW, on w·hich he scores as well as Lacan. \\'riting 
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indeed insists on maintaining the relation between the I and the imaginary object in a 
mimetic alliance that constantly reproduces the time delay effect: I will have written in so 
far as the Other has written me. But if this effect, this temporal difference places the object 
between the present perfect and future perfect how are we to distinguish the 
imaginary/mimetic I from the specular image that assumed me before I started to speak? I 
cannot unless "I" is the effect of the imaginary being-me, as Lacan demonstrated, which 
has not only to do with the specular image but also with the vocal one. The voice plays a 
major role in Nietzsche's writing by no doubt addressing him, speaking to him, as in 
Zarathustra, even if the voice, as we shall see in the concluding chapter, does not exist as 
such, i. e. as a subject. The voice does not exist as such because it is always lost, displaced, 
like the object, or in the place of the lost object, and always resembles the voice of 
another, mother, father, or as in the case of the pscychotic, the voice of God. 
To whom then does Nietzsche speak, given that he speaks in the tongue of the 
mother, or sister, and sends himself, or his self, always back to the image? From the 
symbol to the body, from Descartes to Nietzsche, or, from the other to the lack. One could 
even say that it is a pro-vocation of the I that summons the Other, and the question of the 
Name of the Father in general, to the discourse in which "the Other as such" remains 
unrepresented. Nietzsche seems to be heading always ahead of the specular dialectic, 
always heading for the future to the future, always leaping ahead of himself, to the Other, 
to the name of the Other, in a flight of love for the dead father. Until, again, he finds 
himself speaking to the unknown matrix of the tongue (the Other as such?), this time in 
vocal images which return to the former. And when such future of the always-already-
heading-ahead-of-himself is addressed, his symbolic and pere-verse identification with the 
name of the Other brings him to a moment of pause, perhaps self-reproach, perhaps even 
shame an affect Nietzsche would not venture to shun. All in the language of the mother. , 
From the mother to the dead father, from desire of the Other to the prejudices of moral 
law, then, back to the mother and the object of desire. The lack. Such is Nietzsche's 
imaginary conversation with the object of his desire. The future belongs to no one. 
Perhaps Nietzsche does speak to the mirror - we should consider such possibility 
nevertheless - speaking to the mirror outside the mirror.5 And in doing so he admits no less 
jubilatory jOllissallce than the il!fills of the speculum Nietzsche, as we kno\\. likes to play 
bv the ear, or by the nose, keeping his drives at random vigil and giving the s~mbol of his 
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thought to objectification of desire. Vivid expression and ecstatic language momentarily 
assuage the anguish but never fill the void. If he so often pushes his ineffable infinity ad 
infinitum, it is with the view to enjoyment over another object, not the sight of the image 
that does not see but the voice that the ear never ceases to hear. Could the voice then be 
such other object, the object of writing, the object in Nietzsche's writing? And if so, whose 
voice is it?6 
Solitude is for Nietzsche a source of constant flight of inspiration. But solitude is 
also a mark of duality whose imaginary and symbolic components are difficult to 
distinguish: 
Everything happens involuntarily in the highest degree but as in a gale of a feeling of freedom, of 
absoluteness, of power, of divinity. - The involuntariness of image and metaphor is strangest of all~ 
one no longer has any option of what is an image or a metaphor: everything offers itself as the 
nearesC most obvious, simplest expression. [ ... ] (,Here all things come caressingly to your discourse 
and flatter you: for they want to ride on your back. On every metaphor you ride to every truth ... Here 
the words and word-shrines of all being open up before you; here all being wishes to become \yord, 
all becoming wishes to learn from you how to speak')~ 
Nietzsche reflects here on a passage from Zarathustra as if he was reflecting on his body, 
rapt in thejouissance of the letter, or the image of his body. That one is not identical with 
the other, even if it is an inexhaustible source of symbolic and imaginary jOllissance makes 
itself evident in the discrepancy explained to us, as he usually does, by W. Kaufman. The 
German edition of Zarathustra has "me" in the place of "you" and English translation of 
Feee Homo "you" instead of "me". Hence Nietzsche's reflection on his own text seems to 
effect a certain kind of translation that relates imaginary to the real. What is a translation of 
what? Is there not, apart from the interlingual, another kind of translation already at work 
here? Does not "me" translate to "you", and by this stroke being-me into being-H'ith-
()ther') 
It is indeed striking how this relation appears to us, especially if we consider it 
alongside a parallel transfiguration of a single German term Bild into two English terms 
"image" and "metaphor". What the "original" does not distinguish, appears as an 
impossibility of translating this indistinction into another lexical system. But, it should be 
said emphatically, it is this impossibility of translating the lack of difference in the molher 
tOllgue into allother tongue as a lack, that creates a confusion of symbols, which for liS, in 
so far as image is not a metaphor, is a confusion of terms that psychoanal~ sis al\\ avs 
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ventures to distinguish. The impossibility of translating the lack into the lack would allow 
us to take the view that the unconscious is not so much a kind of "secret" to be translated 
into consciousness, a belief that has its origins in Plato's attempt to "translate" the 
particular present into the universal present, as that which facilitates translation. The 
unconscious makes translation possible to the extent that, in the interlingual translation, it 
is both symbol and image that are translated. Nietzsche, of course, does not translate in 
this sense but his writing none the less maintains a self-reflective and self-referential 
relation to the mother tongue, which already involves "translation", as the autobiographical 
fragment shows, and that is why for him the image and the symbol are involuntarily 
"identical". Speaking in the mother tongue and always coming to reflect on the matrix of 
language, Nietzsche translates into his "own" language as an associating subject, as if the 
tongue in which he speaks was not primary or maternally archaic, but secondary in the 
sense of being imaginary and mimetic, a true language of camouflage. The image of the 
letter, as in Nietzsche's reflection on Zarathustra above, functions here as a kind of 
reflection on the symbol. In other words, and in more Lacanian terms, the signifying chain 
of reflections always "returns" to that initial and primary master signifier, which in this case 
is the phallus as the signifier of the desire of the Other. What says no to realization of such 
project, the theme I will elaborate in part two, is precisely the Name of the Father, the 
patronym as naming and saying no to the jouissance which as such is forbidden in the act 
of speech. For Nietzsche, such return to the mother tongue via the Name of the Father, 
works as a disguise of his own subjectivity, i.e. of the relation between "1" and "you". 
This camouflage then has a double sense, firstly, because it covers the lack of the 
object that conceals itself and remains indeterminate in mimesis, secondly, because it 
covers the truth of such substitution - substitution of "me" for "you" and "you" for "me". 
There is finally a confusion of the image with the metaphor or the imaginary with the 
symbolic and conversely. Both appear as "nearest" and "simplest", both are involuntary 
and such moment of immediacy of their mediatory functions renders them 
indistinguishable. Such indistinction, even indifference, of which Nietzsche speaks 
elsewhere and I will come back to it in the next chapter, happens in solitude and at the 
solitary moment of the body when the lack, the real hole, is most anguishing 
In this most alienating moment heard as a music of solitary etude, the lack of 
distinction between me and you, the image and the symbol, makes the Other most distant 
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and most near at the same time. The imaginary other to which Nietzsche speaks, seems as 
if he was speaking to himself, and conversely, speaking to himself he speaks to another. 
Having lost the me as the object of his affection, he addresses you, always you (you would 
have noticed if you had not read him), not the object that separates him from his mother 
but the jouissance that connects him, in this alienating yet in all its pathos enjoyable bond, 
with the mOther, the distant and near at once. In this, however, he desires not the little 
other of his imaginary constructions but the Other as that unconscious representative that 
allows for such constructions, and so his desire that comes to life becomes caught in the 
fantasy of symbolic production generated by the semblant of representation. Who is more 
near, me or you? 
The question brings us to the boundaries of narcissism, but, to the extent that it is a 
question, the threshold of love and the difference between the love of the self and the love 
of the Other remains unanswered, that is to say, unheard. It is rather the demand of love 
that brought philosophers to the dead end, bringing Nietzsche to the border between me 
and you, the demand that appears as desire. While wishing to be always ahead of himself 
and thinking of the future, of philosophy of the future, of the mother tongue of the 
philosophy of the future, Nietzsche comes to be entangled in his image and in the fantasy 
that the access he thinks he has, unlike other philosophers, to the Other gives him. 
This both "nearest" and "most farther" object has here a status of extimacy, 
something excluded from within, and seems so intimate that it allows him to keep close to 
the solitude of the body, the real body that can, however, only come to be marked as a 
mediatolY image of the body, namely the image that separates the organism from its 
perception. At the same time, the only distance Nietzsche's writing opens in his invisible 
body is that of an encounter with the voice. Melody, rhythm and changes of tempo are 
dominant in his rhetorical discourse just as "The art of hearing" was for example the 
condition for writing Zarathustra. It was written while being heard. Hearing the voice of 
the mother tongue is how the temporal difference operates; it separates, namely, distances 
the voice of the mirror from the mirror of the voice. One is always ahead of the other. The 
ear is always ahead of the other. Once again, what Nietzsche does not distinguish at the 
peak of his ecstatic jOllissal1ce of the body, the image from the metaphor, opens a hiatus 
between the vocal and the specular. Although both derive from the elation of the body -
"The body is inspired; let us keep the 'soul' out of it" 7 - while the latter cements the 
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disarray of the corps-morcetee into a mIrror Image of totality, the former resolves 
"tremendous tension" and "subtle shudders" of the flesh into the anxious mark of writing, 
or philosophising, Nietzsche has no doubt about that. The subject of discourse - the all-
pervasive "I" that sounding in all mouths the same distinguishes the speaker from you or 
me - is linked to the voice and the ear, the vocal image mediating between the voice and 
the ear. 
This then, although I will expand it shortly, is how Nietzsche philosophises writing. 
He listens to the voice which has some relation to the "symbolic matrix" of the mother 
tongue but he does that in the Name of the Father, that by naming removes him from his 
shameless ecstases of his mother's body. Listening he reflects on the vocal image to 
rein scribe it, retranscribe it and send it off to the future from which it will have not come 
back. This is a point of no-return that separates those who have found the object as the 
void, the Nietzschean destiny of amor Jati, from those who lost it as the lack of the lack, 
never tired of misplacing it, the moral philosophers and the prejudiced surveyors of 
consciousness alike. 
CHAPTER 5 
WHAT ARE PHILOSOPHERS FOR? 
Let's take up again some of the themes from the previous chapter. They concern 
the question of philosophy as raised by Nietzsche's interventions that gave psychoanalysis 
some theoretical footing. Who or what is a philosopher? To what extent must philosopher 
be also a "psychologist", and Nietzsche himself, as he tells us, had most to learn from 
those who were not philosophers, say Dostoyevsky. To begin with, the philosopher, such 
is Nietzsche's message to those who come after him, does not only speculate but also 
vocalises. When P. Ricoeur says that Nietzsche's "attack against the foundational claims of 
philosophy is based upon a critique of the language in which philosophy expresses itself', 1 
it is with respect to the relation between reflectivity of the voice and language of 
philosophy that we can read Nietzsche's critique. At this point we should recall some of the 
criticisms that Freud and Lacan address against philosophers. They could be formulated as 
follows: 
1. Freud - philosophical introspection falls under the category of speculation which has the 
Ichideal as its object, and to this extent remains in the pangs of narcisstic illusion. 
2. Lacan - the pursuit of totality, which has always shone as a distant ideal of m~taphysics, 
has its sources in the specular-imaginary nostalgia for the imago of the mother and a 
wholeness of the body.2 
.3 Lacan - the ego is a construct of the specular identification as a bodily image, the other 
being its counterpart, and as such has always cast shadows on the epistemological 
procedures under the name of philosophy. 
There are three principles that Nietzsche observes in linking a possibility of 
philosophy to his psychological insights. In a psychogram sent to Freud, and no doubt 
Lacan, Nietzsche draws our attention to the following: the dynamic of the unconscious 
(drive) in the philosopher, the inseparability of the subject (writing, language) from the 
task of thinking (object as voice, fantasy, symptom), and thirdly, the development of 
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concepts as invented not independently of the "invisible spell" that founds philosophical 
constructions. A certain "ideal" has emerged, and with it a belief in an ideality of notions. 
This belief lures us to a production of knowledge without our realising that these concepts 
are merely signposts on the long way that returns us to the spell-casting and spell-binding 
horror of the "ownmost" yet most excluded real (eigentlich is one of the key-words in 
Beyond Good and Evil): 
something within them [philosophers] leads them, something impels them in a definite order. one 
after the other - to wit, the innate systematic structure and relationship of their concepts [Begriffe]. 
Their thinking is, in fact, far less a discovery than a recognition [Wiedererkennen], a rememb~ring 
I Wiedererinnern], a return and a homecoming to a remote, primordial, and inclusive household of the 
soue out of which those concepts grew originally: philosophising is to this extent a kind of atavism of 
the highest order. 3 
An atavism? Is philosophy a "primitive" remainder that does not take place because it 
never did take place, never realised itself in its body but only appeared as a retrospective 
and retrovocative bewitchment of language ("We really ought to free ourselves from the 
seduction of words") against what remained temporally deferred, the archaic, the ancient, 
that is to say, the unconscious? The future that Nietzsche envisages for philosophy, or 
rather for philosophers of the future worthy of this name, concerns among other gestures 
the change of the object. This would subsequently imply subjection of concepts to a certain 
kind of analysis that release a symptom that supports their discourse. One cannot do 
philosophy without doing at the same time self-interpretation and remain in some 
reflective/retrospective relation to the history of the subject, history as subject - in short in 
relation to the Other of language from which it can then be constructed, reconstructed, 
deconstructed, that is to say subjectivised - even if what is to remain and be addressed to 
the future is only a concatenation of signifiers and the subject of discourse. In other words, 
there is no philosophy without some relation to the real and the body of pathos, the 
recommendation that Schopenhauer took no doubt too seriously, was led to despair at the 
lack. Something else is desired, a desire, precisely, and the object that, as separated from 
desire and therefore causing it, is at play in every discourse, and a philosopher must learn 
how to admit its lures. 4 
Perhaps there has never been a philosophy, or, if it ever existed it was either as an 
ideal or as a clumsy and dishonest piece of psychology. There never was a philosophy but 
either a despaired mourning at the loss of the object of desire or a perpetual covering up of 
the object as subject's primary alterity, this leading up to certain blindness and one-
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sidedness that becomes a totality of all-sidedness. Some explanation of the function and 
mechanism of writing philosophy is desired and this cannot be done without the 
retrospective move towards that which brought us before philosophy One cannot be a 
philosopher without becoming a psychologist, not the "ego psychologist", but an 
archeologist of the unconscious, a psychographer. Nietzsche's last book opened such 
perspective and confirmed to what degree his own rhetoric had sprung from the 
background relations with his desire. 5 
Nietzsche then is faithful to Freud and Freud to Nietzsche. That is perhaps because 
there was no exchange of letters between them, or between Freud and Heidegger for this 
matter, one being always the Other, the symptom and lack that reflects the lack of the one. 
The future belongs to no one, because future has no memory. And to create a memory one 
has to first create a past. How can the teaching of forgetfulness be practised if what is 
remembered is not all, the Present lacking? What do the philosophers lack then? Certainly 
not what can be supplied in abundance to fill this lack, for example concepts. What they 
lack is the lack, the lack of the lack which, because it produces nothing but dark anguish, 
prompts to a kind of premature forgetfulness, that is to say forgetfulness without 
remembering, namely repression. The question of the demand of the Other, and for the 
Other, must always come first. This is so because an imaginary answer to the demand may 
lead wayward to an unlimited amalgamation of concepts in which is lost the way to desire 
the object of desire which is different for me and for you. 
There is also the drive, the unconditional, and "undestructive" as Freud called it, 
pressure in which the vital function, be it of death or of life, reenacts the body of language. 
Nietzsche's writing inaugurates a philosophical discourse of the body, the "subtle body" of 
the unconscious as Lacan called it, in which philosophical theorising finds its beginning. In 
fact, there is nothing more active in philosophising than the philosopher's instinct: "most of 
the conscious thinking of a philosopher is secretly guided and forced into certain channels 
b~' his instincts". 6 By the same stroke, philosophy turns in a new direction whilst the 
philosopher begins to reorient his position in the world from being a scientist of 
"objectivity" to becoming a subject of discourse. That the latter is not a self-identical and 
tl~ed term but subject to and of the unconscious traces and vicissitudes of dri\'~s, is one of 
Nietzsche's crucial discoveries. The critique of the Cartesian cogilo places Nietzsche in the 
position of to use Ricoeur's expression, "the privileged adversary of Descartes" ' :\loving 
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pressure in which the vital function, be it of death or of life, reenacts the body of language. 
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the unconscious as Lacan called it, in which philosophical theorising finds its beginning. In 
fact, there is nothing more active in philosophising than the philosopher's instinct: "most of 
the conscious thinking of a philosopher is secretly guided and forced into certain channels 
by his instincts". 6 By the same stroke, philosophy turns in a new direction whilst the 
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in the direction of the drive, philosophy comes to take its primal contours in the form of 
self-analysis. Philosophers have been always engaged in it but seldom, if at all, admitted to 
practising it. By one and the same stroke, philosophy of existence becomes a sort of 
philosophy jouis5;ance and lack to produce lies of self-introspection from which 
foundations for psychoanalysis could be laid. Freud's "discovery" is at the beginning rooted 
in self-analysis and hypnotic therapy to pave the way, but also to mark indebtedness to the 
Nietzschean heritage that Freud came to acknowledge only in passing,8 for fantasy and 
transference without which there would not be psychoanalysis. To whom and how will the 
psychoanalytical heritage have paid off its debt? 
The employment of the drives, say the "drive to knowledge" [Trieb zur Erkenntnis 
- also perception, understanding, cognition], in which Nietzsche did not believe much 
himself, is not yet a guarantor of a philosophical honesty, let alone does it produce what 
psychoanalysis calls the moment of truth. The desire for knowledge, for immortal life and 
truth does in fact the opposite; it invites and provokes prejudicial formulations. Nietzsche's 
"rhetorical interpretation of philosophy", which for Ricoeur was "directed at subverting the 
claim of [Cartesian] philosophy to set itself up as science, in the strong sense of a 
foundational discipline" should therefore be understood as a "discourse on truth as a lie".9 
The fact that we turn our blind eye to the way the drives of the psychic body 
inspire us to philosophising, leads to a production of lies and fiction which would allow us 
to interpret not the "objective" truth of knowledge but the relation of the desire to the 
Other. What anguish, what guilty mourning and what demand of the Other make desire 
bypass the Other and deflect its object, or, in other words, what is it that the subject does 
/lot desire, does not seek to learn as a knowledge of his/her desire, is the symptom of how 
philosophy progressed hitherto. In which case Nietzsche might not have wanted to tell us 
the truth in the series of fragmentary documents, but precisely the untruth, the myth of 
philosophy. It is in this light that we might follow through one of such fragments. It bears 
witness to what it does not say, what philosophers have never come to say: 
Gradually it has become clear to me what every great philosopher so far has been: namely, the 
personal confession [Selbstbekenntnis] of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious 
memoir. ( .. ) Accordingly_ I do not believe that a 'drive to knowledge' [Trieb zur Erkenntnis] is the 
father of philosophy: but rather that another drive [anderer Trieb] has, here as elsewhere, employed 
understanding IErkenntnis] (and misunderstanding [Jierkenntnis]) as a mere instrument. But anyone 
"ho considers the basic driH~s of man to see to ,yhat extent they may have been at play just here as 
inspiring splrifs (or demons and kobolds) "ill find that all of them have done philosophy at some 
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time - that every single one of them would like only too well to represent just itself as the ultimate 
purpose of existence and the legitimate master of all the other drives. For every drive \\-ants to be 
master - and it attempts to philosophise inthat spirit. 10 • 
Confession, cognition, understanding and knowledge belong to a family whose 
membership has always depended on the libidinal function of the drive. The complexity of 
knowing, of coming to know and of having knowledge, is thus inseparable from the 
familial bond cemented by, but also founded on, the Other. It is to the Other that the 
subject, whether the subject of the family or of philosophy, has always been subject to in 
the dis-course of self-confession and self-analysis. 
There are at least two axes on which the passage rests, the I and the drive. There is 
also an object. Somewhere there is the real at work, the stigmatised body that does not 
speak. Nietzsche's solitude has by now mobilised into work the ingredients that constitute 
Lacanian specularity. But does Nietzsche speculate? Philosophical solitude facilitates a 
dialectic in which echoes, as I have said above, the voice of the other, the voice as a 
lacking object in writing. The discourse is constructed somewhere on the borders between 
the two, the me and the I. Lacan, for example, makes it clear that it is a dialogue between 
the two, the I speaking and the me being spoken or supposed by the signifier of the Other, 
that grants us the conditions for "dealienation of the subject". They are not identical with 
each other, and it is this division of the subject that prompts Nietzsche to turn the 
philosophical truths inside out. But then, is he not saying something else in this 
rendezvous? 
During imaginary conversation with the object, Nietzsche maintains an ambiguous 
relation with the dead (Other). Sometimes it takes on a form of a myth of the Other, 
another time it is a psychic document presented to him as a fragmented and disrupted text, 
the witness to his mother's tears, mourning. Does she still have a son? Having learnt of his 
own insufficiency, and the insufficiency of the Other, "the Other as lacking" as Lacan often 
put it, Nietzsche calls out the name of the Other, summons the absent father. He then 
idealises the dead (Other). Idealisation goes hand in hand with the fascination 
thatimmortalises the living: "Only the dead no longer die". The "I" as subject is therefore 
not to be taken for truth, as Nietzsche warns us in Beyond Good and Evil, by him who 
speaks it. II At best the "I" is a fictional character whose speech already reveals what he 
does not write, his death. To desire the future is to desire death of that which in the first 
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place desired him, the mother. Hence the dress, the masks and masquerade of language, 
the truth as woman. And hence the future as belonging to noone, no simultaneous 
presence of subjects for the signifiers that represent them to circulate, which he addresses 
by writing the reversed reconciliation with its destiny, namely, that it will or has been taken 
for fiction. No one will have taken me for truth. 
The second axis which carries the cited passage is the other drive [anderer Trieb]. 
Generally speaking, the drive has always been found active in philosophical writing, and as 
an activity assumed certain function. It has employed subterfuge and misunderstanding, 
fiction, even confusion. Its power has been dominating and of paramount importance for 
the reading of philosophical text because, seeking the ultimate truth, it has come to erase it 
and leave in this place the naked power to deceive, evade, conceal and, above all, to 
nihilate. In fact, the other drive is nothing else but the power to erase the truth as myth-
telling, which in the first analysis always strikes as a suicidal quest for self-effacement. It is 
the terror of the real, that before which words stop, that turns narcisstic passion for self-
nihilation into a drama of a solitary writer like Nietzsche - drama manifested in the 
ambiguous impossibility of appropriationlnihilation of the image, which nevertheless 
functions as a mediatory drive. Doubtless, such power is active in writing; it is, perhaps, 
writing itself. 
Such is the provocation of the last one who is also the first, where philosophers do 
not tread and the analytic discourse can be heard in the vicinity as a series of 
supplementary notes. He who writes truth does not want to be referred to or quoted as 
truth, which is why he speaks of another drive being at work without naming it. He would 
rather be untruth and unknowledge. He performs what others think they do not do, doing 
what Nietzsche, for example, does undoing. He does not want to be seen as a prophet of 
truth or as a teacher of truth because he recognises the ambivalence of the other drive that 
does the opposite, represses, forecloses, negates, erases the written, mimes the voice, 
substitutes, displaces, wrongfoots, and lures to satisfaction that is nonsatisfaction. 
Nietzsche does not want to be taken for what he is not, a living being that has once and for 
all written out his death, nor for what he lacks, the name Nietzsche for example, given to 
him by the Other yet the same name you and I play with as if it was a little souvenir from 
the past. He does not wish to be taken for truth for it is a fiction which has since echoed 
after him in Lacan' s formula: "truth is structured like a fiction" For a philosopher it always 
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comes back to the question of the subject, to deciphering his desire in the self-inscription 
before the mediatory other. Nietzsche is one of those philosophers whose relation with the 
real transports him to the extremes of jouissance of the body . Writing has to do with the 
body and with the irreversible of the body: "Of all writings I love that which is written with 
blood. Write with blood: and you will discover that blood is spirit", thus spoke 
Zarathustra. 12 
The question that Nietzsche addresses to philosophers is the same question that 
Freud raised confronted with what later became the "ego psychology". How do the 
philosophers propose to bypass the work of the other drive that metaphorises the 
repressed time of a signifier, and dissolves, time after time, the power to seduce and to go 
astray when it realises that the reader's eyes do not follow where it does not go? Another 
drive does not seek alibis. It itself is beyond alibis because being at work it does not speak 
with the mouth whose movement we could follow or with the "I" we seek to recognise as 
properly mine. Another drive does not in fact speak or write at all, it signifies. As for 
Nietzsche, he writes what he does not know to obviate that "there is nothing in the 
philosopher that is 'impersonal"', especially his "knowledge", his resistances, defenses, 
ruses, refusals, and reproaches. Philosophers never stop beating the drums of truth. 
Everything that comes under the heading of philosophy, enters, in one form or 
another, into a relation with psychoanalysis, cannot be disassociated from it, the latter 
appearing as philosophy's Other. It is just that philosophers, with their "drive to 
knowledge", cannot know it. In relation to the non-philosophical Other the philosopher 
finds a pretext under which to refuse to unravel the work of the "other drive". Then, 
Nietzsche notices, one finds such refusal already active in the mimetic identification which 
casts an irresistible charm on the writer who exercises the art of self-deception. If the 
psychoanalytical temporalisation of the body "redeems" experience (this is not necessarily 
Freud's recommendation), it is on the level of this symbolic/literary experience that a 
philosophical writer is subject to the unconscious "body" that sends him to the limits of 
language. Such experience is "liberating" only in so far as it, at the same time, does not 
liberate, certainly not the power to liberate, the desire to signify without the one who 
\\rites it. 
Finally, and this will bring us to the end of this chapter, Nietzsche tries the ensure 
how the unconscious becomes manifest in the philosophical discourse. It appears as a 
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certain indistinction, a truly insoucient power of difference that subjects us to an ordeal of 
patience: 
Imagine a being like nature, wasteful beyond measure, indifferent beyond measure, \\1thout purposes 
and consideration, without mercy and justice, fertile and desolate and uncertain at the same time; 
imagine indifference itself as a power - how could you live according to this indifference? Living _ 
is that not precisely wanting to be other than this nature? Is not living - estimating preferring, being 
unjust, being limited, wanting to be different?~3 
According to another provocation, the future philosopher will have found inspiration in the 
power of indifference which itself is responsible for both the capacity to differentiate and 
the unremitting postponement for the thanatic drive to write without reserve. But this 
"indifference itself as a power" also concerns the mentioned earlier lack of distinction 
between the imaginary and the symbolic functions in writing - a lack that Nietzsche only 
brought to our attention as an experience in psychoanalytical terms, opens a labyrinth of 
alienation. 
It took centuries for philosophy to speak with an indifference to the "norms of 
objectivity" (Derrida) which are still hailed in the theontological institutions and their 
scientific quarters. To-day one can see that Nietzsche's arrogance, although not without a 
price, paid off. It has even become an inspiration for the truth of the subject when it is at 
the same time deciphered as fiction. But the spectre of "objectivity", which for Descartes 
functioned as an agent of the objectifying "I", and whose subjective origins Lacan so 
brilliantly demonstrated in his aesthetics of the mirror stage, is not identical with the 
subject of the unconscious, its objectality.14 Here, the symptom is alluded to in a particular 
style of philosophy that Nietzsche opened, the ambiguity between the lacking object in the 
subject's discourse and the lack as object of desire. It is the philosophical pretension for 
the exclusive omnipresence of the so called "objectivity" that Nietzsche subjected to 
questioning: 
'Objecti\ity' in the philosopher: moral indifference toward oneself, blindness toward good or ill 
consequences: lack of scruples about using dangerous means; perversity and multiplicity of character 
considered and exploited as an advantage ( .. ) 
(,,) I desire no advantages from my insights and do not avoid the disadvantages that accompany them. 
Here I include \\hat might be called corruption of the character; this perspective is beside the point: I 
lise my character, but try neither to understand nor to change it - the personal calculus of \ irtue has 
not entered IllY head for a moment (.,) 
(,,) To rcvolv~ about oneself: no desire to become 'better' or in any \\ay 'othe~ 
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These words, again, set a certain pattern for the homage of thought that a philosophical 
writer pays to his double, his imaginary other as well as to the "indifference" that 
nevertheless facilitates rhetorical dissemination, which is no doubt the case with Nietzsche. 
F or the writer there is perhaps nothing more insignificant, more inconsequential than what 
he writes. It is of no consequence to me what I say because it does not come back to me, 
ricocheting in the ear of the Other, echoing my desire in the future to come. Whatever 
comes to me has been sent away another time. If this letter ever returns to me, I will not be 
there to sign for it. The three of us live in different times, never belong to one and the 
same. It can only return in the time of this chance turning to another. 
It is of no consequence to me what I say, but it is not by chance that I say this or 
that, having been supposed by the Other in the first place. Nor does it not mean that a 
statement is without consequences which especially in the case of a writer reduce his 
ethical act to a moral blaphemy. If the philosopher is for everyone and noone, as 
Zarathustra makes it clear, he will soon recognise what defines him, that is to say, what 
does not finalise his preoccupations. Philosopher's desire is engendered not by the duty to 
or from the academy, and Nietzsche's case tells us something about the Other's demand 
which he abandoned after his academic career for the sake of desire. But this desire could 
not have come to existence were it not for the power of death, the thanatic drive, that for 
Nietzsche disrupts every contract, infringes the law of his predessessors, turns inside out 
the tablets of Truth to bring us closer to lies and fiction that underlie the facile privileges of 
the philosopher as master-legislator. 
The death drive, then, is one of the conditions of dis-course that at the same time 
renders the subject of discourse, the impassioned jouissance of enunciation, possible. 
Despite the often euphoric tone that underlies his writing, Nietzsche's provocation is at the 
same time an invocation of "sad passions", melancholia, sometimes mourning. Often there 
is also guilt or debt that always accompanies the gift. If for Lacan guilt is a sign of giving 
up on one's desire, Nietzsche's notion of guilt is inseparable from the dialectic of 
receiving/giving a gift. But since writing will have never paid back to the dead Other, if 
only for the freedom of having another life to give and for living the gift, we must give 
what has made us, the Other, to the living. If there is a duty for a philosopher to fulfil, it 
has to do not with melancholia, but mourning which will place him on the border of the 
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lost object that is no longer his; there is his place. He must keep his vigil by the grave, 
where there is nothing to see, but where the fantasy of his "Being-one-with-self' is buried. 
He must therefore mediate not between the gods and humans, but between the dead 
(Other) and the living. He will only write by the candlelight. Its blink is the sign of 
communication and communion that the living have with the dead (Other) by way of 
mourning. Psychoanalysis is a site of mourning over the lost object which gives desire life. 
As a guardian of the quiet luminosity, Nietzsche's philosopher goes under the dialogue 
with the living to signify another time of unconscious desire. Ecstatically, yet motionlessly, 
he goes under the tomb from where his name is called and where his body had been 
marked. There is no One to return to but the void that has summoned his signifier to this 
threshold. 
Although Nietzsche lacks the desire for "becoming better", he senses that such 
desire has been at work since Plato, and that at the core of such compulsion lies a drive to 
preserve the narcisstic me of the master. The spirit of ressentiment, which is the spirit of 
revenge, and as such paved the way for Lacan's concept of aggressivity, sustains the 
narcisstico-obsessional desire for mastery, that is to say, for maintaining the Order erected 
on the imaginary reflection that sutures the lack and retains the drops of jouissance. The 
ressentiment, as Deleuze commented, is, among other operations, a moment "by which 
active force is, simultaneously, separated from what it can do (falsification)".16 The 
separation of the active force of desire of the Other from the passive of being signified, 
spoken, written, to which the imaginary other offers helpful hand, is how Nietzsche 
distinguished the dialectic with the narcisstic object of the master from the conditions of 
this relation. What the aggressive impulse does (mythologises), and what it is capable of 
doing, is how one distinguishes between "the discourse of truth as a lie" and the discourse 
of the master desire as it turns against desire's dunamis. 
Such, according to Deleuze, is Nietzsche's answer to the question concerning the 
difference between the desire of the Other (active) and the demand of the Other (passive): 
"while it is true that active force is fictitiously separated from what it can do, it is also true 
that something real happens as a result of this fiction" (ibid.). This "something real" is "the 
body with which philosophers think", that which guides the philosopher-legislator like 
Plato to establish an order which is mythical from the start in the sense that it gives priority 
not only to the drive to revenge but also to the possibility of desire as a whole. The lack is 
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lacking, agam, and what takes place is a suturation of the void in the body that can 
produce nothing but fiction, indeed, restore narcisstic desire to the place of truth as a lie. 
For Nietzsche, the philosopher-legislator is not the executive of 10gistikon, and 
does not rule according to reason's faculty, which one also finds in Kant. Instead, the 
philosopher appears as unconscious thought of the body that can only be affirmed by way 
of falling on the lack, the moment that also confirms reason's futility and powerlessness. 
One must not create a philosopher in one's image to rule and master. It is the body, the 
unconscious, that gives rise to representations among which is found, and founded, the 
discourse of philosophy. If the discourse testifies to the chain-like concatenation of 
signifiers, which comes nearest to the psychoanalytic "knowledge", it is not in order to 
restore them to the narcisstic splendour of specular and speculative unity. The collection of 
fragments takes place as a caprice of time, his time, to live by the side of the broken, 
fractured spectre of presence. Although it is true that "nothing in the philosopher is 
'impersonal''', it is also true that nothing in him is "personal", nothing in particular except 
forjouissance affirms him as a unique "individual", nothing constitutes the "essential self' 
of thought that presses from thanatos and from his indifference to whatever could mould 
him as "other", or whatever creates him as an event, the event of nothing. Nothing except 
for the symbolic experience of the loss of jouissance and lack that, to the extent that "the 
signifier represents the subject for another signifier" (Lacan), is also an experience of the 
incommunicable. The subject can only be affirmed as a desire to die. 
Let me end with the following note. Philosophy is a gravity, the discourse its 
levitation. To levitate is to turn according to the principle of free fall. To be gravitation-
free, is to be drawn to where the signifier acquires the weight of meaning. Nothing else 
defines the subject but the gravitation of the signijiers, a falling in the direction where they 
will have attempted, again and again, to wear out the burden of superfluous meaning, its 
.lollis-sense, and lift the remaining weight, the surplus of jouissance, back to where desire 
has been, the gliding pace of nonbeing "in a discreet fraternity - a task for which we are 
always too inadequate". Nietzsche's subject never grew tired of preparing us for the later 
discoveries and supplements of psychoanalysis as it took up this impossible love - the time 
of the unconscious Other and its gravitation: to ex-ist to give time to name in the face of 
the lack - my gravitation: where it turned me there I will have turned to it. And then to 
have some knowledge of one's weight, and to experience falling as a kind of freedom - is it 
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for analysis to answer or to signify with the light feet as Nietzsche always said he did? 
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PART II 
PASSIONS OF DEATH 
To go under - if this is the route Nietzsche takes, where is it going, in what 
direction? We have heard some fragmentary echoes of his dialogue with the dead, 
encountered some marks of the solitary descension towards the site of loss and 
symbolisation that takes its place. A quiet vigil, anguishing yet ecstatic tone of Nietzsche's 
writing, mark the way towards the vaults of the lost ideal, to be more specific, of the 
narcisstic me, which Freud marks as I was, one of the epitaphs on the tomb of writing. 
This temporal denomination which Freud lays out in his Introduction to 
Narci.'-;.f·;ism, which Lacan's commentary on the question of imaginary identification takes 
up, is not without relation to Freud's paper, written a year later but published two years 
after he wrote it, that returns to Introduction. Returns, that is to say engages in a strategy 
of reiteration that produces, again, certain doubling effects. Thus reading Mourning and 
melancholia, in accordance with Nietzsche's recommendation of infinite repetition, shows 
signs of such strategy and can therefore be regarded as a supplement to the theory of 
narcissism, to its introduction as Freud was careful to call it. Its development sends us 
therefore in two directions: the new material (empirical, theoretical) and a certain style of 
normalisation which emerges in leaning on the past discoveries and formulations. A return 
to Introduction repeats some of its pathemes rendering the former text supplementary to 
the latter - a supplement that ex-ists in the light of its "predecessor". Introduction thus 
informs Mourning of its discoveries to reform and modify them as a repetition of 
difference. 
Our main concern here is not a theory of affects but a further problematization of 
the time and place of the object, namely the temporal, economical and mimetic additions to 
the subjective formation. In so far as the narcisstic subject, the one which takes the me as 
its object, is caught up in the cobwebs of libidinal homeostasis, and subjected to the 
specular image that makes it prone to fixations, what does the melancholic condition tell us 
about objectal position, as it were the lostness of the vanished object which for Freud 
fimdamentally orients the libidinal dynamic. 
I t was Nietzsche in the first place who, in an attempt to take the Platonic ideal by 
the horns, representation that represents nothing save being, shed some light on its 
formation thus anticipating, but also retroactively acknowledging, the losses to come, 
tipping the scales of alleged equilibrium that the theory of Forms was no doubt to support 
through the ages. The ideal and the object have thus become two of the key notions in 
Freud's return to the question of illness, pathology, pathography, but above all in his 
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introduction of libido theory that was to separate him from Plato's disciples of whom at 
least one rose by Freud's shoulder. The ideal which over the centuries permeated and 
governed philosophical discourse arose not as an effect of historical legacy of the Greeks 
but, such was the turning point of Freud, from the imaginary maintenance of the object on 
the horizon of symbolisation. Some inconceivable presence of the object allowed for a 
philosophy to rely on consciousness as a centre point, and on the object as an upholding 
principle of its surveys. The lost object, no doubt most clearly embodied in Lacan's 
discourse but whose shadowy traces founded Freud's libidinal theory, has thus become not 
only one of the crucial issues, and which perhaps lies at the root of the discovery of the 
unconscious, but also wrongfooted and tripped metaphysical and phenomenological 
passages translating them into what evolved in opposition and parallel to psychoanalytic 
formulations and what could be called philosophy of jouissance. 
A resemblance of this lost object came to embody an ideal which, since Nietzsche 
and Freud, can now be placed nowhere else but in the pits of microcosm of subjectivity of 
which it is formative as a lack, a disrupting gap closely, that is to say, extimately tied up to 
discursive practices on the one hand, and on the other, to the objectal loss of which we 
have already spoken. It is in this light that we should regard Mourning and melancholia as 
a reflection on narcissism in the double sense to find in it nocturnal marks of losses and 
'withdrawals that gave rise to a certain kind of writing, a thanatographic inscription in 
search of the object lost, not just any object but that whose alluring absence makes writing 
possible making it trail the voice under the dead letter. Not only would this reflection, with 
all its deferral effects of temporal difference, be Freud's own recapitulation of the terms 
that emerged as an effect of schism in the analytical milieu, but it would also open new 
pathways in which the old ones re-mark an echo with which we seem to be already 
familiar. But are we? 
CIIAPTER6 
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INTRODUCTION TO THE READING OF MOURNING AJYD 
MELANCHOLIA - IDENTIFICATION, INCORPORATION 
It is not necessarily to be decided in the present account if melancholia constitutes 
its own clinical morphology, an ontology that would be structurally distinct from other 
clinical models. If Freud assigns to it the traits of transference neurosis, it is to emphasise 
its narcisstic aspects. For narcissism and melancholia are libidinal allies. They are 
inseparable and mutually intertwined. Whereas narcissism is responsible for the retreat of 
the libido into the me and emergence of the ideal-I that will remain associated with the 
narcisstic object, melancholia supports imaginary death in the name of this ideat within its 
vaults can be found a dialogue of the crypt, the dead body, the cadaver. 
But it is not only by way of support that the melancholic passion draws the 
intelligible means it gleans from and towards meditation on death. Such death, which no 
doubt is not all of it, has already been erected as a (mimetic) agency that will persecute and 
prosecute the residual me following the emergence of the ideal. 1 I said "imaginary" death, 
not specular, for melancholia underscores in making use of the imaginary me which in 
narcissism saw its emergence due to the specular reflection. After all it is the body-image 
that is missing here. Still, it is no reason for it not to give way to language, the sad passion 
which gives rise to the forlorn praxis of the word. Freud's observations of this fact in the 
clinic are not to be taken without reference to poets and philosophers who speak of 
oblivion and loss. For what is encountered in melancholia is a relation to the death of the 
imaginary other, in other words to self-mortification which keeps death alive. But does not 
this "keeping death alive" provoke certain dissatisfaction with death, a desire for death, 
that confirms with every word an inadequacy of metaphor of death, perhaps of metaphor in 
general? Melancholia's intimate relation with the jouissance of the body, the enjoyment of 
pathos that keeps coming back to the ever growing intensity of the symbol granting it 
more death and less life - this melancholic jouissance is but one of many tortuous features 
that Freud singled Odt in his study. But he was not the only one. Freud managed to draw 
them up on the basis of clinical experience and, as we shall see, they are not at all foreign 
to \\ hat can be found in a certain style of fiction, literature, philosophy or writing 10 
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general. What are these traits as they appear to Freud and what can we make of their 
relation to the "melancholic" writing, the relation in which a degree of reciprocity allows 
us to extract from it its general traits? 
In Freud's account, with which I will begin, the characteristics of melancholia 
oscillate between "profoundly painful dejection, cessation of interest in the outside world, 
loss in the capacity to love, inhibition of all activity" to growing self-reproaches and self-
criticism that "culminates in a delusional expectation ofpunishment".2 How then should we 
take the words of a subject who indulges without measure in the presentation of self-
debasement and self-reproach, and unremitting complaints about his or her unworthiness, 
what in everyday language has come to be known as "complex of inferiority"? How are we 
to interpret the verbal picture of his or her unworthiness that demands punishment? 
We have learnt from the lessons of psychoanalysis that the discourse in the analytic 
process reveals another layer or dimension of libidinal fixations whereby representations 
[t 'orstellungen] or signifiers are incarcerated at the time of painful/pleasurable repetition. 
The development of signification echoes the holes and gaps around which repetition has 
found its deadly dwelling giving rise to jouissance. Melancholia is not exempt from these 
general procedures that stem from the discovery of the law of the unconscious, but rather, 
together with other symptoms, testifies to the repression of the signifier to the extent that 
what is subjected to it is a speaking being. And yet, in his analysis of melancholia, Freud 
considers, not without irony, another possibility, what at least seems to be another 
possibility. 
What is at stake here is the question, or should we say a practice, of the symptom 
formation and truth. It is Lacan who reminds us in this respect of a certain convolution 
which involves "double reference to speech and language": 
In order to free the subject's speech, \ye introduce him into the language of his desire, that is to say. 
into the the primary language in which, beyond ,,,hat he tells us ofhimself3 he is already talking to us 
unknown to himself, and, in the first place, in the symbols of the symptom. 
Since what is repressed in the unconscious is the symbol or the signifier, the articulation of 
wishes, complaints, recollections and surprises, that is to say symptoms, will lead to a 
production of metaphorical displacement which, in so far as they make themselves heard 
and recognised by the subject, do not by this virtue constitute the realm of tnlth but rather 
a succession of lies that bend towards truth at the moment of fall Of lapse in the discoufse 
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thus constructed. Metaphor in the discourse appears as "a guide [ ... J whose symbolic 
displacement will neutralise the secondary meanings of the terms that it associates".4 The 
place and function of the secondary meaning will interest us here for it reintroduces the 
duality, and often a duplicity, of references one of which is concealed from the subject. 
This occult element, whether it is operative in the form of mimicry of an image (meaning) 
or symbolical association (signification) is that without which metaphor could not work. 
But the metaphor, Lacan tells us, is not a mere juxtaposition of any two names or 
signifiers, which would no doubt produce an effect of automatic signification gleaned from 
such an intention, but a pairing of symbols between which the unsaid image is sparked off, 
so that something else comes into view. In "traffic was a bitch" we are encountering a 
displacement of meaning which constitutes the metaphorical axis. Something else is meant, 
that is to say imaginarized for the simple reason that something else is identified by the 
subject, that is to say, is subjected to identification. For Lacan the place of the metaphor in 
the discourse is a mark of identification that reveals the subject, rather than comparison 
between two values outside subjectivity: 
TI1C dimension of metaphor must be less difficult for us to enter than for anyone else, provided that 
we recognise that what we usually call it is an identification. But that's not all - our use of the term 
symholic in fact leads us to restrict its sense, to designate only the metaphorical dimension of the 
s~ mbol. Metaphor presupposes that a meaning is the dominant datum and that it deflects, commands, 
the use of the signifier to such an extent that entire species of preestablished, I should say lexical, 
cOlmections comes undone? 
The metaphorical displacement revolves around the production of "primary" meanmgs 
which can only be generated by way of the "secondary" meanings falling, as a result of 
identification, into place. But just as metaphorization is unthinkable without the subject -
Fink even goes as far as to say that: "metaphor's creative spark is the subject: metaphor 
creates the subject,,6 - so the subject caught up within identification is inconceivable 
outside the field of the value of truth. Freud speaks of truth in relation to melancholia and 
we should pay heed to its place and function. Is the truth of the melancholiac merely to 
remind us of the "true understanding" or "self-understanding" that allowed philosophers to 
speak in the place of the Other while concealing the subjectivity of their discourse \\·here 
the symptom always already revealed itself in such metaphoricity? Does the truth of 
philosophy and "true understanding" find themselves in the place of melancholia where 
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.\Dmething else, as Nietzsche showed us, is already at work? If so, then every truth which 
has embarked on the adventure of becoming self-evident and self-manifest must have 
risked self-exposure to the ambivalence and manifoldness of meanings in the sense of 
producing subjectal identifications, that is say, metaphor as a symptom. Freud's 
contributions to the study of melancholia are not devoid of allusions to how 
philosophising, in so far as it attempts to bypass the work of the unconscious, falls into 
misunderstanding, what Lacan called meconaissance. We cannot be certain any longer if 
his "contribution" is to be understood on this level. If metaphorization, which orbits 
around the pathemes of subjectivity, symptom and truth, has something else to declare, the 
analysis of melancholia will not necessarily solicit intervention, let alone interpretation, but 
leave the analyst enigmatically silent. 
It would not be surprising if, in the light of Freudian psychoanalysis which has 
always priority to neurosis, we took the discourse of the melancholiac as an instance of 
articulation. This would from the start allow us to place this articulation in relation to the 
Other, as a repressed discourse of the unconscious. It is the repressed signifier after all that 
renders articulation possible, always leaving something out, omitted or forgotten, 
something else that escapes while soliciting another symbol to make sense. In melancholia, 
this something other, which in the first place echoes the narcisstic attachments to the 1-
ideal and the specular passion over the body-image, on which the subject relies to the same 
degree to which he cries out for transcending the boundaries of his nose,7 is not given a 
recognition it would otherwise receive. The truth is not to be taken for a lie as tluth but, 
such seems to be Freud's recommendation, for what it is worth, that is to say, for what it 
says: "The patient must surely be right in some way and be describing something that is as 
it seems to him to be. Indeed we must at once confirm some of his statements without 
reservation".8 
A remark worth commenting on for, contrary to what we have learnt from 
psychoanalysis, it places the ruses of the subject's self-expression on the same le\'el as the 
unconsciously repressed signifier of the Other placing the melancholiac in the place oj the 
Other as if there was no place for a symptom addressed to the Other. \\hich would in turn 
place the subject in an alienating distance from the other. As if such a subjecti\'e separation 
\\ere not already linked to an identificatory metaphor that conceals anotlier meaning of the 
Other's jouissance, subject to his complaints about the lack. As if the lo\'e-object were not 
already an object-loss sadly and intimately intertwined with the me. Indeed, if we rely on 
Lacan's formula, absence of a metaphor would turn out to be an absence of a symptom. 
F or Freud then melancholia seems to be endowed with a power to express the affect 
roused by the intimation of the mOther rather than signifY the gaps between the signifiers 
("traffic", "was", "the bitch", for example). Such an expression, which I have called here as 
U: takes precedence over what does not yet seem discernible, thus constituting a 
fundamental resistance to the analytic process. But Freud attempts to demonstrate that, 
what might be called, melancholic resistance should be taken literally. We must therefor 
return to our initial question: how is the melancholiac's discourse to be heard and 
interpreted, given that "resistance is always on the side of the analyst"? Freud continues: 
He really is as lacking in interest and as incapable oflove and achievement as he says. But that, as we 
know, is secondary~ it is the effect of the internal work which is unknown [unbekannten] to us ( ... ). 
He also seems to us justified in certain other self-accusations; it is merely that he has a keener eye for 
the truth than other people who are not melancholic. When in his heightened self-criticism he 
describes himself as petty, egoistic, dishonest, lacking in independence, one whose sole aim has been 
to hide the weaknesses of his own nature, it may be, so far as we knO\\, that he has come pretty near 
to understanding himself; we only wonder why a man has to be ill before he can be accessible to a 
truth of this kind.9 
An illness at the service of truth whose "internal work" remains hidden, unknown to both 
the subject and the analyst. Freud does not resist the resistance in melancholia. He takes up 
his position by granting a special privilege to the melancholic confession which places it in 
the proximity of truth. As for the subject his ambivalent privilege is taken at the price of 
"heightened self-criticism", which already appeared in the Introduction, and self-negation 
or negation of the me. 
What kind of truth is at stake here, given that it does not appear as a lie or as a 
metaphor that conceals the unsaid yet operative value of another meaning? Is it not the 
same kind of truth that Nietzsche brought to light in his attempt to rock the boat of old 
truths of philosophy from which one cannot expect anything more and anything less than a 
"host of metaphors" and an avalanche of symptoms that at some point began to bear heavy' 
on us? But here we should distinguish the position occupied by Nietzsche's writing from 
the one of the analyst, namely, that whereas Nietzsche's fundamental revaluation of all 
values and fundamental critique of all metaphysics to come turns on the axis of the 
imaginary ideal. the analyst'S silence that responds to the question of the melancholic loss 
has come to reflect the emptiness of the same meaning, which Freud brought into 
existence by inserting in his commentary a symbolic repetition and, in the distance of 
irony, allowed for the lack of opposition to resistance to be heard in it. lO Freud's "silence" 
in response to melancholia does not promote interpretation as truth but effects an awaiting 
for the lies as truth to burst through, so that a response to the demand of the Other of 
silence disrupt the anguish of waiting. 
What kind of truth then does Freud propose inhabits, and doubtless inhibits, the 
melancholic space when taking melancholia for what it says - is it the one of anxiety which 
tells the truth of resistance in the discourse of the Other or the one of the divided subject 
which speaks without knowing that it signifies in the face of the real? The former would 
doubtless tell us something about all meditations on death given that they do not render it 
ideal. 11 The anguished truth of the melancholiac speaks from the Other to the Other as if 
there was no Other. In Freudian terms the breach of transference and the libido's 
withdrawal from the object - due to "real sleight or disappointment [realen Kr=llkung 
odeI' h,'ntt~uschung]", 12 the terms I will come back to - has no other object to be attached 
to, is neither substituted by nor displaced onto another object. Such truth speaks at the 
cross-roads where no truth as lie is yet possible, in other words, where it is not inhibited by 
the "unknown loss". An absence of inhibition making the truth possible? Such would be 
Freud's ambivalence as regards his treatment of melancholia, the ambiguous inheritor of 
narcisstic ideal, in the proximity of unforgetfulness as truth. Here, we should not reduce 
this ambivalence to a contradiction of the terms that constitute it, but examine them further 
as a certain ironic provocation. 
It is true that Freud speaks of such inhibition which I have taken for a hindrance to 
the emergence of truth as aletheia, unconcealment. But that is not so. I would only be led 
in this fashion to what in the Introduction Freud called idealisation, namely, the sexual 
overrating of the object, that leads to its aggrandisement and alienation of the subject. 
Inhibition on the one hand, and anguish on the other, would, if I were to follow this line of 
objection, appear as major obstacles to both symptom formation, and further, to the 
assumption of the symptom by the subject, broadly speaking, an assumption of the lack as 
an object of desire. 
The absence of substitution and displacement would invite us to consider a 
psychotic phenomenon whereby the signifier of the Other, as in dreams for example, has 
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been appropriated by the subject in such a way that the work of displacement - alongside 
condensation or metaphor and metonymy in Lacan's terms - is out of place, has no place to 
take place and no time in which the temporal difference to work. If self-reproach and self-
negation are the undeniable accomplices of the melancholic passion, its constitution, 
understood outside metaphorization, would acquire a hallucinatory character. It is taken 
for truth only because the melancholic subject expresses his worthlessness for the Other in 
the form of a projective reversal of the Other's lack for the subject. The absence of a 
metaphor would thus signal a lack of inhibition, as mentioned above, in which the signifier 
of the Other (Sl) is taken for the real, which in turn would indicate that the real, that 
"before which the words stop", has not been recognised as a certain impossibility of 
signification beyond a point in which a signifier cannot be substituted for another signifier. 
Such phenomenon of the return of the real where the symbolic fails, would give rise to a 
delusional construction where "words are taken as things, as real objects".13 Jouissance of 
the Other takes over the "truth of the subject" in signification. This impossibility points to 
the "unknown loss" which thus remains unrecognised in the play of metaphors. This may 
sound strange for we are accustomed to think that melancholia concerns nothing but the 
loss and that according to this logic the arrival of the melancholic jouissance was effected 
by the occurrence of loss. But in fact, if viewed in such a way, in melancholia no loss has 
taken place. 
Following Freud's work on dreams, R. Samuels points out that in dreams the 
movement is from primary perception, which holds the subject hostage to infantile 
sexuality, towards thought which opens the symbolic gates of the signifier.1.t The 
projective reversal in melancholia shows that instead of the recognition of a loss giving 
rise to symbolic signification - metaphor on the level of identification and metonymy on the 
level of desire - the impossible and unsignifiable real, Freudian primary repression, is given 
a name (a "loss" for example) every time it happens. In Lacanian terms, the movement 
towards another signifier (S2) is thus hindered for it is presupposed by giving meaning to 
the master signifier (Sl). As a result the signifier of the Other takes on a function not of 
representing the subject for another signifier (Sl for S2), but of the "subject" being 
represented by being perceived, thought, spoken. An appeal to the signified aids a 
psychotic delirium which centres on what Lacan called foreclosure of the patronym, the 
paternal/symbolical cut in the jouissance-pervaded mythical union between the child and 
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the mother, in contradistinction to repression which is fundamental in neurOSIS. In 
hallucination the already discussed identificatory being-me remains, structurally and 
temporally, within the corpus of the Other. Hence the psychotic trait in narcissism. The 
lack of difference between the subject and the Other, S2 and Sl, which is only indicative of 
the death of the subject, shows an impossible passage from identification to object-choice, 
and remains incarcerated in the "regression from one type of object-choice to original 
narcissism" .15 In temporal terms the lack of difference, the lack of the "sense of time", as 
Freud put it, does not imply the lack of difference between, say before and after. The 
absence of difference appears as an absence of the after in the face of the real which 
precedes symbolisation. Since the temporal difference works in relation to death as a loss 
in the real, it is the after that symbolises the lack of before, that is to say, retroactively 
metaphorises what is "fundamentally" missing. But why in melancholia does the Other, 
whether as an object or a signifier, become devoid of value for the subject, given that, due 
to the projective reversal, the subject perceives himself as worthless, keeps his self-
negation intact? 
Freud tells us that something significant happens here. In narCISSIsm the me 
becomes an object but in melancholia the difference between the me and the object ceases 
to exist. Instead of the displacement of the object onto another, there appears an eclipse of 
the me by the object and, instead of a metaphor, an incorporation comes to an aid. In the 
intimacy of incorporation the merging of the me and the object emerges not as a 
substitution but as a fundamental foreclosure of the condition of signification which can 
only be operative metaphorically and metonymically in transference. Incorporation of the 
object is therefore played out against identification to which Freud has always imparted a 
much greater significance. 
Secondly, the incorporation of a love-object, which confirms the loss in the psychic 
economy, becomes, as Freud points out, "an excellent opportunity for the ambivalence in 
love-relationships to make itself effective and come into the open" .16 The diminishing of 
the subject's value is unthinkable without the splitting of the me and without one part of it 
turning against the other to blame it for the loss. Although the object has been abandoned, 
as Freud writes a few lines later, love persists with the immediate effect of setting the 
ambivalence of love and hate to work. This division has a narcisstic feature attached to it. 
The hated part of the me - the process is sustained by the participation of the "critical 
107 
agency" that has already introjected the VOIce as a medium of parental intervention 
concerning law and prohibition - is held responsible for the loss of the loved object and 
itself becomes an object of destructive tendencies of the other (part), among which Freud 
mentions sadism, self-torment and a suicidal fantasy. This hatred of the other is translated, 
with an aid of the mechanism of projection, into "the Other hates me", which gives rise to 
the persecutory self-punishment. Such fulfilment and satisfaction are not constitutive of the 
neurotic subject, neither in Lacanian nor Freudian terms. Instead of signification that 
resorts to metaphor for the first yield, the Oedipal dialectic is altogether bypassed leading 
to an irruption of jouissance. Such omission, to say the least, takes on a life of the 
guarantee of uninterrupted access to the maternal body and forecloses the symbolic 
function of the father as a certain failure of intervention, the cut. On the one hand, the child 
becomes overwhelmed and enveloped in the mother's jouissance, and on the other, an 
attempt to sever himself from it extends onto both further refusal of castration and a 
grievous acceptance of life's only meaning, his melancholic jouissance. 
According to Freud love persists even if the love-object has been abandoned, 
persisting in relation to the object that takes place of the loss, the object-loss 
[Obiektverlust]. Freud remains ambiguous about "a loss in regard to an object", as he 
prefers to call it rather than "loss of an object", and love for it as if it was only the place it 
occupies that underwent alteration. He remarks for example that the me can only be 
destroyed if "owing to the return of object-cathexis, it can treat itself as an object - it is 
able to direct against itself the hostility which relates to an object and which represents the 
me's original reaction to objects in the external world" .17 The suicide, in which "the 
murderous impulses against others" turn back against the subject in the form of self-
destruction, is therefore conditioned upon the existence of an other. Despite the fact that 
the object shows itself to be always "more powerful than the me itself', the overshadowing 
of the object in love differs from that of suicide. Although we have ascribed some 
psychotic features to melancholia (melancholic jouissance of the mOther in the place of 
signification, projective reversal in the place of the imaginary self-reflection, hallucination 
rather than metaphorization), we can now see that melancholia is not without the other. 
Due to the envelopment of the object, the me itself has undergone a peculiar 
disappearance overshadowing, even consuming itself. Given that the me is an agency of 
I1lL'COllllai,\·,v1I1ce, its vanishing contributes directly to the melancholiac's self-negation that 
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has a way with truth. That is to say, which Freud says without saying it, self-negation as 
truth is not to be negated. This would indicate that, in some cases, neurotcization of 
psychosis is possible. If the truth of melancholia is hallucinatory in effect, resistantly 
leaping to capture literally the perception of the Other, its "literality" speaks with anguish 
of the Other of death. But anxiety gives melancholia support of the lost object. Has the 
melancholiac attained the kind of self-understanding and the "kind of truth" Nietzsche 
always took with the pinch of salt, a state of ecstatic beatitude that catapulted him outside 
philosophical discourse as truth? 
Truth, self-understanding, literality are but facets that raise epistemological claims 
in their own right. That is to say, although we can hear in them the echoes of philosophical 
tradition that goes back to Plato, in our analysis they appear as constitutive of the 
"unknown loss" giving rise to "the impoverishment of the me" and sense-of-self 
[lchgefiihlJ But it is not the lowering of self-image and expectation of punishment that 
triggers off the melancholic passion. What "causes" it, what disrupts object-choice and 
ruins identification, is the "real insult" [realen Krankung] which comes from the loved 
person. The lapse into self-worthlessness and emptiness are provoked or called forth in the 
patient [Kranke], which does not happen without the voice, by the Other for whom I am 
lacking. Hence the crucial distinction between who and what of the loss. The melancholiac 
who claims to know who he has lost must have failed to symbolise what he has lost in him. 
He fell out of favour with the Other for whom, it can be said, the me is lacking. I am 
lacking for the Other because the object of the Other is lacking for me. And if I am not the 
object of the Other's love, or if I am is not an on object of the Other's desire, this object is 
lost for me. This reversal has already its roots in the division of the me where the loss of 
the love-object is confirmed in the act of hostility towards that which should be blamed 
and punished for allowing it to have happened. I have been lost as an object of desire of 
the Other. Hence the regressive traits of melancholia that appeals to oral support for 
having a bite of the Other. Consummation of the object has come to be identified with the 
erasure of the me, and with it, of the imaginary mediation. What cannot be said of the 
narcisstic position which strengthens the me as an object, is articulated in melancholia as 
an emptiness and absence of the me which appears to the Other without the veil of 
representation. If it is not without some justification that we should take the words of 
melancholia as truth-telling, it is because it has no relationship to the imaginary. In 
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melancholia, the point we will come back to later, there is no time for the imaginary. 
Should one be surprised that for Lacan it is the imaginary which represents the locus of 
truth? And, by the same stroke, of fiction and lies that sustain speech. 
The melancholiac - the patient par excellence, if we can call him so to the extent 
that his jouissance binds him to the body of the mOther whose desire, not entirely without 
the traits of perversion, he seems to have grabbed by the horns, and who, by being guided 
back and forth in the delirium of inferiority and emptiness, nevertheless embraces the 
signifier of truth about the Other - knows. Such would be Freud's suspicion or ironic 
suggestion which will lead him to consider melancholia as a preamble to mania on the one 
hand, and on the other, as an economic factor of the release of "a large expenditure of 
psychical energy" which, due to resistance in analysis, enables him by means of action to 
throw off his compulsions. 18 Leaving these aside we come to the question of melancholiac 
knowledge. What does it consist in, what is it a knowledge of, given that a loss is usually 
associated with the knowledge of who was lost, if not a knowledge of the Other. Not only 
does the melancholiac know what the Other lost in him - or what is the object of the Other 
that is lacking for the subject - but he also knows the cause of his own predicament. One 
does not exist without the other. He knows, for example, what is wrong with him and it is 
to this aspect that Freud draws our attention. Nothing is wrong with him, that is to say 
everything is wrong which his self-reproaches and accusations confirm; he is simply 
worthless and inferior to others. But it may well be that such a shift towards 
neuroticization in melancholia serves here merely as a point of illustration how the 
symptom, the complaint of the neurotic subject, has already come into place, and does not 
necessarily show the clinical status of a relation between psychosis and neurosis as 
separate structures. In such anticipation one after all overlooks the subtleties on which an 
analysis of a particular case rests and which, as in the case of Schreber, would make the 
sad passion as touched upon above recede into a distance. 
Freud indicates that the melancholiac's passion for literality has its sources in self-
destructive attempts to erase in advance, that is to say retroactively, metaphorisation of 
failed identifications. It is when the analyst responds with silence to the subject's call for 
sLlch negation that the subject becomes provoked to find in this call an already reversed 
reply to the demand of the Other. 19 If the melancholiac does not hear himself speak in the 
mode of a reply to the lack of the Other, it is because melancholia devours its own secrecy. 
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Melancholia has no secret, which strangely opposes Freud's remark about the enigma of its 
"internal force", because it has consumed its enigma. Secrecy guarantees the lack of 
guarantees whereas melancholia, by erasing secrecy, can only admit to the immanent truth 
devoid of the lack. Melancholia's seductive power has therefore to do with the sacrifice 
and renunciation of concealment. Melancholia stands in the open in the unconcealment of 
truth. Mediating without mediation it circulates its lack of secrecy which renders it 
transparent. If that constitutes melancholia's secret, it is to be divulged as non secret, 
unconcealment. But in doing so, in resisting imaginary mediation and seductively 
concealing its concealment, in burying itself in what is buried in it, does it not become a 
crypt of a cryptogram occulted by and received from the Other? To whom does the 
melancholiac address himself for he does not address no one? 
Writing of melancholia solicits meditations which are not devoid of a certain 
insufficiency that places its intricacies on the opposite pole to narcissism. A lack of 
empirical material, however, did not prevent Freud - who in the course of writing his paper 
acknowledges a shortage of observations that would confirm his theory along with the 
"unknown" character of the melancholic ergos and its somewhat "enigmatic" and 
"uncertain" manifestations - from considering melancholic economy and structure in view 
of what was accessible to him. This includes not only his own observations on the cases in 
which he was at the time involved but also, and maybe above all, the exchange of 
correspondence with Karl Abraham who prided himself on being an expert in the field. 20 
Abraham introduced in this respect the term incorporation which for him was a valid 
candidate to replace Freud's notion of identification that is on the limp in melancholia. 
Secondly, Abraham used and confused in his studies the notion of incorporation with that 
of introjection introduced,21 again, not by Freud but Ferenczi. Freud duly confirms 
Abraham's contributions which include his study on the oral phase in the regressive 
tendencies in melancholia. But by confirming them he does not necessarily take them up to 
elaborate but leaves it to others Abraham himself included. 
Melancholic jOllissance floods the child like a ballast bearing heavy on the ship of 
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desire that is likely to sink. Since the imaginary me is eclipsed by the shadow of the object-
loss, its disappearance can only be seen as a blind suffering of jouissance in the darkness of 
the crypt. The Other of jouissance, in contrast to desire, invades the melancholiac as 
something foreign, which in effect produces an inclusion of the object into the me. 
III 
Although it is difficult to imagine how identification is to operate when the object-choice 
[ObiektwahlJ has been ruined by the invasion of jouissance, Freud seeks a relation between 
the two in the following way. The alleged consummation of the object, Abrahamian 
incorporation or its "devouring", is never successful, since the me only "wants to 
incorporate" the object into itself but fails. It is therefore identification that provides 
conditions for object-choice not the other way round. But in melancholia the specificity of 
the object makes it unlike any other. At the crucial moment, when the real insult 
[Kr~l1kung - which also means injustice, grievance] causes the ruination of object-choice, 
and when no displacement to another object seems to take its place, something of radically 
different nature comes to work. Freud calls it the release of "free libido" and designates to 
it sources other than those of the libidinal investment which failed to find another object. 
Does not Freud confirm here Abraham's observations about the increase of sexual 
jouissance following the loss of a love-object? The "free libido" then aims at something 
else outside the objectal chain and is "withdrawn into the me" which forms "identification 
with the abandoned object". The failure of incorporation, Freud's reply to Abraham none 
the less, takes us into the egotic crypt of shadows and losses. Identification allows Freud 
to establish a link between melancholia and transference neurosis. What perhaps remains 
enigmatic about this renewal of identification is the sudden emergence of fresh libido at 
this point. What is also enigmatic is the fact that its sudden inflow seems to serve two 
different purposes for Freud and Abraham thus giving their correspondence both an 
amusing and somewhat disorienting twist. 
In the letter to Freud, Abraham enthuses over his discovery of "the heightened 
sexual need" and "the increase of libido some time after 'object-loss'" comparing it to the 
"'feast' of the manic", but fails to find a "normal" passage from melancholia to mania. 
Freud is amused by the term "normal", which has somewhat become an outcast in 
psychoanalysis, and in his reply points out that he is not so much interested in "normal" 
transition from one state to the other as in the "explanation of the mechanism". 
Abraham, as it seems, tries to envisage the maniacal consequences of melancholia 
while examining melancholia's neurotic-obsessional aspect by means of incorporation. 
Freud, on the other hand, focuses in his analysis on the primacy of identification which is 
reinforced despite the objectal loss. It is not at all clear how identification works in this 
respect although, suffice it to say, as Freud suggests, it survives the failures of 
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incorporation. Saying that "identification is the expression of there being something in 
common, which may signify love", 22 Freud espouses the view that not every identification 
involves an object. In Group psychology Freud makes it clear by showing ho\\'" 
identification works in the Oedipal setting: 
It is easy to state in a fonnula the distinction between an identification with the father and the choice 
of the father as an object. In the first case one's father is what one would like to be, and in the second 
he is what one would like to have. The distinction, that is, depends upon whether the tie attaches to 
the subject or to the object of the me. The fonner kind of tie is therefore already possible before any 
sexual object-choice has been made~3 
The analytical distinction between the categories of being and having is decisive in Freud's 
attempt to find his way with identification in melancholia which, as I showed in the third 
chapter rests primarily on the specular identification of being-me, and, as it were, his 
disposal with the rival concept of incorporation that forecloses on identification. For the 
latter brings into work a mimesis which aims at the subject giving itself a name to affirm 
the resemblance between the subject and the Other, not the Other of jouissance of course, 
but the Other of language, what Lacan called the Name of the Father, the paternal agency 
set up to jettison the ballast of the melancholic jouissance over board on the ship of desire. 
Indeed, for Freud identification with the father is decisive for its ambivalence of love and 
hatred - the ambivalence that, as Freud notes, not only determines one of the three factors 
towards melancholic predisposition, but also reveals for a child an ambivalence in 
identification itself, on the one hand, identifying as being like the father (symbolical), and 
on the other hand, identifying with the object in the sense of an appropriation of the 
imaginary phallus. Freud examined these differences in his famous study of the function of 
the Army and Church. 
The increased libido, as observed both by Freud and Abraham, is not, according to 
Freud, the I-libido, but the erotic one which, since it has to go somewhere, seeks the 
abandoned object rather than meets its own abandonment. As Freud says in his early 
sketch, melancholia is "longing for something lost". 24 In its work identification is formed 
\\ith an abandoned object, which would not be possible in the case of incorporation. 
l\1elancholic identification attempts to give itself a name which is the name of the lost 
object of the Other, the name of the dead or the repressed signifier of the Other. As it was 
so often the case Freud remained suspicious about the concepts introduced by his disciples 
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and, in this particular case, retains his reservations about incorporation. Not only does he 
mention it only once in the Mourning and melancholia but also his "priority" of the 
mechanism of identification enables him to take a decisive step back to his first topography 
and analysis of the structure of the unconscious re-presentations from which Lacan will 
derive his conception of das Ding. 
As we have said, the withdrawal of the libido from the object does not so much 
demonstrate the absolute disappearance of the other as the appearance of a symbolical 
term that mourns, never satisfactorily enough, the object-loss. There is no other object but 
the lost one, the lost object as a lack, not a lack of an object, that sustains anguish on its 
orbit. Identification in melancholia poses certain difficulties for its formation depends on 
the libidinal yield of giving the subject a name, a name of the object lost. The narcisstic 1 
was, and to this extend the I -ideal, is thus insisted upon to the effect that the study of 
melancholia and its losses must to some degree rely on the temporal difference of the 
relation to the master signifier echoed in the chain of significations. 
Freud clearly demonstrates to us that his insistence upon identification rather than 
incorporation in melancholia is in effect capable of resuscitating metaphor to life. In 
constructing a metaphor, as we have said above in relation to Lacan's elaboration, an 
identification is established, being like the other or speaking/writing in the (auditory/visual) 
image of the other. Self-negation in this respect supports identification with the lost object 
as the other (part) of the me. As Mannoni described it: "one half unmercifully criticises the 
other, and the half thus attacked represents the lost object itself through identification". 25 
The splitting of the me, which Freud examined in one of his last papers, gives rise to the 
dialectic of love and hate and can, as Mannoni remarked, be transformed into mania. This 
transformation is not without the traces of narcisstic regression, as the accusing and 
negating me preserves itself as negating, that is to say establishes itself in the position of 
the ideal. 
Freud preserves identification with the object-loss in the way in which Lacan tried 
to define this elusive concept in relation to desire. The object is the ineffable sediment of 
the real and therefore a remainder of the jettisoned jouissance, that which "survives" its 
renunciation. Thus the remainder takes us from the field of the drives to the one of desire 
\vhich it causes to emerge. In other words, identification with the object serves as a 
condition for the Oedipal realisation of desire that activates the function of the patronym. 
1l-l 
We will come back to this. 
The symbolical identification inspires the subject, not without anguish, to practice 
mimetic representation or to give itself a name. But what is a name and, if its origin 
remains unnameable, what does it do? It gives meaning. It thus clears the path of a 
transition from the analogy to the metaphor, and at the same time, raises an obstacle in the 
signification of the unconscious by presupposing a common object as a prerequisite in the 
intersubjective communication. In resonating a meaning for the subject, the meaning both 
opens the path of desire and hinders it to metonymise the lack of being on which 
identification has to rely. In the first place the name is given to the object by the Other, the 
subject hears himself name himself, as if to call himself, by the name that is foreign, close 
and yet most alien to him. Incorporation is without the name, without the other. When the 
subject says "I am a fake", he establishes an identificatory relation with the loss of the 
"original" (ideal) other the negative reversal of which is taken for the object of 
identification. This self-reproach, which would not be possible without the "critical 
agency" of the superego, relies on the relation with something lost, as if loss was longed 
for. Melancholic desire longs for loss. And because it seeks a lost object it also finds it in 
identification. Lacan's "metaphorical dimension of the symbol" is reintroduced again here. 26 
It is on the level of desire that alterity of the Other (sex) is encountered by the subject, 
subject to castration, in a relation that cannot be satisfied. That is why, as Lacan says and 
Miller explains, desire can only work in the open as the desire of the Other, whereas the 
work of the drive is restricted to the jouissance of satisfaction and the work of death?7 
Identification in melancholia is therefore conditioned by the object-loss which 
functions as a lack. In order to give itself a name the kleptomaniac subject borrows or 
steals the signifier from the Other to fill the lack and discover the futility of identification. 
By the same stroke, however, identification becomes the "royal road" to the desire of the 
Other which is, in the work of metaphorical identification, always already confronted with 
the fundamental prohibition - the prohibition of incest, for example, which is not the only 
one In its ambivalent aspirations for love, identification brings the subject in relation to the 
law, while the object-choice, at least in melancholia, turns into an impossible choice of 
havillK or incorporating the object-loss. In Lacanian terms the lost object is the lack that 
generates desire which is an impossible desire to the extent that it is confronted with the 
prohibition attempting to raise from its rums the lost object as the lack of desire's 
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satisfaction. But where and how is this prohibition established, how does it come into 
existence? Is it not founded, as Lacan suggests, by virtue of the No of the Father, the 
paternal agency that installs itself in the Oedipal drama in the form of the eleventh 
commandment which lies at the heart of psychoanalysis - "Thou shalt not have access to 
that which is your supreme jouissance,,?28 I will come back to the relation between 
prohibition and the loss, which is as significant as it is fascinating, in reference to the work 
of M. Torok and N. Abraham. For the moment let's acknowledge, following Freud, some 
of the topographical alterations between the systems. 
In the work of melancholia, Freud writes, there is a particular case of the lack of 
the libidinal investment in the unconscious texture that would allow for a signifier to 
appear at the level of the preconscious. This is so because, if I can put it this way, a certain 
hibernation of the thing-presentations takes place. The isolation of the Dingvorstellung at 
the deepest unconscious level renders das Ding somewhat ab-solute, that is to say, 
detached from the word-presentations. According to Freud a formation of meaning, and 
subsequently of symbolical identification recognisable on the level of metaphor, is only 
possible when the Dingvorstellungen and Wortvorstellungen are linked. In psychosis the 
difference between the two is not operative. Here, the word-presentations act as the 
prim my processes. 
TIley undergo condensation, and by means of displacement transfer their cathexes to one another in 
their entirety. The prooess may go so far that a single word, if it is specially suitable on account of its 
numerous connections, takes over the representation fertretung] of a whole train ofthought~9 
When the word and the thing do not coincide [decken], as Freud says a few pages later, a 
psychotic effect takes precedence over transferential neurosis. Briefly speaking, in 
psychosis the truth is homogeneous; its "literality" excludes the work of metaphorical or 
metonymical figurativeness. In neurosis, by contrast, not only are the thing-presentations 
and the word-presentations libidinally invested, not only the objects are not given up and 
the two overlap, but also are they topographically localizable in the conscious presentation, 
"while the unconscious presentation is the presentation of the thing alone" .30 The path for 
the signifier to appear in the preconscious is cleared (Freud's Bahnung is translated by 
Lacan as frayage - "clearing", rather than "facilitation") due to the supplementary 
investment of the libido in the thing-presentation, which is effective when the thing- and 
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word-presentations become linked, that is to say, when the ideas and words undergo a 
connection [Verkniipfung]. Only on this level does repression become conceivable, i. e. the 
repressed material becomes subject to new appearances and registrations. The 
supplementary investments of the object occur on the proviso that the primary investments 
have already taken place. This allows for the primary processes in the unconscious "to be 
succeeded by the secondary process which is dominant in the preconscious". Repression is 
a failure of translation [Obersetzung] of the idea (presentation) "into words which shall 
remain attached [verkniipft] to the object" due to the lack of supplementary libido. 31 Thus 
the primal condition for repression is an already successful libidinal investment of the 
object on the level of the thing. 
Freud goes on to say that just as the investment of the thing-presentations 
guarantees repression, so the corresponding word-presentations come to form the 
preconscious. If the mechanism of repression [Verdrangung] is common to neuroses (lack 
of supplementary libido facilitating translation of one register into the preconscious), it is 
the mechanism of foreclosure [Verwerfung] that characterises psychosis. Without going 
further into the clinical differences between the two, suffice it to mention the term of the 
drive which we will come to in considering the work of incorporation in distinction to 
identification. In psychosis, Freud ruminates, the drive-libido would be withdrawn from 
what is represented by the "unconscious presentation of the object". Repression, as we 
have said, is operational between the unconscious thing-presentations and the preconscious 
word-presentations and is not constituted by the investment of the word-presentations. 
Such an investment would, as Freud says, indicate an attempt to regain the lost object "via 
the verbal part of it". 32 A failure to accomplish this would leave the word in the place of 
the thing. Indeed, as we have said earlier, the psychotic confuses words with things and 
vice versa. The psychotic way of thinking, as Freud concludes, pivots around taking "the 
concrete things [konkrete Dinge] as though they were abstract". The activity of the drives 
in this process remains restricted to the investment of the words as if they were objects 
(things). It is because the jouissance which orients the work of the drives, and of the death 
drive especially, is not "evacuated" or renounced at this juncture, that the thing-
presentations remain libidinally frozen. 
And this brings me to the notion of the formation of meaning, which requires not 
only a degree of correspondence between thing- and word-presentations but also, so to 
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speak, a libidinal touch that would illuminate a form into an enjoy-meant of the thing-word 
disunity. This disunity, which is disrupted by Lacan in reference to Saussurian sign and its 
components, the signifier and signified, does not disqualifY the level of das Ding from 
taking part in the operation. The passage which comes from 1891 monograph, in which 
Freud criticises philosophers (J. S. Mill) for disregarding the significance of the thing, is 
worth quoting here: 
A word acquires its meaning by being linked to an object-presentation [later thing-presentation], at 
all events if we restrict ourselves to a consideration of substantives. The object-presentation itself is 
once again a complex of associations made up of the greatest variety of visual, acoustic, tactile, 
kinaesthetic and other presentations. Philosophy tells us that an object-presentation consists in 
nothing more than this - that the appearance of there being a 'thing' to whose various 'attributes' these 
sense-impressions bear witness is merely due to the fact that, in enumerating the sense-impressions 
\\hich we have received from an object, we also assume the possibility of there being a large number 
of further impressions in the same chain of associations. The object-presentation is thus seen to be 
one \\hich is not closed and almost one which cannot be closed, while the word-presentation is seen to 
bc something closed, even though capable of extension. The pathology of disorders of speech leads to 
assert that the word-presentation is linked at its sensory end (by its sound image [Lacanian 
signifierl) with the object-presentation.33 
I t is the already mentioned tie or connection [Verkniipfung] between the thing and the 
word that captures Lacan's attention in his analysis of unconscious structures. If Freud has 
already divorced himself, as the fragment above shows, from the classical perspectives of 
philosophy whereby the thing designated an essence or pure being around which orbit 
myriads of "attributes", Lacan will nevertheless return to it not without a philosophical 
taste. The operation of the signifier is not without a link to the thing whose existence is in 
turn oriented on the horizon of the opposition between the pleasure and the reality 
principles. It is just that for Lacan das Ding "is the true secret" outside the relationship. It 
is what in the subject's experience emerges as radically isolated in relation to what is 
nearest, the Nebenmensch, and therefore as something alien, homeless. But das Ding is not 
only to remind us of the Freudian notion of the unheimlich. It is what for Lacan 
fundamentally orients the development of the subject, its dreams, identifications, figurative 
progressions, as that which is always already outside, the very core of what he will call 
('xlimile. In Lacan's presentation 
it is. of course. clear that what is supposed [qu'll s'agit] to be found cannot be refound. It is in its 
nature that thc object as such is lost. It \\ill never be refound. Some thing is there while one waits for 
sOllldhing bettcr. or \,"orsc. but which one awaits. The world of our experiencc. the Freudian world. 
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assumes t~at it is this object, das Ding as the absolute Other of the subject, that one is supposed to 
refind. It IS to be found at the most as something missed [regret]. One does not find it but only its 
pleasurable associations. It is in this state of wishing for it and waiting for it that, in the name of the 
pleasure principle, the optimum tension will be sought; below that there is neither perception nor 
effort. In the end, in the absence of something which hallucinates it in the form of a system of 
references, a world of perception cannot be organised in a valid way, cannot be constituted in a 
human way. The world of perception is given to us by Freud as dependent on that fundamental 
hallucination without which there would be no attention available [Trans. mod.f. 
The hallucinatory presence of the thing is how the primary perceptions are organised. But 
what is most important, what relates to the lost object while at the same time preceding all 
repression, is a fundamental affect of das Ding which as the function of "the outside of the 
signified" [hors-signifie] supports the symbolic order of signifiers. The Thing is thus the 
Unchangeable and has its conceptual roots in Freud's Entwurfwhere he describes it as an 
isolated neurone which is severed from other neurones whose paths it nevertheless helps 
regulate. Since for Lacan das Ding or the object - although he distinguishes the two later -
organises the primary forms of subjectivity, it is subject to the pleasure principle of 
investment and discharge. 
Although this position takes its grass roots from the texture (signifying chain) and 
function (pleasure principle) of the neuronal organisation as described by Freud in the 
Prqject, Lacan grafts it into the field of ethics which I will explore at the end of this work. 
I n doing so Lacan acknowledges a debt to Kant situating das Ding in the place of the lack 
as a universal maxim - the lack of the subjectal relationship with it. 
After this long detour we can now return to Freud's conclusive remarks in the 
Mourning and Melancholia. His diversion in the topographical analysis of the systems is 
well informed by his earlier formulations in The Unconscious to which my detour was 
ineluctably driven. In summing up his findings Freud once again hesitates, seems uncertain 
due to the shortage of material and observation. The question he now poses seems 
nevertheless to derive from The Unconscious paper, completed before Mourning and 
melancholia earlier in 1915, and focuses on the problem of libidinal investment of the 
registers. Is the work of melancholia wholly affected by the underinvestment of the object 
(thing) or is it generated by the identificatory investment [Identifi~ienfl1gsersal~] of 
supplementary libido as he seems to suggest in the current paper? Once again, an answer is 
to come via a reflection on the structure of the systems: 
In melancholia 'the unconscious (thing-)presentations [(Ding-)vorstellzmgen] of the object has been 
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~bando~ed by the libido'. In reality, however, this presentation is made up of innwnerable single 
ImpressIOns (or unconscious traces [unbewuste Spuren] of them) [which is what he says in the 1891 
monograph], and this withdrawal of libido is not a process that can be accomplished in ~ moment. but 
must certainly, as in mourning, be long-drawn-out~ngwieriger - also wearisome] and gradual~5 
and further that in melancholia 
countless separate struggles are carried on over the object, in which hate and love contend \\"ith each 
other: the one seeks to detach the libido from the object, the other to maintain this position of the 
libido against the assault. The location of these separate struggles [EinzelkampJe] cannot be assigned 
to any system but the Dcs, the region of the memory traces [Erinnerungsspuren] of things (as 
contrasted with word-cathexes).36 
These struggles - separate to the extent that their outcome is decided in isolation -
certainly ensure the survival of the Thing over which the struggle erupts, the object-loss as 
the lack that is, even if their result, the outcome of the melancholic Krdnkung, remains 
uncertain. Out of the three factors which facilitate the fall into melancholia - object-loss, 
love/hate ambivalence and the libido's regressive tendency to withdraw to the egotic crypt 
of death - the first two, Freud has no doubt about that, belong to and support the 
mechanism of repression. We should now consider if the third factor may be decisive in 
staking out the boundaries of melancholia in terms of neurotic and psychotic phenomena. 
It is, perhaps, the work of this third component that would allow us to shed some light on 
the difference between writing and speech. 
If the former, to say it in a word, depends according to Freud on the visual images 
of the letter, reproduced, which does not happen without the mimesis of the other as 
reading, the order or dis-order, the course or dis-course, of speech relies not only on the 
connections between neurones, which Lacan "translated" into signifiers, but also on the 
degree to which the thing-presentations in the unconscious are invested. Given that 
psychoanalysis has only one medium, the "medium of speech" as Lacan famously declared, 
the order of speech seems to derive its determination, i.e. its analysis, from the missing 
sipl{fier (failure of the translation of the unconscious thing-presentations into the 
preconscious word-presentations). Writing by contrast, to follow this logic, becomes 
analysable within the framework of the theory of the letter as the mnemic trace without, 
not necessarily, as Freud suggested, the participation of the auditory image. And this in 
turn \\ould suggest, although we should wait a little before jumping into conclusions, that 
the operation of writing does not necessarily and directly depend upon the mechanism of 
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repression as speech does. 37 
Let's say further that if we were to pursue analysis of writing and speech on the 
level of distinction between the narcisstic self-investment of the imaginary and the 
melancholic abandonment of the imaginary which seeks the truth outside the identificatory 
or metaphorical inadequacy, the implications of such pursuit would indeed take us to the 
threshold of philosophy. If, in this respect, such link between narcissism and melancholia 
exists, and there seems to be even more than one, it turns around the Ideal. It can be said 
that the lack which Vvestern metaphysics always tried to repress has to do with the loss of 
the ideal that would ensure and guarantee an infinite conversation of writing - with 
whom/what if not the idealised other that, in writing at least, does not speak back. Such a 
"guarantee" would not be possible to imaginarize other than by way of speculative 
reflection that sustains it and indeed fuels its mortifying gaze through which it is always on 
the way to renew and reestablish itself as infinite, inexhaustible. The limit comes perhaps 
from the Echo that mythically, yet already symbolically, reiterates the last words that 
Narcissus wishes to hear thus closing, with every word uttered, or foreclosing the function 
which made him hear what he refused to reply in the first place. (Not so with Orpheus, one 
could interlude, whose voice comes about in the absence of the gaze he must sacrifice as 
the sole object of his fascination) For it is beyond the imaginary realm in which Narcissus 
always restitutes his vision of the word, its ideal, to become subject to the castration by 
which the divine Other deprived the poor filly of her power to reply. If he therefore takes 
what he hears for the other's response his quest on this path may seem guaranteed, as 
philosophers till Husserl kept us assured. 
But the question here lies not only with various species of speculative discourse 
already drawn from its imaginary well. The question concerns the division that Lacan, 
following Freud, structurally brought to our scrutiny, namely that of the difference 
between foreclosure and repression. The very least philosophers seem to have 
acknowledged regarding the loss bearing heavy on them, was to place its burden on the 
shoulders of repression as if such a speculative recognition of loss, via preservation of the 
ideal spectre, were to fill the emptiness and answer the enigma of the concept of repression 
already extracted from psychoanalysis.38 The flourishing of the imaginary under the slogan 
of the repressed loss - and thus a gradual loosening up of the terms in which this 
con\'ersation, neither philosophy nor literature, unfolds - still manages to bypass some of 
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the more fundamental questions raised by psychoanalysis. One of them would be that of 
the father, not its repression or avoidance performed under the elegance and seduction of 
literary style, but its foreclosure which guarantees the conditions for perpetuating "literary" 
meditation on the maternal body of jouissance (one of the sources of our ~milt in the 
...... 
absence of castration) to which it has somewhat unlimited access. The loss is thus paired 
up with death, death with the lack and the lack with the castration which inevitably 
becomes idealised as a philosophical partner worthy of such a discourse of mourning. But 
if the loss as the lost object already bears witness to the loss of the ideal, as I propose 
melancholia could be approached, the regressive step, which one feels like calling 
reprogressive, towards the maternal object hardly takes us anywhere save the Kleinian and 
Abrahamian resurrection of the Platonic myth. Can it be that this surface-borne 
forgetfulness of the question of the father, this literary flirting with the maternal body, be it 
dead or alive, as Melanie Klein, following K. Abraham, always enticed us to do, and all the 
species of the imaginary reincorporation of loss as object appropriated in the place of the 
lack that are already discernible on the horizon of the production of the word that 
essentially forecloses castration in the refusal to renounce jouissance of the Other, amounts 
to this extent to saying no to the no, to refusing to turn to where it comes from and 
subsequently to foreclose the absolute singularity of the question. 
In writing then foreclosure would seem to preserve the repression of repression. A 
double repression. The notion of the secret, for example, as it appears in the writing of M. 
Torok and N. Abraham, maintains such "metaphysical" status. Metaphysical only to the 
extent to which it attempts to point to a common feature in all repressions, their 
fundamental unrepresentability, their secret. The secret would therefore foreclose 
repression in the sense of repressing the identificatory dialectic present in the theoretical 
problematic of the subject and subject's relation to both the Other and its object, that this 
problematic tries to grasp. The secret, like the crypt as we shall soon see, is situated to act 
as a binder, a place in which the inside would meet the outside in the synthesis of things 
and words. In his study of psychosis Lacan inadvertently brings out the notion of 
foreclosure as a mechanism distinct to that of repression to illustrate, perhaps, how the 
discourse of metaphysics escapes, that is to say altogether forecloses both the castration in 
the formation of subjectivity and the question of symbolic representation as the subject 
The mechanism of foreclosure operates, if we accept the view above of which this one is 
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an implication, outside subjectivity, before or "after the subject", and beyond the 
identificatory promotions of figurativeness which, to the extent that the neurotic subject 
made himself heard throughout history, wields a cut between the body and the jouissance 
of being spoken. I will And this could raise the following question: Does the function and 
structural place of the patronym, the paternal metaphor as Lacan called, serve to guard 
repression, to which Freud attributed "the greatest achievements of mankind", against .. ? 
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CHAPTER 7 
WHAT IS A CRYPT? 
The work of melancholia raises some of the paramount problems. The lost object, 
to begin with, the lost object of love of the Other takes up a function of generating desire. 
But it will not do so, as we have said, should the patronymic agency fail to install a 
skimming device to glean jouissance from the libidinal tie with the mOther. To do that, as 
Lacan often pointed out, the letter must always already be there as distinct from jouissance 
of the Other. How does it find its place then, how does the symbolical intervention 
succeed, given the drive will have always found its satisfaction, could and can do without 
desire's relation with prohibition and law? 
I have showed some relations between the subject, identification and metaphor as 
decisive in the emergence of what Lacan, following Hegel, Kojeve and Freud, called 
desire. Let's say, somewhat dogmatically, that if Lacan in his "return to Freud" goes 
beyond Freud, it is because he has always distinguished the order of the drive from that of 
desire. Nor should we confuse, as Lacan often insisted, the me or ego [Ie mOi] with the 
subject. The subject emerges in the relation with the Other of language and literary 
figurativeness, of which the metaphorical and metonymical representations he always 
promoted above others, and the object. For the subject the object is forever lost, vvhich is 
why "subject's first appearance is its disappearance". To the extent that the problem of the 
lost object as the lack takes us to the field of ethics and to the notion of prohibition - which 
is why the letter will always be homeless, always on exile, in the field of foreignness where 
no part of the mother tongue, can be named by it - the life and death of the drives lie 
elsewhere. The drive is immune to the Other of prohibition for the simple reason that its 
e~istence depends 01 the satisfaction of the drive-libido whose repetitive function always 
returns to the jouissance on the path of death. Life and death have to do with the real of 
the drive. It is not identification therefore that would sustain dri\"t~'s vicissitudes but 
incorporation. By including the embalmed object into its cryptic economy the drive has 
ensured its preservation, and its thanatic power, to draw from it the ecstatic elation of 
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satisfaction. The drive is ignorant of prohibition and ignorant of the loss, for its 
expenditure and gain come to constitute an economical balance of its function. 
In so far as the work of incorporation appears in this light in the study of M. Torok 
and N. Abraham, desire is not considered, as in Lacan, as a distinct order operating on the 
level of language. It appears from their work that neither the secret nor the crypt belong to 
the order of repression. If incorporation of the object were to succeed there would be no 
residue left to generate desire, as understood by Lacan, nothing that would allow us to 
legitimate the Oedipal conflict where the paternal agency of the letter becomes operative. 
Nothing but death. Did Lacan reserve the place of the egotic crypt of the embalmed object 
for da..,· Ding? 
The difference between the drives and desire seems to revolve around the 
difference between the economical view of the libidinal dynamic and the work of language. 
The question of metaphorical identification - the mimesis of being (speaking, writing) like 
the other - and objectal incorporation - having as cryptic preservation/mortification -
should be distinguished likewise. After all the mimetic identification is always confronted 
with the sexual alterity, the Other as anguishing and castrating. Since Freud's study 
demonstrates without the shadow of a doubt that it is an identification with the abandoned 
object rather than abandonment of identification in favour of incorporation, that constitutes 
the vaults of melancholia, it comes as a surprise to learn, as Torok states, that "according 
to Freud, the trauma of objectalloss leads to a response: incorporation of the object within 
the ego".l But what would psychoanalysis be without surprises? Incorporation would 
serve to compensate, even complement the lack thus rendering it lacking. Introjection, on 
the other hand, which Freud mentions a number of times, operates as an inclusion of the 
object into the me in the form of the parental agency mediated by the Voice, as Freud said 
in the Introduction to Narcissism, and in this way constitutes the superego, which in turn 
facilitates the surmounting of the Oedipal complex. Introjection of the vocal object - as 
much abandoned on the outside as its re-finding on the inside - makes it into a symbolic 
Other, an auditory image sensll stricto, even if it does not do justice to F erenczi's 
definition, and becomes an ethical "substitute" working in absentia of the Categorical 
Imperative or the extraneous powers of destiny which the subject takes for its own 
morality.2 For Lacan ethics is above all the ethics of speech. 
Introjection is a brother-in-law of identification and we can tind it on the side of 
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desire. Whereas introjection concerns the I, identification aims at the object. Not so with 
incorporation. Firstly, incorporation refuses identification and remains constrained to the 
drive-work. Secondly, it confuses words with things thus incorporating whatever fills in 
the mouth, and thirdly, it is antimetaphorical. Abraham & Torok call it "demetaphorizatiol1 
(taking literally what is signified figuratively)". 3 All three, as we can see, are interrelated as 
they incorporate a common feature of orality. In this respect: 
incorporation is the refusal to acknowledge the full import of the loss, a loss that, if recognised as 
such. would effectively transform us. In fine, incorporation is the refusal to introject loss. The fantasy 
of incorporation reveals the gap within the psyche; it points to something that is missing just where 
introjection should have occurred.4 
Given that introjection allows for the subject to institute "the harsh and painful" superego, 
and therefore allies with the paternal agency having previously identified with the father, 
incorporation takes over the function of desire by ensuring that the drive reach satisfaction. 
That is to say, that the drive enjoy to death the presence of the pleasure object by 
introjecting it into itself The introjection of the object of pleasure into the me defines 
Freud's description of his use of the term in his paper Drives and their Vicissitudes (1915) 
What is missing then and would "to acknowledge the full import of the loss" mean, given 
that resistance does not relent to some ready "expression" of the loss? It is not only the 
lost object, not only, on the topological level, the underinvestment of the thing-
presentations, but also the mechanism which regulates the work of repression, the 
inevitable homelessness generative of repression that involves symbolical identification of 
the subject. Incorporation, which Torok calls "instantaneous and magical" is a substitute 
not for introjection, which cares only for the object of pleasure, even if its experience is 
always dearly paid for ( death drive), but for identification. But although it is subject to the 
primary process of the pleasure principle, it returns as the real and works by way of 
"hallucinatory fulfillments". 5 Incorporation constitutes the process of bodyfication which is 
why, as Torok writes, "the fantasy of incorporation is the first lie, the effect of the first 
6 . . 
rudimentary form of language". Incorporation, and therefore consumptlOn, eatmg, 
devouring, as Freud says, is the first area around which children begin to form their ideas 
of child bearing. Some Oedipal questions arise here opening the path which due to the 
"incorporation fantasy" lapses prematurely to an end. Hence K. Abraham's intensiYe etTort 
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to demonstrate the importance of the "oral stage" in melancholia whereby the subject 
begins to construct his body by means of oral assimilation which is the first fantasy, the 
first lie of the melancholiac. Is the melancholiac without the body? 
To incorporate would be to produce the first lie, to become, as the saying goes, full 
of it. Given the foreignness of the repressed signifier, every incorporative attempt is a 
failed domestication, a hallucination of "literality". I say "failed" because if it takes place it 
can only happen in the "crypt" (one of the key-terms in the Torok & Abraham's text) of the 
me. In speech the way of the lie of incorporation on the level of the drive is established by 
way of identification and its relation to the "hallucinatory fulfilment". Hallucination would 
be the name of literality of narration about the lost object were it ever safely deposited in 
the me rendering the subject pregnant and phallically potent. When an attempt to assimilate 
the xenography of the object is endeavoured - and with it the shame of its loss and guilt 
over the prohibitive step towards regaining it - when an oral appropriation is destined to 
speak empty words, the lie of incorporation triumphs. For how can the lie be literal, or 
truth, given it is always already a translation, a lingual operation in which some-thing, the 
real, falls off and is missed? How does the "first lie" of incorporation fail to produce 
literality as distinct from metaphoricity if this failure is already encrypted in the description 
of a secret relation to what tries to conceal itself while miming this presence of an absent 
object? In short, how can "literality" be anything else than already a fantasy - a fantasy of 
the melancholiac that Freud ironically reiterated to show that the unconcealment of truth, 
aletheia, works as a concealment of the other? Torok & Abraham adopt the view that the 
function of fantasy of in-corpo-ration allows for the subject, thus situating the subject in 
the place of the specular me, to retain a "status quo" that preserves his immunity to the 
topological changes in the unconscious. A lie is therefore, pure and simple, a resistance to 
the "metapsychological reality" of topographical movements which doubtless incorporate 
the activity of the missing letter or, as we might have thought, an effect of repression 
which structures the indecisive duplicity of lies and truths, their ironic indistinguishibility, 
which always signals a distant presence of another, the unspeakable letter. Immunity to the 
Other then? And if so, would not such a definition of fantasy reinstate a secret agency 
beyond the play of signifiers and outside the presence of an objectal absence that, 
according to Lacan, structures the fantasy of the subject through identification with the 
lost objece 
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Torok & Abraham are concerned with the realm of the dead. For the "desire lies 
buried (the pain being a kind of 'here lies', an inscription on which the name of the 
deceased long remains indecipherable)" in the tomb. 7 Desire lies in the crypt of its object, 
where it has been buried or incorporated together with the name of the dead. Hence the 
cryptic object must be taken for the lost signifier in the discourse that keeps spinning round 
the hole of the missing referent. Or the lost letter, the "dead letter" as Lacan called it, if 
such cryptography involves a writing that is unable to attest to the last word enjoying the 
signifier in its stead. Hence our fantasy of the vigil at the grave (described in the previous 
chapter) and of mediation between the living and the dead, which is precisely the place of 
the crypt, the subject's denial, over and over again, in this place of death, of its metaphor 
that insists on the words of mourning. 
The relation of jouissance to symbolisation is of crucial importance here. It 
describes what Lacan called "the truth of the subject". In melancholia, as we have already 
said, the flooding of jouissance has a hindering effect in the emergence of the signifying 
chain. But, as Lacan pointed out in the seminar on Ethics of Psychoanalysis, it is not 
without some delirious stir of jouissance that the relation to das Ding would allow for the 
symbol to take its step out of the river of jouissance; to step out but also to step into the 
signifying mode where some sediment of jouissance remains under feet. 
If the hallucinatory regression succeeds in making its way to the oral satisfaction, 
the mouth becomes the centre piece of, on the one hand, acquisition and appropriation, 
and, on the other, dispossession and expulsion causing "the debased object of love" to be 
faecelized. Such is the thesis of Torok & Abraham regarding the failed domestication of 
the signifier. Satisfactions of the mouth, and of the anus at the other end, since they 
relentlessly destroy the maternal object in the process of consummation, are replaced with 
words as another type of maternal object, its substitute. The drive does not distinguish 
between the two, objects and words, for it is not meaning (identification), as it is clearly 
the case with FInnegan's Wake, that would mark their difference. Whether it is the way of 
\vords or objects the satisfaction of presence is marked without doubt and the jouissance 
as the way to death prevails. From emptiness to empty mouth. What such a denial signifies 
for us is the failure to institute the introjective agency that would prepare for surmounting 
the Oedipal complex, which begin with the fantasy of origin as incorporation, by means of 
founding the superego within the subjectal economy. As Freud said, the superego as the 
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conscience or the voice of the other brings the Oedipal tussles to an end by replacing it 
with the representative [Reprasentanten] of the outer world. The "community of empty 
mouths", crying for the object to close them by filling them, exemplifies the lack of 
meaning particular to the subject and the lack of identificatory connection that would 
relent the lost object. The failure of incorporation is the failure of the drive tryina to take 
. b 
over the work of language in the face of loss: 
Because our mouth is unable to say certain words and unable to fonnulate certain sentences, W~ 
fantasise, for reasons yet to be determined, that we are actually taking into our mouth the 
unnameable, the object itself. As the empty mouth calls out in vain to be filled with introjectiyc 
speech, it reverts to being the food-craving mouth it was prior to the acquisition of speech. Failing to 
fced itself on words to be exchanged with others, the mouth absorbs in fantasy all or part of a person 
- the genuine depositOly of what is now nameless. The crucial move away from introjection (clearly 
rendcred impossible) to incorporation is made when words fail to fill the subject's void and hence the 
imaginary thing is inserted into the mouth in their place~ 
The secrecy of empty mouths demonstrates the effect of what Lacan called "empty speech" 
[parole vide], which is not without history, given Heidegger's earlier elaboration of the 
"idle talk" [Gerede] which "closes things off' in uprooting Dasein from the "relationships-
of-Being".9 It thus becomes a mark of Dasein's "floating unattached", another term to 
which Freud would not turn a deaf ear. The empty speech echoes the emptiness of the 
mouth. The empty mouth fills itself with what is common or commonly present on the 
level of superficial dissemination in so far as it lacks in distinguishing itself from its 
"primordial sources". The empty mouth is without history and the discourse thus 
constructed takes place without paying the price of dropping what is average and common 
in the sense that only identification strips the signifier of its "objectivity", that is to say its 
ideality. From the emptiness of object-reference to the full - not fullness of - speech that 
for Lacan designates self-referentiality of the I, truth, lying. 
The empty mouth which wallows in the empty floating does not say anything, 
unlike I, truth, lying. does, because it is the nothing it attempts to say, to understand the 
absence of quality, as the melancholiac does, by naming the cryptic object of the Other's 
desire. The feast of incorporation takes place at the cryptic site of the loss of the me - the 
loss which, because it is celebrated on the level of the drive, fails to engender the desire of 
the Other.lo Is the object-loss then pertaining to the loss of the specular me and therefore 
of the deceptive I-ideal that tries to excavate the supremacy of the gaze? If so, we should 
ill) 
note that the cryptic object has its mediatory role in summoning the voice in the process of 
introjection. The constitution of the cryptic object is not purely specular but refers to a 
structural position of, as I have said, the concealment of concealment or the secrecy that 
has incorporated the mechanism of repression. It would seem then that the cryptic object 
does not prevent the play of signifiers in general but, on the contrary, since it has been for 
ever encrypted by the voice, remaining "indecipherable", impossible to decipher at the time 
of encrypture, maintains the position of the privileged letter that in writing facilitates the 
fantasy of the subject, what Lacan designated as $ 0 a. In speech, however, the crypt 
prevents what Lacan called the phallic signifier from being deployed to guard the subject 
from the Other of jouissance. At this juncture we should turn our attention to this 
enigmatic notion, the crypt, as elaborated by Torok & Abraham for it signifies a place of 
confusion of two fundamental Lacanian concepts, object a and das Ding. Perhaps such 
confusion would not arise were we to examine the findings of different authors in their 
own right, which is not the case here. We should thus consider the notion of the crypt in its 
duality and ambivalence; on the one hand as a place of the secret, the foreignness of the me 
lashed into shame over the loss of the object of love, and, on the other hand, as a place of 
das Dil1g, the absolute alterity of loss which, as Lacan says, "raises the object to its 
dignity" . 
What is the crypt then and how does its metaphorical device account for what we 
have said about the loss, for what we have not said or been unable to say regarding the 
working mechanisms in melancholia? A consideration of the crypt and its concealments 
will take us to the end of this chapter only to open the perspective in which I will explore 
writing as a particular species of encrypture that is not without the relation to the cryptic 
object. According to Torok & Abraham the crypt shakes the foundations of "the subject's 
topography" by dividing, splitting it. In the grave of the crypt the spectre of the lost object 
is awake. Freud already suggested it and it now remains to be said that what is awake is 
me as a dead other. The "death of the object" functions as a life of a dead object, a dead 
letter of writing, perhaps. The spectral dwellers of the crypt or "the shadow of the object", 
as Freud called it, are the survivors of loss. An imaginary scene has to be constructed, a 
fantasy rise to its feet, to allow for the identification to make room for the metonymy of 
desire. These symbolical survivors, whose ship has evaporated into the misty fantas~' of 
their demand addressed to the Other (and which should not prevent us from building the 
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"ship" by means of the signifiers it carries), must in the first place live on the secret of the 
cannibalistic desire, consummate the corpse which inhabits the underside of their unknown 
abode. In his 1924 study, K. Abraham recalls a work ofRoeheim in which the latter speaks 
of necrophilia as the ultimate solution to "mourning" practised in the "primitive" societies. 
What could "primitive" mean here if not to indicate the "civilised" society's way of naming 
the cadaver whose remainder is spiced into our daily meal made of "organic food"? Is 
such "imaginary meal" a form of "protection against the danger of incorporation", 11 or 
does its very enjoyment guard itself against the prohibitions of culture? Necrophagia, as 
Torok and Abraham write 44 years later, reinstates the name of communion which absorbs 
not our presence but the dead letter of the deceased. Although we "will bury the deceased 
in the ground rather than ourselves", we will not have ceased to identify with the dead who 
live symbolically in the place of our desire. It may be then that incorporation is a fantasy of 
necrophagia, even if Torok & Abraham say the contrary, as if divesting the laws of fantasy 
of the lost letters it is made of It is after all in the fantasy of loss, the "myth of loss", that 
the communal devouring has survived, i.e. took on a symbolic dimension of a ritual that 
amounts to linguistic repetitions and sanctification of words. Language mourns. It allies 
prohibition with symbolisation. 
In dividing the subject into the secret place of the mortified me, the crypt hides 
hiding what is hidden in it; its walls are clayed of shame. Here jouissance lives and dies 
when the "object also functions for the subject as an ego ideal". The shame of the loss of 
the ideal withholds the jouissance within the limits of these walls. Hence perhaps, as Torok 
& Abraham point out, the subject's excessive anguish at the possibility of the metaphor 
that would divulge a meaning which has bound the secrecy to loss. And hence the vicious 
circle of the metaphor which holds within its vaults being as the principle of identification 
repressing the metonymy of desire to which we will come back later. Two metaphors, or 
two species of metaphoricity, emerge from this account, what we have tried to distinguish 
in relation to the neurotic discourse and the psychotic expression. The repressed metaphor 
as a repressed meaning is guided by identification with the object. Lacan's notion of the 
paternal metaphor is thus designed to enable identification with the Other sex to the extent 
that the facilitator itself, called also phallic function, come to the place of the Other. 
Castration supports the fantasmatic quest for refinding the object. Not so with what Lacan 
called "delusional metaphor" which operates precisely where the signifier is taken for a 
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thing present, aiming at self-cure by means of a prosthesis that glues the letter to the body. 
In psychosis then the subject remains to be the object for the Other of jouissance while 
refusing to be one through the delusion of having sloughed off the skin of the letter. 
To incorporate would be to encrypt the lost me, to encrypt it in the me, so that the 
difference between the me and its object, the difference that could only be articulated in the 
imaginary terms, be obliterated in the unconscious. But this obliteration also reveals a 
conflict which appear,s' to be of a formal nature. We have already shown that for Freud, 
but especially for Lacanian reading of Freud, the me takes on a function of the imaginary, 
specular to be more specific, object. In the function of incorporation the conflict makes use 
of the me as that which incorporates and is incorporated. How does the me perform these 
two functions simultaneously? 
Incorporation encrypts the dead other as the imaginary partner of the me. This 
other bears the trace of the Rankian double objectivised into that which ambivalently 
appears to be both hated and loved, mortifying and immortalising. The crypt is the place of 
ambivalence, of the lost object as encrypted and encrypting, which Derrida, for example, 
presents in the form of a paradox "of a foreign body preserved as foreign but by the same 
token excluded from a self [Ie moi] that henceforth deals not with the other, but only with 
itself'. 12 The me, to refer again to the Freudian term, is thus overshadowed not so much by 
the object in the sense of extraneous presence, but by itself. This simultaneous 
exclusion/inclusion shows the lack as an absence of temporal difference between the me 
and an object which through the ruse of simultaneity renders the lost object always already 
incorporated. The signifying subject is thus caught up in the alienating relation with the 
other. The difference here is indeed the difference between the imaginary and symbolic 
orders which have the real at stake. If Derrida says that "The more the self keeps the 
foreign element as a foreigner inside itself, the more it excludes it", the reference here is 
not so much to the "foreign body" and "foreign element" as the real body, but rather to the 
banished foreignness of the signifier which I have called the cryptic object, indeed, an 
impossible signifier of the Other's desire for it is unsignifiable.
13 
It is this dubious relation of the subject to the signifier of the Other - dubious not 
only because of an impossibility of retrieving it as the master one, but also because the 
melancholic crypt holds hostage the signifiers which this lack, this real impossibility, makes 
possible, ginJIl il i.\ ill place - that Freud brings to the fore under the pretext of truth: if the 
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melancholic subject tells the truth and nothing but the truth, the crypt must have 
structurally displaced the phallic signifier from the place of the Other, so that this mis-take 
has failed to produce mistakes (imaginary lies), and, it is this failure that Freud reiterates in 
hi s commentary. 
It is doubtless the ambiguous character of the crypt, already a metaphor, whose 
enigmatic diversity will be retouched upon in the following chapter, which calls for a 
reiteration of my thesis regarding the place of the imaginary in melancholia. Since the 
imaginary is constructed by way of mimesis on the level of various images, the fantasy of 
melancholia has a hunch to carry. Not only is incorporation disparate from identification, 
but also the latter, and with it the ontology of the subject, gives way to the insistence of 
having. So much for Torok & Abraham's contributions which I do not wish to diminish 
here. The incorporative mechanism, omitted by Freud in his analysis of melancholia, 
functions in our picture as foreclosing both identification and the lack by which repression 
operates. If being like the other opens the path of the lack, having what the Other lacks, 
does not have the phallus, turns the subjectal development into what is now called the 
"object relations". The lack, instead of being installed, is gradually expelled from analysis 
that seems to work with good and bad objects. 14 What incorporation mourns is not even 
the loss of fantasy but the loss as fantasy, which the study of melancholia, as presented to 
us by Torok & Abraham, misses out. And yet it is not without their fantastic language that 
we could fully appreciate the deafness of the melancholic subject as presented by Freud. 
Since the melancholiac does not make himself heard in saying the reversed message 
received from the Other, and since turning a deaf ear to the metaphor he nevertheless 
produces, makes him keep the dead other alive, the function of incorporation and its 
cryptic secrets has proved valuable enough to show how the repetition of the melancholic 
confession could be heard. 
What is the relation between cryptonymy and patronym, the name being at the 
heart of the relation that is not at all clear. Given that the question of the name is at stake 
here we should be cautious not to confound it with the problem regarding the lost object in 
the crypt. And yet we should ask: in the crypt or as the crypt? For such would be a 
metaphor of incorporation, its "first lie", even if Torok & Abraham do not say it. To show 
the "demetaphorization" of incorporation they nevertheless invent a language, a vocabulary 
that cannot be taken litera/~r: crypt, tomb, secret, exhumation, cryptophoria, cryptony-my-
"Demetaphorization" invites a metaphorical invention as a means by which to show 
"incorporation as antimetaphor". If these names carry us across the place of concealment 
they resonate, at the same time, with metaphorical revelations. There is perhaps no way of 
telling the lie, and tnlth, without naming the other in whose resemblance the truth/lie of the 
subject appears as a disappearance. And so the alleged "literality" is but a masking device 
to conceal what is concealed in it. Literality would be merely another term for the 
operation of the letter whose performative, that is analytical, power in so far as the 
discourse is "a discourse of the Other", can only make itself heard if it refers to the Other, 
the symbolical foreigner in analysis. 
The crypt, it should be remarked again, is not merely a place of an unconscious 
secret as a repressed signifier. In their later study of the Wolf-Man case, Torok & 
Abraham devote numerous passages to elucidate the concept. What Freud showed us in 
making a distinction between thing- and word-presentations is brought here, in the 
topography of the concept, into conclusion as synthesis. The crypt is not simply a place of 
concealment, nor even a grave made of the walls of shameful jouissance. This jouissance of 
the Other becomes unrenouncable because the metaphor which operates in the Torok & 
Abraham's text is not a metaphor of the concealed lack. Instead, the metaphor of the crypt, 
the metaphor as the crypt, preserves the synthesis of words and things thus leaving us with 
nothing concealed. ]\Jo other signifier would ever emerge in this chain, save the master 
one, because the "nothing concealed" already constitutes the unconcealment as truth and 
its interpretation. Freud's suggestion of taking this claim seriously in the case he described, 
and which most likely refers to the same Wolf-Man case he finished less than a year before 
writing his paper on melancholia, should be repeated again here. For Torok & Abraham 
the signifier tjeret, the "magic word" from the Pankeyev story, earns no other place in 
interpretation than that of a "word-thing", as if the wish to masturbate (tieret means "to 
rub") were not a remainder of repressed castration, that allowed Freud to think of the 
\vhole case as that of an obsessional neurosis. The notion of the crypt, as a metaphor that 
substitutes the repressed signifier, is thus devalued by Torok & Abraham allowi:lg them to 
reduce the unconscious to an imaginary reservoir of hidden "word-things". Although in 
Freudian terms the place of the crypt would have to be identified with the investment of 
the thing-presentations, no consideration is given to Freud's topography in which the 
concealment of \vords is already an effect of the libidinally invested things which render 
signifying associations possible. 
As far as das Ding is concerned, the name of cryptonymy is given to a psychogram 
sent by Freud and received, though not signed, first by Heidegger in his refusal to read the 
former, then by Torok & Abraham, and finally by Lacan in his reading of the concept 
which subsequently receives a reformulation. For Derrida, by contrast, the metaphor of the 
crypt is inseparable from the question of the thing, and to this extent the answers to both 
questions, about the crypt and the thing, seem interrelated. The Thing is found in the place 
of the metaphor of the crypt to indicate both structural and spatial dimension as a 
precondition for thinking the problematic and acknowledging a certain "crypt effect" in the 
Torok & Abraham's text. If this cryptic effect responds to the problem of metaphoricity of 
death in melancholia, which interests us here, it does not necessarily present us with a 
measure to account for das Ding as it appeared in the above mentioned authors. If to ask 
"what is a crypt?" is not the same as to ask "what is a thing?", which Derrida admits, it is 
nevertheless the case that the latter question does not receive here the attention it deserves, 
its, shall we say, cryptonymy. Are we on the level of metaphor then? "Neither a metaphor 
nor a literal meaning" is Derrida's immediate answer which leads him on to consider "a 
different tropography" of the crypt. 15 
The crypt is a place, but not a natural one if one were to take Heraclitus' dictum 
about the ~~®~©'a r of :!:®~l1lr seriously and literally. The crypt is not of the natural 
order, as formulated in the Ancient aphorism, but an artificial construction, "an 
architecture" of spatiality with partitions and divisions that have nothing to do with 
signification and the order of the letter. Thus we find ourselves in the space of a "forum ", a 
place where the free circulation and "exchange of objects and speeches can occur" .16 It is 
within this general enclosure of the forum that another, "more inward forum" of particular 
kind is founded, the crypt. The space of free exchange of "objects and speeches" is thus 
that of a market place, an agora, to follow the metaphor, a forum of Platonic characters 
and sophists who, given the setting of their interlocutions, amount to speakers, or an 
internet web site, where indeed, the signifiers are exchanged at will circulating from one 
part of the world to another without crossing the inner space of the crypt, or what Derrida 
calls the "safe". Being at the centre of the signifying space of exchanges. this central and 
internally excluded place can only make us think of the secret object as excluded - hence in 
Lacanian terms referred to as extimate - from the symbolic contract of representational 
circulations. Not so in Derrida's Foreword, where the status of the object (thing), 
paradoxically, earns the place of inter pares among the signifiers. The safe as a secret 
object sealed from the order of signification is, of course, not a bank's vault storing the 
reserves of the mythical gold which will have, partially at least, at some point been released 
and exclusively included in the circulation to regulate the value of the current units. No, 
the safe of the crypt does not conceal what is invisible to the public in terms or symbols of 
what is already accessible, although temporarily withheld from the effects it is bound to 
produce when released; rather it can only be preserved when installed inside me or "inside 
'myself beside myself'. The safe, or "simply" the crypt, is me within me. 
What appears problematic here is the status of the crypt as that which excludes, 
being already internally excluded from the generalised spatiality of the forum, both the 
"objects and speeches". The question concerning the "nature" of the secret, the ultimately 
alien Thing, is therefore likely to provoke all sorts of speculations, specular in the first 
place, which will leave us with as little epistemological satisfaction as before we started 
speculating. The crypt, given it is not natural, has been installed in the me [Ie moil, but not 
by me, as the imaginary status of such procedure would leave us with no less specular 
product than the one arising from the construction of a fantasy. 
It is rather the case that the crypt, not as a "metaphor or literary meaning", divulges 
a secret of its being-there as the Thing to the extent that what appears in the circulation 
around its place is always already assembled within the order of the Other. Is the crypt 
then the lack of the Other, the mythical loss situated, in the awe of its fundamental 
irretrievability, at the heart of discourse in which it echoes as the lack because it is its "lost 
nature" that put it there in the first place? To answer this question we would have to 
consider succinctly two categories of absence that inscribe the "secret" object in the 
middle of the signifYing space or agora: the absence of the object as present and the 
presence of the object as absent. To subscribe to the first category would place the object, 
and with it the crypt, cryptonymy, secret, safe among the signifiers, which, to the extent 
that they are symbols representing the subject of the meaning for other symbols, is the case 
here. As for the presence of the absent object as lacking, the concept of the crypt would 
have to be revised. Or does the crypt allude here to a completely different order on \\ hich 
Lacan, as perhaps a foreigner to the cryptic device, and therefore excluded from this 
dialogue has already shed some light. I am not even thinking of what has been illuminated 
~ ~ ~ ~ 
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here regarding the loss and the preservation of "what takes place secretly, or takes a secret 
place, in order to keep itself safe somewhere in a safe", namely, what Freud saw at the 
centre of the paranoiac watching oneself "being watched", as discussed in the first chapter. 
Also I am not thinking of the ideal whose loss is always an invitation to a strangely 
inverted process of idealisation of death as the ultimate preserver and mortifier of life. I am 
thinking of the phallus. 
The crypt, to come back to the clandestinely philosophical theme in analysis of 
melancholia, is given a further description that deserves our attention. According to the 
speculation on the secret: "caulked or padded along its inner partition, with cement or 
concrete on the other side, the cryptic safe protects from the outside the very secret of its 
clandestine inclusion or its internal exclusion".17 The ambivalence of frigid stone on the 
outside and the folds of warm lining on the inside is no doubt a particular choice of words 
that give the intimacy of the place of exclusion, or the intimacy of the exclusive place, to 
vivid associations. Hence the cryptic place will so often be identified with the "sepulchre" 
that, again, "can signify something other than simply death",18 or a tomb that hides, as a 
tomb, a trace of the dead to be followed alongside Blanchot's path. The scene of the crypt, 
which for Torok & Abraham is associated with the preverbal trauma and which to some 
extent tells us why a linguistic symbol can for them be both a word and a thing, remains 
within the site of the forum to the extent that, as Derrida says, this site has a judiciary side 
or even a structure of the court of law. 
Thus the crypt as a metaphor of incorporation has assumed a relation to the law 
and prohibition. If the crypt means anything, in court it will have been heard not as what it 
means but as a meaning. But, as Lacan reminds us in the Seminar on Ethics, the meaning 
of the statement is subject to the "general assembly of the people", the jury, in which 
echoes the etymology of the Thing as chose and causa. What would the crypt represent in 
the grave atmosphere of the court, given that on the whole the latter is but a host of 
representatives and representations whose circulation is internally excluded from the 
alleged truth of the subject doubly represented, in the court at least, by the solicitors and 
barristers? If the crypt has a place in the courtroom, it is certainly not a legitimate place to 
the extent that only representation, as the crypt, can be represented here thereafter vVe are 
unlikely to find out the truth from the empty mouth of representation save the signifier 
addressing another signifier. Irrespective of whether it is a case of conviction or acquittal. 
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the cryptic place, in its illegitimacy, could only be that of a secret pleasure of jouissance. 
That is perhaps what Torok, N. Abraham and Derrida refer to when speaking of the loss of 
"the object of pleasure", and which situates us again in the dimension of the drive. The 
crypt as a loss of the ideal and a place of jouissance. But what kind of jouissance, what 
kind of the real is at stake here, provided it is not a sexual one but rather, so to speak, a 
jouissance of secret representation? Ifwe are to consider this possibility, as we have in the 
discussion of the difference between psychosis and neurosis in the previous chapter, it is 
not because the notion of the jouissance of the Other allows us to see it as a world market 
place of free exchanges and circulation of "objects and speeches". Rather these exchanges 
are allowed because of what is not allowed, namely to transmit the symbol but not the 
absolute singularity of the object lost in symbolisation. 
It allows us to see the incorporation as a secret pleasure/displeasure of the drive as 
opposed to the impossibility of finding the object other than "refinding" it. Why then is the 
phallic jouissance forbidden? The signifier of the Other is forbidden because it is a signifier 
of the lack. The object is prohibited because it is lost. It is not lost because it is forbidden 
but, because it has been lost, it is prohibited as impossible, as the real. In other words, and 
in Lacanian terms, since in melancholia the object has not been experienced as causa 
(chose), not giving rise to the phallic function, it can only return as a jouissance. In Lacan's 
formula, what does not emerge in the symbolic reemerges in the real. The historiography 
of loss leaves us with little doubt about its relation with prohibition. In asserting that "the 
loss works as a prohibition" (1968), Torok was neither the first nor the last to have done 
so, clandestinely perhaps acknowledging what Lacan had to say earlier, which in turn 
makes Miller's remark about prohibition being "the myth of loss" (1994) sound familiar. 
Jouissance of the symbol is forbidden for the speaking subject not only because the subject 
"is subject of the Law and the Law is grounded in this very prohibition",19 but also because 
prohibition of the "myth of loss" conditions identification on the level of desire, for which 
in analysis one pays for with jouissance. One is certainly not forbidden to pay this price but 
one certainly has to pay for the loss. 
Derrida's considerations of the crypt as a place of secret pleasure on the one hand, 
and as a "padded" safe, internally excluded from the exchange of "objects and speeches", 
not onl~' fly in the face of the link between prohibition and loss, but also are caught in \\ hat 
I \\ould call two Lacanian moments. Firstly, and this brings me to the crypt as the phallus -
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the phallic signifier standing for the always already outside of the signifying chain and 
circulation of signs - incorporation is marked by a simultaneous appropriation and rejection 
of the paternal phallus as "the object of pleasure". It is at this point where the illeo-itimacy 
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of the crypt comes to light. For the crypt to be legitimate it would have to be smuggled 
into the courtroom, to return to the metaphor, concealed as nonrepresentation. Having 
appeared, however, before the jury, the superego no doubt, it is already a representation 
"forbidden" to tell the truth of its own jouissance unless it lie, lies thinking it tells the truth, 
there is no other way. That is why for Lacan the phallus is neither the object of enjoyment 
nor a fantasy which relies on the symbolic construction. The phallus is not a cryptic "safe" 
that would shelter the beyond of language: 
The fact that the phallus is a signifier means that it is in the place of the Other that the subject has 
access to it. But since this signifier is only veiled, as ratio [raison I of the Other's desire, it is this 
desire of the Other as such that the subject must recognise, that is to say, the other in so far as he is 
himself a subject divided by the signifyingSpaltung.2o 
"Desire of the Other" is recognised by the subject in relation to what Lacan called the little 
other in fantasy. It is on this level that the "padded" safe, or "crypt", comes to existence, 
but it is not fantasy that gives the "crypt" existence as fantasy. According to Torok & 
Abraham, division of the crypt is a prerequisite for the crypt to come into existence, that is 
to say, to enable the metaphorical function of substitutions of meaning. But this precisely 
would not take place should the phallic signifier not come to the place of the Other by 
being incorporated as "object" or "word" in the fantasy. If the phallic signifier is extimate 
then, if it is not an object but a lack, its "cryptic" character makes it an object of 
jouissance. Hence, the question of desire and law. 
The second "moment" concerns prohibition. As Derrida says: "Incorporation 
negotiates clandestinely with a prohibition it neither accepts nor transgresses" 21 It is by 
virtue of the imaginary character of this negotiation that jouissance, which concerns the 
real of the body, is only granted as prohibited, as phalliC jOllissance; since the prohibition 
functions as an impossibility of both inclusion and exclusion of the object a, the object 
remains internally excluded, extimate to the extent that refinding it on the level of 
signification is only possible if the phallus as a paternal metaphor has been deployed in the 
place of the Other to enable the production of meaning. 
139 
If "secrecy is essential", as both Torok and Derrida agree, it is essential not for the 
sake of the crypt which orders signification from its secret place, as for example the 
preverbal trauma of the Wolf Man, but in order to allow articulations to be heard by the 
subject of interpretation. Secrecy is essential not in order to preserve the crypt as a place in 
which is preserved "a disguise hiding the traces of the act of disguising", unless this were 
either a metaphorical meaning or a literary device deployed for the sake of therapeutic 
effect by the subject who invented it, but as subject of the unconscious chain. 22 As a place 
of double disguise, "a disguise hiding the traces of the act of disguising", the crypt, to say 
it again, is not the place of repression. The secrecy, in the cryptic sense of the word, that is 
to say in the analytical sense, is a foreclosure of the patronym revealed in the conspiracy of 
verbal delirium of the one who both accepts and transgresses it while remaining in the 
embraces of jouissance that refuses to the end to pay with castration. 
In the view of this, and of Derrida's silence to the psychogrammatic messages from 
Lacan, the former's claim that "the crypt is the vault of desire" can only remain analytically 
valid if it remains metaphorically seductive. The reason why it is difficult, if not impossible, 
to contribute to the view that desire can be operative in the crypt, as a secret pleasure that 
"neither accepts nor transgresses" prohibition by which the symbolical terms of this desire 
are called into ex-istence, is an indication of difference, initially given by Freud, between 
the order of the drive which is always satisfied, and desire which never is. But this is a 
distinction that neither Torok nor Abraham are prepared to take on board. 
The crypt has a value of the melancholic symptom to the extent that the 
melancholic discourse leans on to signify the meaning of death as an imaginary death of the 
ego. If melancholia keeps the dead other alive, one already finds in the signs of this 
maintenance the invention of the crypt as an enigmatic and ambiguous meaning encrypted 
on the place of burial which appears as the death of the ideal, or the ideal as death. The 
mortifYing inhibition as opposed to an attempt at exhumation and necrophagia in the sense 
of incorporation will owe a great deal to the regressive character of melancholia, Freud's 
third factor, and to the oral satisfaction of effluvium of jouissance. For if the subject is, as 
Nicolas Rand put it, "divested of metaphorical reach", it is an inaccessibility of the dead 
other that silences the imaginary operation. The analysis of melancholia has led us to 
employ metaphors invented by those who studied it, including Freud, tlnding their use 
indispensable in accounting for what in representing they do not represent. This ~hould not 
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prevent us from attributing to the attempts to mataphorise death an element of failure in so 
far as the melancholiac's quest for truth, which Freud duly acknowledged, of the lost 
object always slips into an abyss of pathos and disappointment. The signifier wielded in 
such a quest is never powerful enough to effect an induction of structural transformation 
and to bring the cure to an analytic conclusion outside transference or in absentia of 
castration, or, as Freud's ethics would recommend, to the place where the lack would 
allow to love and work outside the conditions that do not. 
To return to our question about the relation between cryptonymy, and the 
patronym, what appears as two "rival"terms in our discussion, the latter designating the 
signifying transmitter as both the no of the father and the father's support, melancholia 
reveals the unexplained concealment of the latter. The crypt would thus remain to support 
the ambivalence of both failing to activate the paternal metaphor and producing a 
metaphorical prosthesis to extract and detach what would otherwise seem sunk in the 
literal stupor of jouissance as it is in the case of Finnegan '8 Wake. The ambivalent 
function of the cryptic term must therefore be regarded as pertaining to the melancholic 
symbolisation which has as its object the "longing for something lost". To this extent the 
paternal metaphor is an enabler of metaphoricity as such which opens to the function of 
language while prohibiting to satisfy the "supreme jouissance" of the mythical unity. For 
the signifier cannot be eaten leaving incorporation to feed on the indigestible Nothing. 
What it "incorporates" instead is the horror of loss on which jouissance wears the death 
drive to death. 
It must be therefore be noted in the same vein that the already mentioned term of 
the "word-thing" not only confounds object (object of the lack) and symbol (signifier of the 
lack) but also situates both in the dimension of drive's satisfaction. This attests to a certain 
impossibility of synthesis or unity of "words and things" which neither Torok & Abraham, 
nor Derrida for this part, help disentangle. Why is the Wolf Man's signifier tieret, "to rub", 
removed from the status of a signifier and from allowing the subject to associate a meaning 
that in the discourse arises in the vicinity of the fantasy of masturbation which Karl 
Abraham situated at the centre of melancholia? The "word-thing" is erected in the place of 
the phallus which would, for Torok & Abraham, give it to phallic jouissance, the 
unthinkable hotchpotch of body and language joined in fusion. The answer to the question 
hides in the lack of distinction between the lack and the signifier, which is bound to 
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diminish the value of the prohibitive function of the loss Torok herself elaborated. 
It is with respect to the inhibition of loss therefore that we can see how the 
function of the imaginary becomes inoperative. After all it is only when the metaphor is 
taken literally that the symptom can be produced. If in melancholia the symptom focuses 
on self-negation in relation to the agency of conscience or the voice, it has become clear by 
now that in analysis, as Freud demonstrated, the inhibition of self-negation does not 
prevent the commentary from keeping the secret by means of a metaphor that signifies 
what has not been said. 
Inability to lie about himself is the source of melancholic illness. How can there be 
lies without the semblant of identification, without the self that misrecognizes itself in the 
other taking the other for the self, for the me, to whom the imaginary owes its 
subterranean whereabouts? In melancholia the function of the imaginary is suspended 
leaving no room for the production of fantasy to the extent that fantasy centres around the 
lost object. If for Nietzsche truth is a "host of metaphors" made up of literary ruses, in the 
analytical sense "I, truth, speaking" is made of lies and errors and therefore constructed as 
a fiction. In other words truth operates on the level of the metaphor which produces what 
constitutes the essence of the imaginary, namely a meaning that suffers from the lack of 
knowledge. Although the life of meaning attempts to retain at its very centre the specular 
object of identification thus promoting a tendency to totalize, round up, close and fill the 
gaps in the chain, as an imaginary product it is also a place subject to the unconscious 
textuation of the symbolic where meaning always lies by telling the truth, the truth of the 
imaginary. The appeal to the resources of the other remains fictive in their effect of 
representative manifestations, always subordinate to the laws of intervention and 
interpretation, that is to say, to the discourse of the Other. 
This dislocation of the imaginary, this resistance to mimesis, doubling, substituting 
and, generally speaking, to fictionalisation of meaning when giving due to jouissance 
\vithin the cryptic walls which echo the emptiness of repetition - these characteristics, this 
melancholic profusion is already a symptom through which an appeal is made. I'he 
question is to whom. Or to what. For when the melancholic cannot cease to flood his 
listener, the analyst otherwise a reader, with his self-accusations permeated by shame and 
guilt, he has already accused an other issuing a demand to be heard in the appeal to the 
agellc~' that keeps silent. For it is not without pleasure that the appeal to half-baked truth 
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will make him heard by the other when he comes back to the same meaning of either well 
regurgitated wisdom expressed by an individual expressing or as a subject emerging in the 
uncertain articulation of what his truth is, the truth that like an invisible partition separates 
the body from the letter. It is to this moment that Freud lends his ear literally and why 
should we not listen to him? 
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CHAPTERS 
AUTOPSIES: BLANCHOT'S IMAGINARY VERSIOl\S 
In the last two chapters we have discussed the space of melancholia. It has 
remained undetermined whether this space, its morphology and dynamics, remains within 
the structure of psychosis or neurosis. Such determination - indispensable in the clinic to 
the extent that the clinic analyzes solely the subject's relation to language - is of secondary 
importance in this study. What has gradually acquired more interest for us in the last 
chapter is the space of writing, the place of the letter in melancholia. It is to this that I will 
now turn my attention. 
By way of outlining the problematic that concerns us here I propose the following. 
Nothing suggests that it is possible to accede to any other way of reading literature than by 
way of a psychoanalytical detour. That is not to say that psychoanalysis is the only way to 
"read" literature/philosophy, the crudeness of this statement not being worth exploiting and 
equalling perhaps its self-defeating wish. But rather that reading inevitably subjects its 
statements to the other of the unconscious, which is the other of reading. Nothing testifies 
to a reading more eminently and erroneously than the truth of the subject of the 
unconscious. Any other way is therefore already the way of a subjectal difference, one of 
the demands of reading in general, especially that psychoanalysis is concerned with the 
alterity of reading. 
To repeat our task then we shall concern ourselves with the other of reading, 
rather than, as it was suggested by De Man, with the "ontological priority" of work. The 
task of critique in this instance responds to the division that separates the voice of an 
author and his elusive charm that deflects his wishes. One could say for instance that Noli 
me legere functions, in its ambiguity, as such a vocal attractor. No critique can perhaps 
\\ithstand resistance to the unconscious laws of the letter and sexuality, which only 
translate this resistance into an effect Freud saw in producing a joke, namely, a production 
ofjouissance in the Other or a jouissance of resistence. On the other hand \ve should note 
that if there is an enjoyment in writing, its suffering, its pathos or pathemes, appears to us 
in what Lacan called knowledge'S "dialectic with jOllissanct.''', 1 that sustains a relation of 
the letter to a lure. Such a seduction, never simple or univocal, serves to guide the reader 
as a beacon of deflection. Even if it could give us some direction it could do no more than 
that; it does not illuminate where it shines and the way to it is not without rockY' traps. 
That is perhaps, in one glimpse, what Blanchot's writing has given out, the letter without 
guarantees, the light without sources, identification without objects. Some patience is 
required nevertheless to test this premature promise that Blanchot throughout his work 
attempted to show under an enigmatic command Noli Me Legere, where a secret preserves 
the secrecy of the crypt. It is in response to what we might call Blanchot's imperative, that 
De Man spoke of a certain intimacy between work and its origin giving the reader 
somewhat secondary place: 
What we are reading is located closer to its [work] origin than we are and it is our purpose to be 
attracted by it to the place whence it issued. The work has undeniably ontological priority over the 
reader. It follows that it would be absurd to claim that in reading we 'add' something, for any addition, 
be it in the form of an explication, a judgment, or an opinion, will only remove us further from the 
real center. We can only come under the true spell of the work by allowing it to remain what it is. This 
apparently passive act, this 'nothing' that, in reading, we should not add to the work, is the very 
definition of a truly interpretative language~ 
This Heideggerian "passivity" is indeed what De Man tries to resist here by yielding to it 
and by adding 'nothing' to reading. Yielding to what then? To "the real centre" of the 
origin that precedes every subject of reading? To an extent this eagerness to leap over to 
the site of "the tndy interpretative language" confuses here two levels of linguistic 
operations which bear witness to the divide I spoke of above. Lacan, throughout his work, 
emphasised a difference that separates the enunciation [enonciation] from the statement 
[el1ol1ce]. The play of the two constitutes interpretation. For Lacan enunciation is an 
enigma. It marks the cryptic side of the discourse, which he encourages his listeners and 
readers to make into a statement or utterance. Lacan gives an example: a citation. In citing 
De Man I say he said. I suppose another by introducing this he for it is not I who said it of 
Blanchot. It is not me and yet it is I, hence the two registers. A citation is a statement not 
an enunciation. A commentary is supposed in this way by an invocation of a sense stated 
by the supposed reader. In other words, a reader supposed to know emerges as an effect 
of a citation only to inspire a commentary that is merely a proliferation of statements. An 
enunciation is what Lacan calls mi-dire which takes the power of the statement from a 
citation that is always half-said. This play of registers not only affirms an indeterminacy of 
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such dialectic but also does not permit us to take De Man's distinction between "the 
author" and work, the reader and origin seriously. The division of the subject of the 
unconscious must therefore be read in view of bringing out the play of signifiers which 
operate on the level of the statement only. If citation aims at persuasion it is not certain as 
to what the "supposed reader" is to be persuaded about except the enigma of the 
enunciation thwarting the very project, and with it, as in the case of De Man's critique, the 
supposed subject of reading. 3 Suffice it to say that the crypt, the patheme discussed in the 
previous chapter, serves here as a place, and a structural moment, of the subject of the 
enunciation on the one hand, and on the other, in so far as it appears in the form of a 
statement, the imperative above, as a beacon of deflection. The question of distance rises 
to significance here and so we should remain in the distance, neither too far nor to close 
the concealment which enables an encrypture. 
We will thus remain in this chapter in the proximity of the image. It concerns us 
when the praxis of death and the possibility of time emerge in the immanence of writing. It 
is perhaps in writing that the problem of the image as immanent death comes closest to us. 
The image remains proximate to the letter despite their estrangement, a distance without 
which nothing could be said. We speak of distance here, not opposition, for the relation 
between the image and signification resembles a relation of an absent present to the 
presence of an absent. That is why in his consideration of the image, Blanchot goes to the 
extremes to trace the relation between the image and the dead letter by situating death in 
the impossible place where the image becomes identical to itself. It is not the dead man or 
the dead woman that rouses him to vigilance at the site of the dead but the cadaver as 
.... lIch, a resemblance as such. Can such self-identity, to the extent that it is image's self-
resemblance, be regarded as a moment at which writing begins? Is a self-resemblance of 
the image the site of the letter, its crypt? The cadaver as self-resemblance will constitute 
one of the three themes to be discussed the other two being the myth of Orpheus and 
Eurydice and the song of the Sirens. Neither the choice of themes nor their order are 
accidental. 
Blanchot's writing fascinates us. But what is it that draws us most to it? This 
"-
fascination, in its strangely pacifying effect, has to do with proximity of the image and a 
liaison between the image and the letter. One is perhaps never ready to read Blanchot, as 
Krell remarked,4 never prepared for a distance necessary for reading, and which, as in 
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Blanchot's text, becomes a power to attract. Does the reader have to arm himself with a 
certain resistance - resistance as a condition of sensitivity according to Valery whom 
Blanchot never really grew fond of - to approach the distance in which writing marks? Or 
is it a question of a certain jouissance of passivity that would allow us to live through the 
distance of pathology, or pathography, in a mimesis of the letter, as Derrida does in his 
reading of Blanchot in Living On? But above all this is perhaps not a question of choice 
between styles or modes of reading but rather a matter of a response in which the choice 
lies in the very ambiguity of what responds in relation to the real, not the "real centre" of 
De Man, but the impossible real as formulated by Lacan, the inarticulable density of what 
has escaped us: "It is not to his consciousness, that the subject is condemned, but to his 
body, which in many ways resists actualizing the division of the subject".5 
It is in view of the lost jouissance that Blanchot's question of death is reinstated in 
relation to writing. But what kind of passion is Blanchot's passion of death, passion for 
death, that always haunts him as essential, solitary and at the same time inadequate and 
unsatisfactory, passion to death, that would allow him to avoid death and turn writing into 
what death is not, the No of death? Is it the literary fascination that, coming from the 
contemplation of the image reflects its emptiness by leaving us anguished and at a loss; 
what has remained is only a sense without reference, a letter without an object? Or is it the 
seductive singularity of Blanchot's aleatory wandering across imaginary landscapes where 
the passion of death, and death of the object on which it is suspended, becomes possible in 
the terror of its impossibility? In preparation to broach these problems one is somewhat 
disarmed in dismay to give the necessary rig our which would do justice to reading, just as 
mourning does justice to the loss. It is with this rig our, at the risk of putting justice at 
stake in the face of law that we must advance when we come to the point of , 
disappointment. The steep serpentine of Blanchot's step, hanging over ascending edge, is 
certainly no more vertiginous than the path of descension. These two possibilities then - of 
writing without an object and of writing as an objet perdu - seem closely related in the 
intimacy that guides Blanchot's meditation alongside the edge. Their closeness appears as a 
dis-tance between mourning and melancholia, between the justice of exile and melancholic 
indictments of the law over the loss. 
Two possibilities then and also two versions, deux l'ersiolls, for the signification to 
take place where the image is concerned. And further, but always in the same direction, 
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two directions which on the way multiply, digress to become diversions or dil'ersions. 
That is perhaps Blanchot's way of writing and writing as a way of Blanchot, a perpetual 
diversion that submerges itself in a detour, off the road, de version, of the version which 
remains as structurally manifold as it is ambiguous in meaning. Thus the work of diversion 
becomes subject to exposure of a passivity in relation to that which it operates. In fact, 
diversion facilitates a certain disengagement of letting "oneself be taken by it [c'esl s:r 
laisser prendre]", 6 a passivity of a distance that always already emerges as a divide 
between a "free decision" and an associative fall which is never free but directs us where 
the signifier comes to mark the direction. It is a direction of the subject which disappears 
as an appearance of the mark, the signifier that constitutes its truth. 
This surrendering, to which I will come back later, this submission and a peculiar 
delight in submission to identify with a representation that holds us in a distance by making 
us submissive to it and to its freedom, is what Blanchot recalls when he speaks about the 
subject's ideal and the opposition between an event and its image. Blanchot speaks here of 
an outside, a primary outside, if I can call it so, of submitting to ourselves or to the self 
[moi] that the passion for the image entices me to. Somewhere, and we never know when 
it begins or ends, we are in the embrace of the Other. 
Blanchot demands that we follow him, which is already inexact a formulation. Not 
to follow him but to follow the diverse path of anxiously mournful meanings in which, 
nevertheless, something rather than nothing is said, not only said but also marked, cut, 
engraved in the thought of those who come near, perhaps too near to capture the distance 
of seduction. For if seduction is possible, as Freud in his abandoned theory showed it was, 
the letter opens up a site of the image that attracts, that is to say fascinates. Such a step 
seems necessary whenever the image gels up in a letter, and the latter's restricted 
movement seems to be an effect of it being pervaded by the image of fascination. 
Something else then appears here whenever the movement towards the image that seems 
to hamper the production of words is in question. Something else than this observation 
concerning the petrifying power of the image over the sense of words. It is true that the 
image holds words hostage giving them out to death, but it is also true that it is the image 
that frees them into alleys of signification cutting loose their estranged self-love and 
univocality that stills them. The image does both, freezes the diversity of \\ords and melts 
the hard ways in a fantasy that lets univocality burst open into another sense Blanchot's 
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meditation on the cadaver may seem to be just a good "example" of such a manifoldness if 
one takes example to mean that which serves a prescribed purpose, for instance that of an 
operative structure that underlies the practice of discourse. Underlies, that is to say. 
subjects the "discourse of the Other", to reading. A statement in which desire as subject of 
enunciation remains veiled. There is a temptation then to which we often yield to seek 
sense but in such a way that it succumb to a previously elaborated formulation. But there is 
also a way of reading which writes the sense of this preViously, which is the direction 
towards the image just as the former movement, the progressive forgetting tends to drive 
us away from it thus falling, submitting to its dark power. 7 
Freud's analysis of melancholia showed us that at its heart lies an identification with 
the loss which to the extent that it deprives - as a loss that in its absence is nevertheless 
present - the subject of an imaginary support, ifby that one means an imaginaly unity with 
an object, a me, it turns me against myself. But the claim that melancholia suffers from the 
lack of the imaginary, that in the melancholic discourse the imaginary is impoverished or 
that it is lacking, which produces a psychotic effect of delirious "truth-telling", must again 
be reread. It is, after all, in the spoken discourse that such impoverishment, as Freud 
analysed it, in favour of all-knowing truth, comes to an effect. Does Blanchot, for example, 
by putting Orpheus on trial, not evoke a metaphorical landscape of the "other night" which 
raises the scene of mourning over Eurydice to an anguishing point at which the loss 
becomes potent of conceiving the image? The meditation on the cadaver which gives 
nocturnal voice to him who in the night searches for "what the night is concealing" is not 
therefore without a relation to Orpheus' guilt of impatience and to the metaphor of 
mourning. Who mourns? No one mourns, such would be an answer gleaned from The 
writing of the disaster. Language mourns. What remains a mark of dissolution, what 
hovers in the distance of the other night mourns over the objectal eclipse of the 1. But that 
is precisely a paradox which deserves some attention. No one mourns because there is no 
one to mourn, certainly not a subject in the "philosophical" i.e. Cartesian sense of the 
\vord, no one, that is to say, the unconscious desire, the metaphor of mourning mourns. 
Yet the image of the cadaver, which I will now approach, and which Blanchot presents to 
the reader as an image of self-resemblance remains to function as a cryptic object in 
Blanchot's text, even if desire for it is in advance pre-empted by the object -loss Pre-
empted but also generated for it is the lacking object, which philosophy took as an object 
1~9 
of knowledge, that causes desire to signify. There is no me to mourn because it is the 
shadow of the me that is mourned, and that is why Blanchot always seeks the night, the 
"other night" of language in which mourning could become a nonmourning, a writing 
without the loss or the lost writing. 8 
Why the cadaver? There is a preliminary movement in Blanchot's text Two versions 
(~j' the imaginary. It aims to establish the terms in which the path towards the dead could 
lie open. We find the cadaver, the image of the dead flesh, thrown into the middle. A 
fathoming analysis of the image, of what the image might be, serves as a preamble. One 
does not approach the grave dead, that is to say, one does not go there without the tools 
and instruments with which to approach the cadaverous site and with which to pay it its 
respects. But, above all, this funereal procedure, and a ritual in its own right, takes place 
only post mortem. It is its condition and its secret motivation. 
In these preliminary steps, which perpetually draw from the ambiguity of the 
French pas, Blanchot attempts to gauge the relation between the image and the object, the 
image and the thing. Each thing seems to have an image that rescues it from nothing. 
When things fall into nothing, when repetition loses its force and ceases to exert change, 
then the changeless image emerges, and the thing, "sunk into its image", follows it like a 
shadow, like a no-thing. That is not exactly the order, the chronological order, in which 
Blanchot places the image in relation to the object. In Blanchot's literary investigation 
perception precedes imagination. There is a difference, Blanchot seems to suggest, 
between the object of perception and the image. Surely, it is not a thing that we "perceive", 
so that, when it disappears, the image remains holding itself out of the abyss of 
disappearance. What we "see" is already an image raised to this position as a result of the 
loss of the object. This is at least what we have said in the discussion of the specular 
relation. 
But Blanchot seems to run against it: "We see, then we imagine", "After the object 
comes the image".9 What does this after mean here, what does it signify') It designates a 
place of break or removal, a crisis of repetition, where the ever renewed satisfaction does 
not resume its function in the circular trajectory around the object. Something is taken 
away from the demand for satisfaction and what has been taken away does not return to its 
economy. The after then does not replace the before, nor does it come after before, as if 
h(ioJ'e ever existed. The (?j'ter signifies the lack of before by assuming the latter's imaginary 
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existence. In other words, the image is not what remains of the thing but what appears in 
the effect of "the thing as distance, present in its absence, graspable because ungraspable, 
appearing as disappeared" . 10 
It is only in this way that we can grasp the horizon of time; the image of the dead 
will have earned its context and its middle place in that order. Although Blanchot says that 
"the thing was there",l1 this it-was of the thing, even more than the "thing-itself", has 
always already become subject to dissolution or distance followed by the image. Still, the 
image in this sense is not a trace of something that existed in "reality". Rather it is a 
peculiar species of what has fallen off as a result of the crisis of repetition - a certain death. 
It cannot be doubted that the image mortifies, but it cannot be determined what kind of 
death awaits him who looks. The image comes after this indefinite moment of, as Blanchot 
calls it, appearance as disappearance, only to the extent that there has never been a 
perception of some-thing. And yet this moment finds perception. 
Since the image does not reflect some past reality, some memory to be reached out 
for - even less the real, which for Blanchot embodies the dimension of the living and their 
active, that is say subject-based "initiative", and which Lacan places at the highest stake in 
the subject's discourse - its reflection is doubtless a place all the more significant for a 
writer. It is a signifier that speaks of a loss or a lack. This lack, however, has nothing to 
do, as we shall see, with something missing in the field of perception but constitutes a lack 
in the field of the Other, a lack operating in the symbolic order. Hence a metaphorical 
inadequacy that haunts Blanchot in his pursuit of the image of the dead, hence his 
perpetual disappointment with the metaphor of death, and hence the symptom of 
unyielding persistence to articulate what is impossible to articulate, what yields to the 
temptation of seeing beyond that which is to be seen. 
The image not only idealises the emptiness of the object by giving it a second life, a 
life of death, but also, as Freud observed, overvalues the object in the subject's libidinal 
economy giving it a narcisstic quality of self-sufficiency. This claim is elaborated by 
Blanchot in relation to art, as if marginally, in a series of interim reflections on what is 
nothing else but a moment of mourning, the externalisation of "impersonality" and the 
'-
insistence of nothingness. Writing too is committed to mourning, and sometimes to 
melancholia which is the former's symptom and ruination, the imaginary idealisation of lo~s 
and the contlated complacency of being. Is the image in Blanchot's meditation already the 
151 
Freudian shadow of an object cast upon the I? To answer this question we must move 
towards the place where the image, as Blanchot tells us, finds itself 
The image tempts us. The image of woman's breasts does not appear as pure 
transparency without him who looks at it. Such appearance is not indifferent to us, blurred 
in the interface of night and day. It is a "passivity which makes us submit to it fpassivit.9 
qui faut que nous fa subissons]",12 in our appeal to the return from the obscure future to 
the essential past. Is it then the power of the image of the breasts that seduced us to its 
lure? Or is it the gaze that follows it, under the seductive charm of dissolution, still active 
in another time, following that which severed itself from it? The gaze appropriates the 
subject when he says to have seen this or that, what in the image remains of the object 
There is a relation then, if we follow the gaze's attachment to the lure, in what the subject 
says about the lure's essence, between the image of the breasts [Ie sein] and being [das 
sein]. But what kind of a relation? Is it, for example, a relation resembling that of a lack of 
a living person to the corpse? For Blanchot it is never a question of a simple relation 
between the living and the dead. What he elicits in such a relation is its dissymetry, its 
distance of alienation. The mortal image of the immortal body is neither "any sort of 
reality" nor "another, another thing". Here the repetition inscribed in the moment of gaze 
does not transport us into a dimension in which, simply, something else will have been 
recovered, say another sense. It is a question of the other of sense. The reason for an 
insufficiency of another sense effected by this moment of mortification is due to the fact 
that we do not speak about the relation of places. The place of the dead is without a place, 
even if there is a grave to attend, a tomb with an epitaph or, indeed, a crypt. 
We can thus say that what intervenes in the relation of fascination, the relation that 
couples the imaginary ego, as Lacan defined it, with the image in which echoes th~ loss of 
jouissance, is the fantasy of unity. This fantasy is not without a legitimate status that 
involves a relation to the law, and occupies a place where Blanchot situates death The 
relation to the place is fundamental for Blanchot. What makes death, and in particular the 
dead, stand out, is the lack of place. Death is not in its place. Again, it is not a mere 
displacement of death that is in question here but a lack as operative in language - \\'hat 
Blanchot calls l'e/oignement [remoteness, distance, postponement] - that sets 
displacements in motion, for example rendering repression possible. That is why I call it a 
t1.lI1damental relation; not a lack of the signifier of death but an absolute alterity of du.\ 
lJing, that allows for the missing signifier - the phallus - to make the lack operative in 
language. What makes it operative is that the signifier "death" [fa mort] has a place in the 
reality of discourse, even if the real of death, the lost jouissance is without place. \\'e 
spoke about it earlier. But how are we to justify this strange lack of place death has always 
already found? Death is only for the living and that is so, because only the living have a 
relation with death. Although, as Blanchot remarks, "Death suspends the relation to 
place",13 and further that "the corpse is not in its place", the logic of displacement becomes 
effective due to this lack and any possible determination of displacement, of the other of 
sense, pertains, in accordance with Heidegger's preliminary remarks to the analysis of 
death, to the living, to those who remain. Blanchot's confirmation of the placeless place of 
dead should not, however, be read without the repeated reference to the cadaverous flesh, 
as if thrown into Heidegger's meditation as that which it lacks. The nowhere of death is the 
here of the corpse, the missing other that supplements the second version of the imaginary 
to Heidegger's analysis. The urgency of corpse's presence contrives a rigour of response to 
"Someone", which is why there is an inadequacy in speaking about death's "unity", and 
which has been said of Being's potentiality. Nothing comes to the place abandoned by 
death. In fact, Blanchot goes on to say, evoking a profoundly narcisstic estrangement of 
those who contemplate it, the dead "jealously" clings to his place as "a basis of 
indifference, the gaping intimacy [l'intimite beante] ",14 which is on the one hand the place 
of the Nietzschean drive, and on the other a resonance of the Lacanian beance, that 
alienating and anguishing gap that divides the subject. 
The indifference of the deceased finds its location in the here to which the nowhere 
becomes attached. Like in Freud's concept of the death drive, the indifference of death, its 
silence, pro-vokes post mortem readings and interpretations, Mourning and Melancholia 
not excluded. And when Blanchot says that "he who dies cannot tarry [demeurer Il'est pas 
acce.\'sihle B celui qui meurt]",lS we can hear in it en echo of Nietzsche's words "the dead 
can no longer die". But here it is not a question of an ideal, or melancholic triumph of 
immortality. The dead both expose the living to the lack of shelter and open them to the 
field of ethics of mourning which by admitting to the inapprioriateness of moving the 
corpse from place to place venerates the placeless place and fragility in the living But this 
does not leave deat:l without a relation to the ideal where the subject who writes it is 
inclined to find it. The word "death", after all, seems like a suitable shelter for the dead 
Blanchot does not follow this path which would meet dead end in suspending the I7(Twhere 
elsewhere. Where? \Vhere the dead are missing, in the analysis in which death reigns erect 
as a house without inhabitants, a temple without mourners. But this is also why it is not the 
dead who jealously cling to themselves but the living who hold out the image clinging, if 
they can, to what has remained, to the remainder that moves their desire to speak. To 
whom'? 
Blanchot's meditation aims to establish a relation to invite us to witness what 
cannot be witnessed and what falls into a singularity of articulation: "It is striking that at 
this moment, when the cadaverous presence is the presence of the unknown before us, the 
mourned deceased [Ie de/unt regrette] begins to resemble himself [ressambler B lui-
meme]".16 It is a striking moment and one of the most formidable passages in Blanchot's 
text. We are summoned to give a testimony of the dead coming to himself to form an 
image, the self-resemblance, of itself within itself. But is it self-resemblance? This first 
impossibility articulates also a moment of mourning in that it marks the absolute departure 
of the real, the unassuagable disappearance of life. There will be an accusation following 
this event but not here. It is not that there has never been a "perception", as Derrida 
remarked, but that perception binds the subject to the imaginary object as the object 
excluded from within, so lyrically intimate that it is always already extimate at the moment 
of commemorating the real. 
On a different level, this is also a moment when philosophy stumbles on the dead 
body of the philosopher, the jouissance of writing that brought him there. Blanchot, too, 
struggles ascertaining that "resembles himself' is the right expression, the only one and yet 
both excessive and insufficient. It is not certain whether himself owes its existence to the 
grammar of the masculine Ie de/unt, which thus excludes elle-meme or soi-meme, both 
herself and itself. What is certain is an insufficiency of the other affirmed in a failure to 
grasp the outwordly in the world and seize the "not in this world" where I, who uttered it, 
lack in the Other who is therefore lacking Other. The excess in Blanchot's choice of words 
rests on the affirmation of the other whose loss makes us wrest the words that remain from 
the beyond where they vanish. The question of "love and work" is decided here: the 
former as a loss inaugurates the latter as remaining. What remains, these words resembles 
him,..,·e({, is not a resemblance of nothing, which is why himself is excessive, already saying 
too much when the question of the father is brought into view. Hence the ambiguity of 
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who - who dies, who is nearest - remains at the heart of ambiguity about the other, not the 
"real" person, but a metaphor at our disposal, whether mythical or not, in this case 
Eurydice, as we shall see. The "impersonal himself', the paternal, fraternal, is therefore at 
the same time the most personal, the only there is, given he, the other, is not an object as a 
semblance, but what corresponds to the loved object. Paradoxically, though not without 
justification, the moment of such intense suffering reveals itself in the pathos of enjoyment, 
jouh;sance which enjoys its subterranean liaisons with suffering. In Blanchot's text this 
enjoyment of suffering lapses into ecstatic admiration, and the appearance of a lure, the 
semblent, is indeed a moment of a certain death: 
y es~ it is he, the dear living person, but all the same, it is more than he. He is more beautiful, more 
imposing; he is already monumental and so absolutely himself that it is as if he were doubled by 
himself, joined in his solemn impersonality by resemblance and by the image. This magnified being, 
imposing and proud, which impresses the living as the appearance of the original never perceived 
'1 17 untI now ... 
The moment of pathological trembling is pursued, in the waves of exclamatory admiration, 
if I can say so, to the backbone, to the extreme unknown or to the place of the real which 
does not change place. This moment aims to affirm, in the delirious spasm of image's self-
identity, the beyond enjoyed in the letter. But it is also the moment of the burst of the 
signifier as resonating, not without pathos, in the testimony of self-resemblance as 
Blanchot articulates it. This symbolic moment marks the departure of the real: "Let us look 
at this splendid being from which beauty streams: he is, I see this, perfectly like himself; he 
resembles himself. The cadaver is its own image". 18 
But who is this I, the I that has been avoided throughout only to appear where 
there is nothing to see? It should not escape us that the I appears at the moment which is, 
as one says, breath-taking, the moment of instant nihilation burst into I see this. This 
breath-taking and, it would seem, speechless moment which takes our being away with it 
[essere] occurs in a sudden display of beauty of which Rilke said that it is "nothing but the 
beginning of terror, which we are just able to endure, and we are so awed because it 
serenely disdains to annihilate us" .19 What is striking even more is the sudden convergence 
of the breath-taking and speechless instant and the emergence, as in the Rilkean self-
annihilation, of the subject as the first pronoun signifying an encounter with the corpse as 
resembling himself. That is why, when writing out this grave and speechless moment, one 
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must immediately remark that it is not really I who can see the moment of death, or look at 
the impossible image of the cadaver as it becomes identical to itself. Rather it is another I, 
an already displaced, separated and distanced [s'eloigne] I, which speaks from the place of 
"gaping intimacy" where it is not: the I as subject to desire of the Other. 
The subject of the testimony does not speak from "here" to which these events 
would come, allowing me as thought to remain always outside being, as it was for 
Descartes. The subject speaks from "nowhere is here", or from a nonbeing, what Lacan 
called desetre, the speechless instant which opens into I speaking. Je Ie vois, I see this, 
speaks to us from the outside, I would even say, from where it was. In this sense, before I 
see this or that what my image reflects back to me in a deadly manner, or as a certain 
death, I am seen by the other, looked at by the empty gaze that sees nothing. Thus the I 
emerges not as a subject of the statement, where the gaze and voice, are locked in the 
drive that satisfies a certain dissatisfaction of impossibility of seeing, but the subject of the 
unconscious as enunciation, placed where it has been always missing. This is how 
Blanchot names it~ he brings to focus in the course of his meditation a fragment of 
discourse. In this fragment the I speaks as a lack of having been seen. 
This is also why Blanchot's words "like himself' never ceases to puzzle us, 
especially that the statement: "I am like myself, like I was" does not alter the sense of 
Blanchot's meditation but attempts to maintain the relation between the signifier and the 
imaginary field. The I can only appear where the cadaver is missing. I speaking outside of 
where I was, and dying the death of the other, is here in the crypt of the Other to which 
there is no return because the ego, as the object of the Other, lies buried and bound to the 
identification with, and love of, the dead other. Such appearance of the I, in the place 
where the dual character of the cadaverous object as both real and imaginary becomes 
manifest, the I which follows the real object to become trapped, in the grave of the other, 
as an imaginary one, is what I would call a melancholic moment in writing. It is true in this 
sense that the cadaver does not resemble "the person he was when he was alive". It is more 
than he, resembling what the Other loved in me, as me, and where I, enveloped in the 
shadow of the object cast upon me, speak as a bereft I. 
What the order of imaginary resemblance establishes in Blanchot's text is the law of 
signifier in which the object is always absent as present, the lack. But this goes even 
further, for what is affirmed in the likeness of the cadaver, in the "what is it like? l\othing", 
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is the affirmation of language which occupies no particular place to the extent that in 
signifying it signifies nothing. The image of self-resemblance is therefore "the dissolution 
of the thing", the dissolution that persists in speaking. What does the signifier resemble? 
Nothing. This is what we can say about the signifier: it resembles nothing because in its 
singularity (outside the chain) it means nothing, which is not to say that no one speaks or 
that it does not make sense in the subject's ear. Not only does it make sense but it also 
induces signification in the signified which, as one says today, is on the side of the real. It 
is these signifiers that we must find in order to remark on what does and what does not 
have a relation to jouissance. They can be found on three levels. For the moment let me 
mention just two. On the one hand, there is in Blanchot's texts a whirlpool of homophones 
- la mort, demeurt, mer, l'amour - whose ambiguous work allows us to situate them as not 
just a production of another meaning, as Blanchot will say at the end of The Imaginary 
Versions, but as the other of sense, the ambivalent identification with the imaginary father 
of love, the identification that sustains, in the melancholic enjoyment of the mOther, that 
which is inseparable and irreducible, an intimacy of the extimate distance [l'eloignement]. 
On the other hand, what appears here as a concept, and what is to be associated with the 
work of the death drive, is also manifested at the level of recurring signifiers that shift and 
distribute significations in the text. They appear not only in the texts discussed here but 
throughout Blanchot's work. These key signifiers - absence, the inaccessible, the 
impossible, death, corpse - are not simply concepts but signifiers as missing objects that 
assume subjectal singularity of sense in the persistence of ambiguity in which Blanchot 
situates them. In addition, given Blanchot's concern with the "real" that places him on the 
threshold of what is called the language of psychoanalysis, there is also, as if in the middle 
of this experience of pathos, a series of terms to be found in the later phase of Lacan's 
teaching. The encounter in which writing as a remark on the dead letter awaits a 
commentary, comes to the fore here. The power of resemblance would manifest itself in 
such comparative reading: does Blanchot's commentary resemble Lacan's central themes, 
or is it the other way round? And further: does the language of psychoanalysis resemble 
the language of literature/ philosophy? The question seems however illegitimate for it aims 
to delineate two dimensions, or what Lacan called dit-mensioll, by relating them to the 
place of origin, the twofold origin of literature and psychoanalysis, which each of them has 
inferred in the relation which can only be sustained as a relation of the sign, as It! reel Still, 
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I do not raise the question in vain. Blanchot's entrance to the symbolic serves as the next 
step in his meditation. The reflection on the symbolic comes second in the order of the text 
working as a certain thematization by way of negativity. Some jouissance have been 
jettisoned and the pathography of the cadaver is subjected to a reversal. I will come back 
to it. 
In the year L 'espace litteraire was published, Lacan was conducting his Seminaire 
which would later appear as the second volume in the series of twenty six. Much of it is 
devoted to the three registers of the real, imaginary and symbolic, the cornerstone of his 
doctrine. The real stands out as one of the most radical ones. We have grown used to 
speak of it as unspeakable, impossible. In this Seminar II Lacan shows how to delineate 
the boundaries between psychoanalysis and psychology, or indeed philosophy, by saying 
that "the real is without fissure". 20 It has no fissure for it already wedges a crevice in the 
body, a traumatic disruption of the Other. It has no cracks or gaps, unlike the symbolic, 
for, as he will interpolate in the Seminar XI, it does not change place. Although the 
existence of the real is only inferred, it emerges as a result of a critique of the psychologists 
of his time (von Fritsch, Fairbairn) who tried to construct a "reciprocal holism" of 
coexisting psycho-organic systems, the kind of parallelism against which Freud already 
warned us in his paper The Unconscious. This unified corpus would allow for the objects 
to be maintained at will. The question of qualifying them as "good" or "bad" would be left 
for Melanie Klein to answer. 
The real slips and evades such constructions. On this level the object remams 
inaccessible because it can only be approached, as a lack, on the symbolic one. According 
to Lacan, the psychologists try to invest the real with the symbolic to imagine the former's 
"qualities" as reflected in the symbolic constructions. In effect, the symbolism is set to 
operate in the real "not by virtue of projection, nor as a framework of thought, but by 
virtue of being an instrument of investigation". 21 If the undisplacable and uncrackable reel 
refuses translation, indeed resists, it is because of the image's resemblance of the object. 
Lacan proposes therefore a twofold nature of objects: 
On the one hand. they are imaginary in so far as they are objects of desire - if there is something 
\\hich analysis from the beginning brought to the fore, doubtless it is the fecundity of the libido in the 
creation of objects corresponding to the stages of its development. On the other hand, these objects 
arc real objects - it is taken for granted that \\e cannot give them to the individual. that isn't within our 
pO\\cr. what's at issue is allO\\ ing him to make manifest, in relation to the exciting object. that is to 
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say eliciting the imaginary reaction, the libido whose repression constitutes the knot of his neurosi~~ 
There are no symbolic objects. But that is not to say that a letter of writing cannot function 
as an object of such dual nature. In writing the letter often slips into an imaginary hole 
which it both covers and discloses. Both mourning and melancholia in writing, although 
they certainly deserve a distinction, seek the dead letter as an object of desire - desire 
which seeking the image finds an imaginary whole, a mimetic product of autopsy, what 
Torok called the "word-thing", to commemorate fa beance of the real. But it is the 
traumatic real that sets the imaginary to work symbolically provoking "the imaginary 
reaction". The place of the phallus as the facilitator of signification is of great importance 
here. For Lacan it is neither an object, nor a part of the body it represents, to the extent 
that the imaginary body desires a lost object. In writing, does the phallus come to the place 
of the letter concealed in the crypt, excluded from the production in so far as this 
production'S sole condition is the cryptic hole? In which case it would be the object of 
desire of the mOther that, excluded yet indispensable as excluded, writing has some 
relation with as a writing of the imaginary phallus, -<p as Lacan marked it, and, to this 
extent, writing's relation to the patronym, that in Lacan's economy regulates the 
melancholic jouissance, remains problematic. To what degree does writing of Blanc hot rely 
on the intimacy between the object of desire and the phallus, and to what extent these two 
seem indistinguishable in the metaphorical crypt, is what concerns us here: can the loss in 
writing, played out around the signifiers which name nothing and which in Blanchot's 
autopsies are gathered under the name of the cadaver, have any relation to the lost writing 
as the place marked by the crypt, the void through which writing must pass in order to 
mark? 
At this point we come to realise that Blanchot's fascination with the corpse, the 
name he gives to the image as a remainder of the (real) object, has come to an end. And 
when the symbolic agency is, if I can say so, called upon, the difference between the 
statement and enunciation opens agape. Has the imaginary been employed by Blanchot as 
a pretext that serves as a preamble to signification? And is not this "pretext", precisely, 
constituted as an instance of the letter or insistence of the letter that separates the subject 
from being? Having pointed out the dual nature of the object Lacan goes on to "introduce" 
the subject at this juncture: 
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The subject does not have a dual relation with an object with which he is confronted, it is in relation 
to another subject that his relations with this object acquire another meaning, and by the same token 
their value. Inversely, ifhe has relations with this object, it is because a subject other than himself has 
relations with this object, and they can both name it, in an order different from that of the real. As 
soon as it can be named, its presence can be invoked as an original dimension, distinct from realitv. 
Nomination is invocation of presence, and sustaining of presence in absence~3 -
The subject is a breach and an instant of naming in relation to another subject, where the 
present absence of the object induces signification. Or rather provokes it. Blanchot's text 
vacillates between these two: seduction and provocation. On the one hand there is a 
movement of drawing closer to the image, towards the imaginary pits of anguish and 
death, on the other hand, there is a moment of cessation, the terror and abandonment of 
the vicinity of jouissance, as well as drawing away, coming to sense of the encounter. Only 
the latter dimension - which is not to say that Blanchot will once and for all renounce the 
endeavour to return or the recurrence of that which returns to him - speaks of the subject 
as he signifies where the real and the imaginary do not meet. 
When Blanchot says by way of a provocation that "man is made in his image", 24 
echoing in it both religious and phenomenological traditions, as well as the above 
mentioned psychologism which brings "man" to self-reflection that attempts to inject the 
real with the symbolic, his provocation aims to reveal the knot of negativity in language. 
As I have said above, the signifier arrives - we could call it an event - at the site of the 
image as a reversal of that which is dropped, indeed mortified in naming. 
This affirmation of the signifier, in terms of negativity to the extent that it leans on 
the love of the Other to return to desire as nothing, finds its articulation in Blanchot's 
symbolic formula that immediately follows the imaginary precept above: "man is unmade 
[defait] according to his image"?5 The process of undoing [defail] weighs upon the 
imaginary axis supported by according. Thus the linguistic operation and its power to 
name works in Blanchot's meditation in a reverse order. It is not from the image but to the 
image that, in his poetics, the signifier is addressed. This is so despite the fact that, as 
Blanchot often repeats in his paper, and as I have done so likewise, the image precedes the 
linguistic operation. Although, unlike in Lacan's doctrine, Blanchot does not introduce the 
notion of the primacy of the signifier or the letter which must be in place, as the lack, for 
the linguistic symbol to take an effect, such primacy is an implication in his writing. And 
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yet if his fascination with the cadaver ends here it is because it has never begun; never did 
the post-mortem appear as a pre-mortem. Death is the reason to write. This is no doubt 
Blanchot's case. Also the case of Orpheus. Nor has there ever been an attempt in 
Blanchot's writing to stand vis a vis the cadaver. Not only is this relation a symbolic one 
but it also involves a retroactive slide, temporal difference, perhaps a memoir. Is this the 
end of the image? 
Blanchot demands that we put an end to the interminable. Not that putting an end 
would mean to render the interminable terminated. Under the disguise of ending the 
interminable is named or termed. It is a moment of the cut: "We do not cohabit with the 
dead under the punishment [sous peine] of seeing here collapse into the unfathomable 
nowhere .. ".26 The intimacy of encountering the present absence of the dead (les morts, 
although Blanchot uses most often the term fa depouille: skin, snake's slough, carcass, the 
stripped and therefore emptied remains) is subject to punishment [peine] should the dead 
drag the living to fill the lifeless carcass, or should the living love too much the object that 
excites them to love. But the difference between here and nowhere seems too subtle to 
hold. Earlier Blanchot says that "nowhere is here". To distinguish the two, to breach the 
bond of melancholic jouissance, to breach prohibitions and to blaspheme between the most 
nigh and most distanced, where the distinction comes to be named, implies an existence of 
the third term. Thus I return to add to the earlier mentioned two levels of reading 
Blanchot's text the third one, promised but not executed appointment of the ethical dit-
mensiOll where the symbolic value of the patronym is situated. We have already said that 
the name in the place of the Other guarantees meaning in the series of passionate 
approaches, and that it is the breach of the impossible desire that gives subject its existence 
as enunciation. 
Blanchot inserts the name of the term peine [penalty, punishment, sorrow, aporia] 
somewhat in passing to acknowledge a few passages later how signification comes to 
existence in conjunction with truth and law. Punishment, and its implicit relation to 
melancholic self-punishment, is given a name which is closely associated with 
condemnation and execution: the term peine de mort is a synonym of arret de mort, death 
sentence and the revocability of death, the step towards "the absolute neutrality of death" 
and the No of beyond. Thus the intervention of the symbolic tum in Blanchot's paper, and 
the suspension of the mortifying vision immersed, as it were, in the haunting emptiness of 
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the carcass, is not without a wave of shame, perhaps guilt. This is further illustrated by 
Blanchot's sudden disassociation of signification from the image. Somewhere Lacan asks: 
"Up to what point can a discourse that seems personal bear, on the level of the signifier 
alone, a sufficient number of traces of impersonalization for the subject not to recognise it 
as his own?".27 It is on the ethical level of the relation between the subject and the 
"depersonalised" third person, between the "I" and the Other, that these limits come to be 
recognised. 
In the Republic Plato recounts a story of a certain Leontius who on his way home 
encountered corpses lying on the ground. The temptation to look at them led him to 
approach the dead flesh in this ad hoc vivisection and evoked a cry of terror: "there you 
are, curse you - a lovely sight! Have a real good look". 28 Leontius is caught up in the face 
of terror and admiration only to appeal to what is not there. The voice of love and 
condemnation testifies to the division as effected by the necrophiliac fantasy and 
prohibition. Although Leontius is horrified by the imaginary passion that lashes him into 
shame he is not prepared to renounce it as this passion for death places him in relation to 
what is forbidden as much as it is desired. After all this is what the fantasy is, that is to say, 
it concerns the imaginary object of desire, the object which can only be refound in the 
ambiguity of the call. To whom would he appeal in the cry of passion ill flagranti if not to 
the other from whom he demands an answer and a solution. But in addressing the other in 
his terror-stricken voice he must hear the other calling him, and it is in deciphering this call 
of the other as voice of conscience coming to him that he will the meaning of his desire. 
That is why love should not be equated with desire. One cannot desire the dead without 
breaking the law, which is what Orpheus is found doing, and to love them is to love what 
they loved in us giving us what we do not have. But if love reveals a fundamental lack, that 
whose absence persists in presence, desire knows no bounds in desiring what is prohibited. 
Thus the necrophiliac desire, in some way more "fundamental" than the incestuous one, 
would signify the metonymic lack of being, the relation between desire and an object, 
which is renewed amidst reproaches that keep coming back as flames, old and new, of the 
passion of death, a voice of accusation and a voice of renunciation sustained by the 
impossible love of the father. I will come back to it in the next, concluding chapter. 
This is how Blanchot stages the mythical scene of Orpheus. In it Orpheus plays the 
mam, and the sole, character in proximity to repetition and to betrayal, guilt, that both 
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ensures the satisfaction at the sight of an object and remains unsatisfied in the face of 
prohibition. It is not necessary that we see Eurydice on stage as she does not have a role to 
play. Blanchot's theatre of thanatos is not devoid of monologues and imaginary dialogues 
around the names - for most part names of the harbingers of death such as Kafka and 
Rilke. The function of these proper names, to the extent that they refer to the third person 
- naming not the subject, but what corresponds to the object - and which is how Blanchot 
envisages the passage of writing, is as yet uncertain for us. Orpheus proves to be an 
important figure to consider in the imaginary schema and Blanchot situates him in the 
metaphorical order that sheds some light on the nature of work. Thus the aleatory relation 
of Orpheus to the dead other which, as Blanchot makes out, resembles himself, also bears 
the traits of Eurydice who is twice lost. 29 For Blanchot it was Eurydice by contrast to 
Antigone as chosen by Lacan to embody the birth of the signifier. Just as the image 
appeared essential for Blanchot to establish the missing connection between it and the 
work of language, so the gaze works towards the unfolding of space in which the threefold 
relation of Orpheus with Eurydice, the work and the night, undergoes a series of betrayals: 
But not to tum toward Eurydice would be no less untrue [ce ne serait pas moins trahir - no less 
betraying]. Not to look would be infidelity without measure, imprudent force of his movement, which 
does not want Eurydice in her diurnal truth and her everyday appeal, but wants her in her nocturnal 
obscurity, in her distance, with her closed body and sealed face, [ ... ] not as the intimacy of a familiar 
life, but as a foreignness of what excludes all intimacy, and wants, not to make her live, but to have 
living in her the plenitude of her death.3o 
To wish her dead and absent in her presence, and to revive her in her exuberant death of 
which she does not tire as long as he who wants to see her dead will not cease to mortify 
her. Orpheus? The cruel work demands so, but above all, so does inspiration. The 
dynamics of desire in search for its imaginary object must thus appeal to the metaphorical 
sacrifice to ensure the work of desire which will subsequently guarantee the work. It is 
interestina that Blanchot sketches the demand of work in relation to an elusive object, the b 
semblant which allows for elaboration of that which reissues the demand. This loop-like , 
circuit of work suggests that it would be more appropriate to place its itinerary on the level 
of the drive. Not that it matters most here, but the repetitive effort that Orpheus puts up to 
keep the dead alive, and the order of writing that seems inseparable from the work of the 
gaze, resemble a schema, ambiguous in its meaning, in which we have already found 
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Nietzsche. Blanchot, too, by closing her body and sealing her face, makes a necessary 
requirement for writing's self-referentiality. Something must be removed from the view to 
allow for the invisible, the feminine invisible, to guide the hand which will remain at rest 
unless its movement is generated by the lacking object. 
Again, the anguish of writing, and perhaps the anguishing voice that accompanies 
the production of work, stumbles upon the lack of him who demands that it be so. 
Orpheus, not without reason, and not without fault, is thus put on trial, indicted for 
betrayals, impatience. But we must wait, adjourn it for a moment, for, according to 
Blanchot, Orpheus is already endowed with the gift and power to create. In which case it 
remains uncertain why the impatience and betrayal, given they take nothing away from 
him, nothing that make him lack were it not for the dead other he demands to be there to 
gather his potency at its sight. 
Although we are on the level of melancholic utterance what is at stake is the 
subject of the unconSCIOUS. The hermetically sealed landscape of the 
mythical/metaphorical, characters serves, here as elsewhere, to successfully conceal the 
place of the I. But to what extent does this concealment succeed despite Blanchot's 
statements to "preserve" the I, for example in his remarks on the "automatic writing" to 
which I will come back shortly. Blanchot's insistence on the passage towards the third 
person, the truly no one, "the neutral", the absent and unsignifiable other whom I can only 
address as I, can only happen at the price of either foreclosing the I or substituting it for an 
other that is metonymically reinstated. For Blanchot it is not I who respond(s) to the cry of 
the other at the site of the dead object, but writing: "writing responds to the demands of 
this uncharacterizable 'he'''. ,'1 Thus, in this most radical substitution, if it is one, writing 
occupies the place of the letter and the place of the subject. In the place of I who address 
him, or her, whom, in order to ensure they do not exist, I have to mortify mortifying 
myself, writing reveals the crypt as that which is always already lost. The orphic 
cryptography serves two purposes here: firstly it denies the ego in which and through 
which the other is addressed, and secondly, it replaces - the move Blanchot wants to avoid 
- a possibility of the speaking subject with the practice of the letter in which the I remains 
encrypted. But can it be that this consideration discerns writing in terms of the laws of 
speech? 
In the collection L 'Entretien infini, published fourteen years after L 'E.~pace, 
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Blanchot seems to contribute to the desubjectivised concept of speech, which would 
support the above claim of writing as the power to signify outside the subject. Further, 
despite the fact that his additional remark that speech, "spoken by no one", precedes the 
gaze of Orpheus, the gaze from which, as he says in L'Espace, writing ensues, it is not 
possible to adopt the view that writing is a repressed speech. Hence the term foreclosure, 
as introduced by Lacan, or exclusion, seems more adequate, for it designates an absence of 
the I in effect of the lack of the Other, with which I have identified, and not merely its 
metaphorical displacement. This is the case of the automatic writing. What is at stake in 
Blanchot's writing, and not in the scenes written, is the enigmatic identification with the 
dead other and the passionate liaison with the terror of absence. As Blanchot remarks, an 
encounter with the nudity of Eurydice's image takes place "in order to discover that this 
nakedness is what one encounters but does not seize". 32 There is a limit to exercising the 
power of self-reflective understanding of the loss, the limit which appears at the moment of 
what Blanchot calls "the experience of the outside". The violent terror to grasp what has 
slipped, "the unseizable desolation of the desert", is subject to error. That is what Blanchot 
says but it is not the only way in which articulation can get off the ground. The crime of 
impatience awaits a castratory disruption of the law which is not merely a law of re-
iteration, but a law that sets the dialectic of impatience - the impossible autopsy of the 
naked intimate - and patience - the passive impossibility of waiting and non-acting - into 
work: the law of the signifier. But if speech is the gaze of Orpheus, as Blanchot confirms 
retrospectively, the power of the drive for that which does not exist, and which 
nevertheless supplies enjoyment to writing, must already have some rooting in the 
symbolic law. Such is, what we might call, Blanchot's modification of the early "theory" of 
the image, in which the image and the gaze appear as an inaugural moment for writing. At 
the end of The gaze of Orpheus Blanchot speaks about opening of the space of writing at 
the instant of looking as if the semblant, the lure that glued the gaze to the night in which 
nothing appears, was that radical shadow of the thing with which writing exchanges its 
essence. Not just in relation to the imaginary other but in the embrace of the big Other 
from which writing never departs repeating the Other's errors and effacements. 
At the same time Blanchot ventures to speak against the exclusion of the I. Even if 
the I does not appear in the text as the first person pronoun and writing takes over as the 
missing letter that is nevertheless pervaded with the sense of tragic enjoyment that sustains 
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it, we should not identifY writing with the dubious procedures of automatism. In fact, 
Blanchot strongly opposes the mode of literary production that would "suppress 
constraints, suspend intermediaries, reject all mediation". 33 In the automatic writing, 
notoriously treasured by the surrealists, the 
hand seems to put the depths of language at our command. But in reality, we cannot use this language 
at alL any more than we can use this hand, which is as foreign to us as if it had forsaken us or as if it 
,yere drawing us into the very milieu offorsakenness, where there are no more resources. where there 
is no more support, no more grasp or limit.34 . 
The constraints here concern the "aesthetic, legal, moral" dimensions. Can writing 
overcome these constraints by putting into focus what establishes them? In the automatic 
writing "the language whose approach it ensures is not a power - is not power to speak. In 
it I can do nothing and 'I' never speak". In the automatic writing the subject is obliterated 
in favour of it being spoken, but is it manifest in writing that is not automatic? In writing 
that perpetually mediates, that like the immediate of the medium, deploys the signs as if 
they were objects, I do not speak either, but rather it does, it speaks, the law itself perhaps, 
t he transgression as constraint. Besides, I cannot speak in writing because, in writing, 
which speaks for me as no one, the letter precedes thought, coming before the subject, as 
the letter of the unconscious. 
We could consider Blanchot's opposition to the "automatic writing" as seductive 
and deflective of what is nevertheless guarded as "the experience of the outside", not as if 
the relation to the law did not exist, but as if writing itself were the law, the forbidden 
jouissance of writing as law; taking on a form of the "narrative voice" that speaks in the 
third person, is it the Other that speaks as writing? He is what happens in telling a story. 
But he is also what the story shrinks into, the relation to "the banality of the real" and 
"uneventful everyday life when nothing happens".35 It is also he, Blanchot replies to our 
earlier question, that eventually becomes a character, he who speaks in the story, for 
example of Orpheus and Eurydice. Let's note this: in the story but not as story, for 
example The Gaze of 01pheus. There are two sides to the third person, fiction as a real 
object, and another, the veiled and fictionalised subject, on the one hand, "objectivized 
reality", on the other, the masked I. But that is precisely what Blanchot does not admit, 
perhaps cannot afford to admit lest he ruin the relation in which death reigns as the 
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absolute Other. Blanchot admits neither literary reality in which the object of the writing 
subject is missing, nor the veiled I of the subject's fantasy. Only the veiled other is given an 
ideal footing, that is to say appears in the silence of the I as an idealised loss of the I. He 
does not allow it by issuing, if I can repeat it, a command: non me legere. Can it be that 
the elaborate meditations on the works of, for example Rilke, Kafka, work as disguises, at 
least where the question of writing is concerned? And of death. What is it that fascinates 
Blanchot about death? "Why death? Because death is the extreme. He who includes death 
among all that is in his control [QUi dispose d'elle - has death at his disposal] controls 
himself extremely [dispose extremement de soi - has it/self at his disposal]. He is linked to 
the whole of his capability; he is power through and through". 36 Is death, to ask it again, 
an imaginary ideal which prevents us from encountering death in language? 
The limit and limitation encountered in Blanchot's texts, the double impossibility of 
waiting and grasping what one waits for not only deprives us of the terms in which writing 
could be analysed via the laws of speech but immediately establishes a relation to the 
paternal law, both the patronym and the no of the father, namely the ethics of desire. 
Although it is an imaginary other to which I respond in anguish of realising that I might not 
exist, something in the place of the Other enables me to address this little other when my 
desire remains unsatisfied. We thus come to the judgement day which Blanchot reserves 
for Orpheus by way of instigating him to repeat what is impossible to satisfy. On the one 
hand, the "infinitely dead" Orpheus is presented by Blanchot as guilty of a murder he 
infinitely commits when surrendering to the gaze which renews passion for dissatisfaction 
he at the same time demands, and as guilty of another betrayal when, avoiding to look, he 
tries to save and preserve her. On the other hand, this twofold impossibility is how 
Blanchot's desire speaks: in a symbolic relation to the law, a prohibition of necrophiliac 
cohabitation. Blanchot does not seek a reconciliation between these two impossibilities but 
rather makes room for the letter in whose emptiness the I remains doubly concealed, as I 
who speak to an other, and as I who does not write. What writes under the penalty of 
death [peine de mort]? Jouissance of the Other. Who speaks? 
Paradoxically, Blanchot's obsessive pursuit and fascination with death is not, as I 
have already suggested, doomed to failure of production but guarantees work as that 
which does not judge Orpheus. But this pursuit of fascination nevertheless always already 
returns to the impossibility of immanent seeing, seeing the letter of writing as an impossible 
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cohabitation with the dead, from which writing that is yet to come attempts, over and over 
again, to wrest something that is not there. The melancholia of such imaginary insistence is 
a torment, both enjoyable and unbearable, which is what the term jOllissance designates, a 
torment that lies in the vicinity of the gaze. But the effect of the attempt to uncover or 
discover the truth of the dead is already the truth of what they do not say, namely the truth 
of the subject. This effect is a quest for nothing else but a dead letter to which the I can 
only respond as an empty testimony, a signifier which says nothing in particular, nothing of 
the singularity that constitutes a subject. 
The orphic song would appear as a dirge of mourning and as a literary justice that a 
writer pays to the enigma of loss, were it not for the melancholic refusal to mourn. It is this 
refusal that makes Blanchot issue accusations and stage a trial. But who is Orpheus? Or 
rather what is the function of the name, in so far as it names an absent other? A name of a 
man, an artist, a writer or indeed a "universal" image of a writer and his dark obsessions. It 
is not just a name of a mythical character, not just a metaphor that assuages, whether in the 
cadaverous scene or orphic music, the anguish of identification at stake. It is rather a name 
of being, and Blanchot does not hesitate to stake out the redundancy of being in the 
literary funeral. Here, in court as well as in the crypt, where every sentence scores a death, 
peine de mort, it is a question of a certain structural moment in which discontentment is 
articulated, accusations issued, reproaches circulated and accounts to be settled as an 
effect of a breach of law by which the living live and habitate. With the I in the crypt, and 
the object dead, will not the orphic jouissance be always condemned to the error of 
impatience? In the last analysis it is work, Blanchot lingers, that sur-vives the judgement of 
the dead Other - '"If the world judges Orpheus, the work does not,,37 - to which Orpheus, 
or the mysterious narrator of the death scene, is exposed from the beginning, from the 
moment of appearance of an image. 
If Blanchot ventures to entice us to follow the imagery that the scene of death 
holds for us, whether we enter it or not, this temptation has the power to make us believe 
that what is not there exists, not behind or beyond the words, but as that which makes 
them appear and brings them always nearer to the distance in which they speak. That is 
\vhy Blanchot manages to instigate his ideal '"hero" - a name in the place of the ideal I 
resurrected yet at the same time fallen - to infringe the law by sending him back to the 
\acant image in order to regain not what was lost but the desire to speak it, the signifier 
168 
that marks in absence that which it says. But it is not the desire of Orpheus. What Blanchot 
calls forgetting of the law names the ambiguous inspiration and it is from there that 
Blanchot draws his. 
Let me return at the end of this chapter to Blanchot's imaginary versions in their 
allusive rather than elusive impact. To rearticulate the distinction between the imaginary 
and the symbolic: how does the imaginary serve as a pretext in Blanchot's meditation. How 
does it introduce the symbolic dimension? The emptiness of the image - its remainder 
[reste] , the term so often used by Lacan in his scattered elaboration of the objet a -
determines the here of the cut that intervenes as the world, the law. But this choice 
between the image as, what Blanchot later calls - in a Hegelian fashion which was not 
entirely foreign to Lacan either - "the life-giving negation of the thing" and its burden that 
pushes us towards "not the absent thing, but to its absence as presence, to the neutral 
double of the object in which all belonging to the world is dissipated", 38 is laden with 
undissolvable ambiguity. It is an ambiguity which leaves the sediment of the real of 
jouissance in the open where the image makes its constant reappearance. This ambiguity, 
like an aversion of Leontius, is an ambiguity of the double sense around the remainder of 
the real that animates and annihilates it. The symbolic associations in the production of 
discourse, and in pursuing the dead letter to which writing melancholically testifies, are 
performed, as I said earlier, in terms of the "instruments of investigation", the post-mortem 
examination as the present case suggests. In my analysis of Blanchot's image of the 
cadaver I have not yet mentioned his allusions to Heidegger's meditation on death. Firstly, 
Blanchot's image echoes the work of the Heideggerian tool which, when put out of use, 
seems to stand out of the function it served. To this extent Blanchot will not tire to 
emphasise the ambiguity in which the image as a left-over of repetition in which it served 
to satisfy its user - this is how Blanchot imagines the image of the useless tool - is 
implicated and inseparable from the thing it revives to an ideal. If Heidegger's meditation 
on death, which I spoke about earlier in this work, revolves around such an ideal, Blanchot 
seems unable to resist the temptation to present him with the real corpse to deal with in 
the face of the idealised, that is to say abstracted from the dimension of jouissance, 
practice. And this shows that the symbolic itself is laden with the imaginary versions that 
constitute it and somewhat inaugurate it. Heidegger might not have wished to recognise 
this dimension. Secondly, when Blanchot employs the image in order to arrive at the 
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symbolic, "which has nothing to do with the image", he himself does not eschew what in 
the production of discourse is unavoidable, using the Heideggerian tool as an "instrument 
of investigation", a writing in which that which stands out as lost in its repetitive function, 
is precisely also thal which always reenters its faltering use. The phallic signifier of the 
Other as the symbolic lack thus assumes its function in writing as the lost letter being both 
an instrument of the operation and the image which draws us towards its never finished 
performance (does a mechanism take its function from a metaphor?). That is perhaps the 
double sense of ambiguity, as alluded to by Blanchot. If he brings it to our ears in a certain 
opposition to Heidegger's philosophy (two passages in Two Versions) he has nevertheless 
used these imaginary tools to no less effective degree than his predecessor. 
Blanchot's "image" never escapes, despite its masquerading function as a pretext to 
the symbolic operation, the void that renders it buried in advance; its only "proper" place is 
the grave from which it radiates with "terrifying beauty" towards those whose gaze seeks 
the tarnished epitaph. Thus the Heideggerian and Blanchotesque diversions seem to run 
back its course to bump against the elaborations of Lacan who greeted them both in his 
doctrine to be unfolded year after year without ever recognising, to the astonishment of his 
readers, his theoretical legacy other than that of Freud. In the final analysis it is striking 
how this psychogrammatic dialogue between Blanchot and Lacan dispels the prejudices 
about psychoanalysis not being informed by literature which the former finds on the side of 
resistance. Thus it is not only the question of some reciprocal resemblance that allowed us 
to establish the connection between the language of Blanchot and the doctrine of Lacan in 
his later teaching. If semblance puts being at stake, the Lacanian formula of in nomine 
patri intervening in Blanchot's meditation is itself not without traces of Lacan's relation to 
Heidegger, a reply which we will put into question in the next, concluding chapter. 
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CHAPTER 9 
TO CONCLUDE: ON THE VOICE OF CONSCIENCE, 
BEING -GUILTY AND LOVE. 
We have arrived at the point where some concluding remarks deserve their place. 
But "'concluding" does not mean "conclusive", which is why in the last chapter I am going 
to continue the task of bringing the discourses of philosophy and psychoanalysis into a 
direct confrontation. How direct? To what extent can these two discourses be brought face 
to face, as if in an interview, in which case it would have to be asked who is the 
interviewer and who the interviewee? To what extent would such face to face 
confrontation, such interview be evocative of an impossibility that psychoanalysis testifies 
to when it tries to deal with the real? This is the question that was posed at the beginning, 
at least at the beginning of this work, and we must now try to readdress it despite the 
difficulties arising in the course of themes or pathemes we have followed around this 
question. That is why we are going now, again, as if caught in the snares of repetition, to 
speak about the real, about jouissance. 
But how does one speak about jouissance? How does one speak about the 
philosopher's jouissance, given that it is precisely jouissance, as Lacan always claimed, 
that the philosopher does not speak about? If Nietzsche attempted to gauge the terrain of 
suffering one nevertheless enjoys traversing thus bringing philosophers face to face with 
the real, that is to say with the symptom, he only showed the fragility and uncertainty of 
what they asserted as "universal truths". But it was not until the Freudian discovery of the 
unconscious and Lacan's return, one of many no doubt, to the linguistic structure and 
ethical status of the unconscious that pointed in the direction of how the stammer of 
ontology should be, could be heard. Hence we could say that Nietzsche's case, if we can 
call it so, served as an inaugural step, as I have already pointed out, in the motion of 
psychoanalytical theory to come. For should we not call inauguration that suffering of the 
subject which gave rise, as a fantasy, a symptom, an ideal perhaps, to another 
problematization of old questions? Nietzsche's discovery and "teaching", as Lou Salome 
called it, of the doctrine of Eternal Return is perhaps only one of many examples of how, 
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in the words of Klossowski, a concept can become "a means of concealing behind an 
ontological problem a completely different problem of a psychological nature". 1 
But with psychoanalysis it is not a question of looking under a mask to discover 
there another mask, another layer of fiction. Such a procedure has never been either an aim 
or an intention in this study. Under the mask, it could again be said, there is nothing; the 
object behind the gesture of desire to uncover is missing. With the entrance of 
psychoanalysis then we are no longer satisfied with dissatisfactions about existence, so 
passionately evoked in Nietzsche's pursuits, for these are merely an introduction to the 
questions about the subject, that is to say about the return to the question aboutjouissance 
and symptom. If Lacan was adamant in criticising the philosophers for not dealing with the 
real, it was because to question existence instead of questioning Being constitutes a no less 
myopic undertaking. And this indication already points to the fact that the question of the 
meaning of Being - as painstakingly delivered not only by life-long obsession of Heidegger 
but also interrogated by those who still try to transgress him by taking hi,,,}' question 
"beyond" ontology - cannot even be raised qua theory because it resists, deflects and 
postpones from the start the analytic experience of loss and the condition of mourning 
from where it was raised in the first place. And this, in the second place, brings me to the 
concerns of this chapter, to the very deflection and its repetitions, so vital in neurosis, 
namely guilt and debt. 
This fundamental guilt, which simply permeates the philosophical questions and in 
advance responds to the call of the Other, concerns either the primary presuppositions, the 
enigmatic site of the pretheoretical, or an attempt to glide over or bypass this impossibility. 
Psychoanalysis asks about the meaning of jouissance, the jouis-sense or the enjoyed sense 
of suffering in repetition and therefore the sense of symbolical fixations which promote 
suffering despite, and because of, the insistence of the Other as language. Thus 
Heidegger's question about the meaning of (1ost) Being - whether as a narcisstic being-me, 
as I proposed in chapter 3, or as a being-with-the-other, which generates a profusion of 
jOlli,\',\"({l1ce engulfing the subject in prophetic delusions, as has been discussed in chapters 7 
and 8 - reaches its pinnacle in the analysis of conscience and guilt, which 1 will now 
pursue. That is why, to be more specific, I would like to begin by bringing to our attention 
a \oice, a voice of conscience most likely, which can be heard in the work of H~idegger 
and Freud alike. 
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In the opening pages of his celebrated Discours de Rome Lacan wrote his equally 
famous pronouncement: 
Whether it ~ees itself as . an instrument of healing, of training, or of exploration in depth. 
psychoanalysIs has only a smgle medium: the patient's speech. That this is self-evident is no excuse 
for our neglecting it. And all speech calls for a reply~ 
I f speech is the sole medium in the analytical process, does it imply that voice is its sole 
vehicle? To speak does it imply that at the heart of speech it is the voice that speaks') What 
is the status of the voice in speech? Is voice that which speaks or that which is heard? 
There is a philosophical tradition in the light of which the answer to the first question 
would be affirmative. It is the tradition which gives to the voice, to use the words of its 
most prominent critic, a "privilege" of full expression. 3 There is also another tradition, that 
of Kant, which identifies the voice with the subject, and from which Heidegger's analysis 
of the voice of conscience takes its momentum. As for the first stream I am not going to 
enter the debate which revolves around the dialectic of "privilegingldisprivilegeing" for it 
only reminds us of two wrestlers in the middle of arena, or forum, fighting over access to 
the "safe", the centre excluded from the space of combat (see chapter 7). 
Instead, I will pose a question of the status of the voice as object, the voice in the 
place of the object which is always missing, a voice which calls saying nothing. It is not 
just that there is a long way from the HusserIian tradition to psychoanalysis, that the 
ideality of fullness collapses into fragmentary presence of what is absent, there is an interim 
in this "passage". This interim, this midway between HusserI and Lacan, could be situated 
in the word of Heidegger. We are going to start by reading closely Heidegger's 
innovations and contributions to what has already become a "history" of voice, which in 
his thought receives the treatment that is not indifferent to the interests of psychoanalysis, 
and in particular Freud's elaborations of the 1920s. This will subsequently take us to 
structural considerations of the relation between the voice and the subject, the voice and 
what Lacan called o~jet a. 
As a point of departure we could situate Heidegger's account of the voice of 
conscience in opposition to what I would call vox populi, the common, universal discourse 
understood here as a seat of alienation. He calls this common, populist register das Man, 
the term which has somewhat awkwardly been translated into the "they". It is perhaps 
\\ hat in English is designated as "one", the assumed totality of opinions, the general 
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outlook which one can only refer to at the expense of a particular subject speaking. Dasein 
is lost in the chatter of all, sucked in by the estranged character of all-speaking. It thus fails 
to listen to the possibilities that are offered it existentially, that is to say as ek-sist or stand 
out of the "they" of the public voice. It is this singularity that is in question for Heidegger, 
a singularity of Dasein as alienated from itself, as lost in the self of the Other, in the one of 
the Other. Dasein, which always already is a potentiality-for-Being-its-Self, must find itself 
by finding the way out of its lostness in "one". Dasein's singularity is a choice and a 
possibility it can take for itself, and this requires attestation in the voice of conscience. The 
question for us is whether these bonds of alienation, which already indicate beyond any 
doubt Dasein's place in language, its being-there as being entangled in the net of signifying 
structure, i.e. the Other, are to be cut by way of existential analysis guiding Dasein's steps 
towards the potentiality-for-Being it already is, or whether thisjouissance, this suffering of 
alienation has to do with Dasein's Being-guilty. 
Heidegger's preliminary remarks aim at, as it is done by Freud in Civilizafion and 
ils l)iscontents, debunking conscience of any supra- or metaphenomenological pretences. 
As we shall see, the voice of conscience is employed in order to execute this separation 
and to provide Dasein with the means for encountering its own singularity. As a 
phenomenon the voice of conscience has its structural foundations in Dasein. Not only is 
the phenomenon of conscience related to hearing - or subsequently to Dasein's failure to 
"hear its own Self in listening to the "one-self,4 - which is why Heidegger speaks of it as 
an appeal, a call [RId], but also this appeal is revealed in "wanting to have conscience". 
Before the voice is actually heard, not that it says anything, anything in particular, or 
anything oracular, it is wanted, desired as that which is missing in the world of empty talk. 
This desire to have conscience, this lack-of-conscience accounts for Dasein's choices, its 
"choosing" called resoluteness [Entschlossenheit]. It would seem that in so far as 
discourse is constituted by calling of conscience, desire to have conscience is generated by 
this call, this voice as lack. If Heidegger contests the "lack", what I called the lack-of-
conscience, it is because he chooses to relegate conscience to a different ontological 
species than what is present-at-hand, what on occasion becomes manifest as conscience. 
For Heidegger then it is not a lack-of-conscience in the first place that founds Dasein as 
guilty It is rather Being-guilty that provides Dasein with the possibility of conscience. 
If in the discourse the subject is nevertheless in the position of being guilty, it is 
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because, Heidegger says, this Being-guilty is a primordial reference, a "position" to be 
summoned into if one is to bring oneself back from the "lostness in the 'onemo Despite this 
denial to approach guilt as a lack, a division of the subject, a subject divided between the 
voice and the locus of the Other, we shall soon see, that the lack as barred subject is 
situated in the heart of the call; desire to have conscience is caused by the lack, by the lack 
as voice standing for the missing object. 
We could say from this perspective that desire to have conSCIence, which 
Heidegger understands as an effect of the appeal, our response to the call, is an effect of 
Being-guilty. Clearly, neither for Heidegger nor for Freud, should conscience be 
confounded with guilt. It is the fundamental guilt [schuldJ that makes an appeal to 
conscience possible making its call, its voice appeal back to me. The call, the voice of 
conscience is what is wanted because it is what is lacking. But this allows us to stress, here 
and elsewhere, the function of a certain alterity which is constitutive of the very character 
of disclosure, shall we say the revelatory truth, of conscience. This alterity, whose space 
Lacan divided between the imaginary other and the symbolic site of the Big Other, as we 
have discussed it, remains for Heidegger located in the other voice, be it the common or 
the singular, in what calls in the voice, in the appeal made from the beginning. 
To the extent that the voice discloses the site of speech, it involves the Other, 
which Heidegger always treats marginally as if the so called "self' [das Selbst] was not 
always already a sign of the Other. 5 The alterity of the voice, as for example commented 
on by Agamben, and I will come back to this, is what allows, I would even say precedes, 
Dasein's orientation as potentiality-for-Being, its Seinkonnen. If the voice of conscience 
"gives us 'something' to understand",6 as Heidegger keeps saying, it is because in the 
calling of the voice there already resounds an ambiguity which for Heidegger at least 
renders its locus, namely the Other whole and complete. It is only on the basis of such 
complete Other that the call, and the summons to the self in the midst of repetition as 
empty talk, can be heard. 
The voice then, even if it does not say anything in particular, does not voice some 
secrets or truths, acquires a status similar to the one it had for Kant. It appears like a 
signifier informing Dasein of its singularity and potentiality. Once the fundamental guilt has 
been acknowledged, the voice of conscience, saying nothing in particular, addresses and 
imposes itself on the subject in the form of a certain imperative. After all for Heidegger the 
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voice of conscience is identified with what Dasein always already is. Thus just as for Kant, 
as Miller remarked in his commentary on Lacan's Kant avec Sade, the voice is a part of 
the subject, so for Heidegger the voice of conscience is a part of Dasein. 7 Miller also notes 
that in Kant the voice has a status of a remainder, that "the voice appears at the very 
moment that it makes the object disappear. What remains is the voice of conscience, a 
voice which has something of a signifier about it because it is a voice with a fonnulation a 
, 
voice that says something". 8 In Heidegger's analysis the situation changes, to which I will 
come back later, since the voice has nothing to say and remains silent. That is why, as I 
will also try to stress, for Heidegger, unlike for Kant, the voice does not have a character 
of a moral imperative but of a somewhat "magical" and salvational agent to which the 
subject tries to appeal rather is appealed to. 
The "lostness" of Dasein in the vox populi and the tacit promIse of the 
individuating voice of conscience as a remainder oj the Other of language constitute a 
consistent whole, a certain totality. And yet, in this supposed totality, as we learn from 
Heidegger, the voice is not at all "given" or ready-to-hand but is desired and therefore 
lacking. 
This amounts to nothing else but postulating a division of the subject which is 
always severed from the object because the latter, as a remainder, does not belong to the 
subject or to the Other. On the contrary the object, objet a, is a scission that is 
unrepresentable as scission. Should we not cut in here by reintroducing a distinction that 
underlies Lacan's whole teaching to the extent that it articulates the division of the subject 
in relation to the lost object as desired? Although the division of the subject as one of 
Lacan's chief motifs runs across his entire opus, and I have already referred to some of its 
instances, this time I propose to take up briefly a passage from Seminar XI: 
What L Lacan, following the traces of the Freudian excavation, am telling you is that the subject as 
such is uncertain because he is divided by the effects of language. Through the effects of speech, the 
subject al\\ays realises himself more in the Other, but he is already pursuing there more than half of 
himself. He "ill simply find his desire ever more divided, pulverised, in the circumscribable 
metonymy of speech. The effects oflanguage are always mixed with the fact, ,vhich is the basis of the 
aJlal~1ic experience, that the subject is subject only from being subjected to the field ofth~ Other. the 
subject proceeds from his s~11chronic subjection in the field of the Other. That is \\"by he must get out. 
get himself out and in the getting-himse(f-out. in the end, he "ill know that the real Other has. just as 
mllch as himself. to get himself out, to pull himself free.{1 s 'en depatouiller].'} 
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The division of the subject between jouissance and the signifier, between the 
prohibited, impossible, unspeakable jouissance and the signifier or, as we have discussed in 
the previous chapter, between the enunciation and the statement, is here given voice in the 
first person. Is it necessary to confirm that it is only when speaking as subject, taking my 
position as subject, that such division comes into play, that it plays out the impossible 
difference between what I say and what I enunciate? It is therefore not by accident that 
when speaking about the effect of the subject speaking in the field of the Other Lacan 
speaks as I. What then is at stake in such a position has precisely to do with the absent 
object to the extent that in the metonymy of desire it is lacking. How does the subject "get-
himself-out" of the attachment that like a mirage of Being holds its pretences tied up with 
the Other that grows beyond fiction? 
When speaking about wanting-to-have-conscience, Heidegger already testifies to 
this lack, even if he does not say so, even if he places desire-to-have-voice outside the 
opposition to the lack: "in existence", Heidegger says, "there can be nothing lacking, not 
because it would then be perfect, but because its character of Being remains distinct from 
any presence-at-hand".l0 But to exclude the lack at the level of discourse is to exclude the 
division between the unspeakable real and the subject as divided in this manner. And it is 
precisely this denial that Lacan calls exclusion of the real by philosophers, whereas Miller 
accuses the philosopher, Heidegger, of guilt and silence about hisjouissance. l1 
This lack, as manifested at the level of the voice of conscience, is thus assigned a 
place of presence-at-hand which is always superficial for Heidegger and not without traces 
of inauthenticity as the popular voice. 12 Since we should not give any serious consideration 
to the lack of object at the level of presence-at-hand, we ought to disregard the lack where 
the ontological primordiality of Being-guilty is readily decided. In fact, to understand 
schuld as in anyway related to the lack, as he says on the previous page, is, again, to 
misconstrue it or misunderstand it or, at best, to situate it falsely where there is "nothing 
lacking". This "nothing lacking" will be later linked by Heidegger with "indebtedness" not 
as an effect of the loss of the object, say voice, but as an ontological condition of all 
indebtedness and all, as Miller calls them, "at-fault" or "in-debt" called Schuldigsein. 1' 
When we pursue Heidegger's division between presence-at-hand, where the lack 
appears as not present-at-hand, and therefore in some way commonly confused, and the 
fundamental dimension of Being-guilty where there is "nothing lacking", we will soon 
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notice that this enables Heidegger to situate the VOIce of conSCIence as already 
incorporated in Dasein before hand. This principle of the voice being identified with 
Dasein, being already Dasein's essence or, as Heidegger says, that which both calls and is 
called in it, should not lead us to confuse the call with the statement as constituted in the 
signifYing chain and which involves the order of speech. 14 In other words, what Heidegger 
tries to clarifY, as if distinguishing himself from Kant, is the fact that the voice standing for 
the lack of object is not a signifier. This distinction, already pondered by Augustine, is 
significant given Heidegger's insistence on the enigmatic silence of the voice which only 
"gives to understand". 
In analysing the nature of the voice from Augustine through the grammarians of the 
Middle Ages to Being and Time and beyond, Agamben posits a theory in which the voice 
is neither a sound nor meaning. And although on this basis the vox cannot be situated 
either in the order of writing or in the order of speech, it nevertheless has, as Heidegger 
attempts to demonstrate, a contribution to make. It seems to me that this "contribution", 
this participation of the voice lies in Lacan's situating it in the place of the missing object. 
Characteristically, Agamben's learned study ontologises the voice by resurrecting the 
illusion of unity between "intention" and "object", or at least gives this relation an 
ontological status. This will be effected by the necessity to remove the voice in order to 
render discourse meaningful, and will thus establish a link between vOliloir-dire and 
meaning leading to an emergence of the "other Voice" which he calls "human language". 
Agamben describes: 
an experience of the word in which it is no longer mere sound [istas tres syllabas] and not yet 
meaning, but the pure intention to signify. [ ... ] The intention to signify without a signified 
corresponds. in fact, not to logical understanding, but to the desire for knowledge. [ ... ] (Here it is 
important to note that the place of this experience that reveals the vox in its originary purity as 
meaning [voler-dire] is a dead word: temetum.) 15 
This, we should add, is a comment on the question raised by Augustine who asks: 
Suppose someone hears the word temetum, and in his ignorance asks "hat it means .. H~ ~ust, 
therefore, already know that it is a sign, nanlely, that it is not a mere word, but that It SIgnIfies 
something. r ... I-If an~one, therefore, applies himself with ardent diligence to know. and inflamed 
"ith this zeal continues this search, can he be said to be without love? What, then. does he love') For 
certainly something cannot be loved unless it is knO\\n.16 
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Certainly this connection between jouissance and love is not without significance with 
relation to conscience and guilt, as we shall see more clearly when we come to Freud. It is 
this desire for meaning, exhilarated by the search of object - and always "successful" to the 
extent that it unfolds a signifying chain within which another signifier, say te-me-tum has 
emerged - that constitutes for Lacan the metonymical desire of an object that is always 
displaced because its "meaning", its wanting-to-say is always elsewhere, just as its being is 
always elsewhere, that is to say, it is not where meaning as an enjoyed-sense is. For 
Heidegger, by contrast, the always displaced object - what Agamben refers to as voice and 
Augustine as that which is loved as known - or simply a quantum of jouis-sense and being 
constitute the impossible liaison outside the law. Such is the basis and the condition, but 
not necessarily the status of, for his taking up of Being-guilty, or indeed "the idea of guilt", 
as situated outside law conceived as obligation, indebtement. In other words, guilt must be 
placed outside the dialectic of compliancelbreach, obligation/repayment in order for the 
voice to become active as silent and yet as complementary to Being-guilty. 
This underlying principle of complementarity is thus given the same status 
Agamben gives to the other Voice. The other voice is nothing more and nothing less than 
wanting-to-say or a desire to speak whose singularity Dasein must find amidst its own 
possibilities. The only one it does not find, the only one it supposes as subject to know is 
its impossibility, the hole in Being. Desire to signify is the "origin" of Heidegger's 
"wanting-to-have-(voice ot)-conscience" which is based on the lack of the subject as 
Lacan developed it. Lacan linked metonymical construction in language with wanting-to-
he, which is enigmatic to the extent that the lack of being, manque-B-Atre, has its source 
in the lack of the voice, the other voice to be specific, which neither says it all nor makes 
sense of it all. 
Although the voice can only be assumed by the divided subject in the first person, it 
must also, by the same stroke, be removed or dropped asjouissance for separation to take 
place. Thus it is an ambiguous presence/absence of the voice that enables me to assume a 
voice that is both mine, to the extent that I speak knowing not what I love, and not mine in 
so far as it is always already another "voice" standing for the lack of the object, that only 
\\(ants to speak not knowing of the sense to come. And could we not say that the silence of 
the voice is above all the silence of sense to the extent that its displacement reveals it as 
non-sense? This is what happens in analysis. The voice comes before sense but is missing 
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when the sense is made, that is to say when sense of assumed knowledge resonates in 
nonsense. 
Silence of the voice is what Heidegger refers to emphatically at least twice in 
sections 56 and 60. The voice of conscience calls only in silence, it "gives to understand" 
as the other calling and it calls "back into reticence of his existent potentiality-for-
B' ,,17 Th 11" .c emg . e ca comes lrom the soundlessness of uncanniness [unhemlichkeitr.18 
Heidegger marks this moment of disclosure as "an abrupt arousal [abgesetztell 
A l~friittelns r. The call is from afar unto afar. It reaches him who wants to be brought 
back". 19 Back where? On the one hand to the reticence of not-all and on the other hand to , 
the "original" Being-whole. And such aspiration would no doubt mark one of the moments 
that has been characterised in Heidegger's work as "nostalgic". How does this desire 
return to face up to the repetitive character of the empty speech in which the lack is always 
covered by wanting to have conscience? 
To do justice to answer this question we should not hesitate to make a 
psychoanalytical intervention at the level where it is discarded by Heidegger in advance, 
and perhaps somewhat intuitively,20 as 'they' always take on board what in covering the 
lack, the lack of the voice of conscience, insists on retaining a relation with the complete 
Other, and simply takes on a form of enjoyed suffering, namely jouissance. Thus when 
Heidegger repudiates in a number of places the psychological "Self which one has in mind 
when one gazes 'analytically' at psychical conditions and what lies behind them",21 we will 
take these "psychical conditions" as nothing but language conditions given in the discourse 
of the Other as Lacan outlined them. The call, despite its uncanny silence, can be situated 
in discourse as precisely that which the delusional elements, of which Heidegger speaks 
below on the same page, burst out in the form of hallucination, or what he calls getting 
"drawn by the one-self into a soliloquy in which causes get pleaded, and it [the call] 
becomes perverted in its tendency to disclose". 22 That is why we must ask how this call 
appeals to Dasein, and how in this appeal does it plead, given that it calls upon Dasein's 
authentic possibilities. What then is the relation between the desire to have conscience, the 
caIl for identification with the father, and conscience's disclosure, how does this disclosure 
avoid a catastrophe of hallucination in which the real speaks deliriously outside the 
subject') 
How does the voice of conscience participate in the silent discourse? Three things 
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are worth stressing in Heidegger's elaboration at this point. Firstly, the call always comes 
from the outside, "from me and yet from beyond me [ubermich]". Secondly, the caller and 
the one to whom the appeal is made are present simultaneously, and thirdly, the character 
of the call has nothing to do with the predictable, expectable or intentional. The call 
surprises me, for it comes from elsewhere. By coming from beyond me, it appears as 
foreign in the midst of familiarity. We would be prepared to take Heideggerian 
phenomenological description as no less surprising were it not for the fact that something 
else happens in this surprising call. For is it not the case that what strikes us, us who read 
not only Heidegger, in his use of the term ubermich is precisely its somewhat uncanny 
resemblance, in the way in which I have referred to it throughout this work as 
psychogrammatic, to the Freudian term of Oberlch with which we are going to acquaint 
ourselves later. It is this familiarity which strikes us as uncanny when we least expected it, 
when it takes us unawares to the "other Heidegger". 
This familiarity - of what for Augustine is both known and loved and yet senseless -
anguishing to the extent that it imposes itself on our ears unawares confirms the alienating 
relation within the structure of Dasein. Dasein, in so far as it wants to separate itself from 
the vox populi, is alienated. What appears "beyond me", beyond our expectations as 
narrated in Heidegger's statements, is a link between the symbolical term and jouissance 
that is forbidden [interdit] as such, a link that I do not wish to overemphasise here but 
merely note, following Freud and Lacan, that what is most foreign, uncanny and 
unexpected is also that which is nearest, next to me, and which does not cease to concern 
Heidegger, both sexually and politically, namely Nebenmensch. 
What Heidegger calls "the voice of conscience", and what merely conceptually 
echoes desire-to-have-conscience, already has, in terms of discourse, an alienating 
character, for Dasein is merely a possibility, revealed in the anticipation of death, of a 
"reality" distinct from what is vulgar or common, namely the generalised discourse. This 
"reality" of the voice of conscience, this "from me yet beyond me" also confirms for us the 
fundamental division, manifested as a difference between statement and enunciation. It 
confirms the presence of what is absent and what for Heidegger is nevertheless desired in 
the way in which I have called, in a note above, salvational. After all, the voice of 
conscience as that which testifies to Dasein's ownmost potentiality is supposed to disclose, 
that is to say to differentiate. That is what Heidegger insists on. But it will not do so unless 
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"wanting-to-have-conscience" has come to a realisation in which the call could be heard 
, 
that is to say given to understand. The voice of conscience is what authenticates and 
individuates the anxious Dasein giving it to understand its singular possibility. 
On another level, the alleged "reality" of silent conscience also acknowledges for 
us the significance of the second topographical structure, as constructed by Freud, in 
which he designates to the voice a place in which the "parental medium" has found its 
successor, its internal heir so to speak, that confirms dissolution of the Oedipal relations. 
Does Heidegger's voice of conscience have then the same status of an agency, or a judicial 
instance, that provides Dasein with the possibility of separating from the common vox 
populi in favour of its singular aspirations? And if so, can the voice be regarded as an 
internal part of the structure of Dasein, especially that desire to have conscience most 
evidently indicates that the voice is not identical with the subject, but indeed divides the 
subject in relation to the Other as the locus from which it speaks? 
And this brings me to an already promised moment of interjection in Heidegger's 
analysis. In this respect, I will echo some of the keypoints in Freud's analysis of conscience 
and guilt as he elaborated them in section VII of Civilisation and Its Discontents. The 
term "home" and "unhomely", and indirectly "homeless", returns to us in the title Freud 
gives to his seminal work. Un b ehagen , feeling unhomely, discomforted at home already 
indicates the type of relation in which Dasein is involved with that which is common, 
vulgar, the empty chatter as heard in the vicinity, in the neighbourhood of our home or, 
indeed, at home. This theme of alienation, which runs throughout Freud's exposition, will 
be taken up by him not only in terms of the relation between the subject and jouissance as 
both excluded from the subject and as enjoyed by the subject as jouissance of the Other 
but also as attesting to what Lacan called "Freudian ethics". 
The views Freud develops in Civilisation and Its Discontents could be regarded as 
two sets, not unrelated as we shall see, representing topographical and economical 
perspectives. According to the former, but in the most economical way, conscience is 
defined as the turn of the superego against the ego which demands punishment. Following 
from this, guilt is viewed by Freud as a conflict or tension (Freud does not say "clash" or 
"combat") between the critical agency of the superego and the ego. The development of 
conscience as a part of the ego turning against the other part, what we have already 
encountered in melancholia, could therefore be regarded as preceding what Freud calls 
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"the sense of guilt [Schuldbewustsein]". 23 
This leads Freud to take a broader view. Does guilt relate to a particular deed - the 
question also posed by Heidegger - or is guilt an integral part of the structure of 
unconscious desire? And if an intention to commit a bad deed already contributes to guilt, 
how would bad actions qualify as "bad" if they were not committed? In Seminar on Ethics, 
Lacan reflects on the "bad" deed of Antigone, who buried the body of her brother 
"against" the decree forbidding her to do so, and contrasts her action with the conservative 
position of Creon. Antigone is driven by desire which has a force of law in so far as it is an 
enactment of desire of the Other, and pays with life for disobeying the law as represented 
by Creon. Creon, by contrast, is driven by guilt which, according to Lacan's formulation is 
"giving ground relative to one's desire" [ceder sur son desir].24 In other words, to be 
guilty is to cede one's desire on another. It is this ceder sur that resonates in Freud's 
account, remaining muffled in Heidegger's, for what is at stake in guilt is precisely the 
subject's relation to the Other in the sense of an assumption of metonymic desire in 
relation to the lack for which stands the object, for instance a voice. 
As if following Nietzsche, whose genealogy of "good and evil" already paved the 
way beyond the classical frameworks of morality, Freud's analysis attempts to reformulate 
the relation between the subject and the Other. From this perspective, "bad" is no longer 
considered as compliant with Aristotle's ethics of "pleasure and good" ("good for 
whom?", Lacan asks in relation to Antigone), for, if we followed Aristotle's criteria, we 
would soon discover that what is harmful and unpleasant is not necessarily to be identified 
with "bad" or "evil". We are all too familiar with the contemporary "hero" portrayed as a 
film character who says: "I am bad but it feels good". What is unpleasant can doubtless be 
enjoyed and - whatever may be the case of the ancient, or medieval (think of chapter 2 of 
Augustine's Confessions), writers - this is perhaps the sense, the enjoyed-sense, both 
Freud and Lacan render of what, as it seems, Kant and Heidegger, left unproblematized. 
As Miller stresses, and as we have said above, the philosophers have always been silent 
about their jouissance, and it is in this silence that one can trace the roots of their guilt, 
their symptom. WelL yes and no, for it is not at the level of concepts that guilt could await 
a problematization notoriously bypassed by the philosophers but at the level of the relation 
between the signifier and enjoyment its repetition generates. Since this leaves us in the 
order of the drive-satisfaction where jouissance is preserved rather than abandoned, the 
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problem of desire, which touches upon the lack of being, remains untouched. 
For Freud the sources of what is called "'bad" should be sought in the subject's fear 
for the loss of love. It is this fear of loss of the love-object that solicits punishment. Unlike 
in melancholia, where the shadow of loss envelops the subject, guilt enables the subject to 
anticipate, in the way in which for Heidegger Dasein anticipates death, the loss by 
projecting it, and makes up for its possibility by building what would appear as a kind of 
slIhstitlltive protection of self-punishment, which is how the symptom is constituted: 
At the beginning, therefore, what is bad is whatever causes one to be threatened with loss of love. For 
fear of that loss, one must avoid it. This too is the reason why it makes little difference whether one 
has already done the bad thing or only intends to do it. In either case the danger only sets in if and 
\-\hen the authority discovers it, and in either case the authority would behave in the same \\,a\;. 
I f this were to suggest that "at the beginning was love", the problem of jouissance would 
immediately come to the fore as the stake and price in such a fantasy as articulated by the 
subject in relation to the lacking object. Hence Lacan's insistence, and moditication, in 
response to the prophets who promote love as preceding the order of language, on the 
primacy of the letter as a material for structuring the subject's relation to jouissance. 
Leclaire remarks that the division concerning the subject could precisely be taken as a 
breach between the letter andjouissance. In commenting on the traps of the death drive he 
proposes thatjouissance as the real and the letter as a symbolic mark of the body engender 
each other reciprocally to the extent that jouissance as such, the pure interval, the "pure 
difference" is prohibited or interdicted, the latter term showing perhaps with more 
precision, as I have already articulated, the impossibility of uttering the difference in the 
signifying order, the "forbidden saying" or the "intersaid". 26 It is in relation to jouissance 
then that we should seek the origins of alienation to the extent that what this alienation 
involves, whether for Lacan or Heidegger, is the imaginary material, be it gaze or voice, 
that fails to cement the symbolic gap. 
If the authority always has, whether from "outside" or "inside", the same effect on 
the subject rousing him to guilt, the question is posed why Freud stresses the distinction 
between the two origins of guilt, "one arising from fear of an authority, and the other, later 
on, arising from fear of the super-ego".27 The answer has to do with the fact that Freud 
situates the super-ego in the developmental order and thus perhaps underestimates its 
status in the unconscious structure, especially its status in relation to the law and language. 
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The fear of loss of love implies that some of the libidinal satisfactions have to be 
given up. Freud points out that if such renunciation, which is also involved in repression, 
were the sole cause of guilt in subject's relation to the authority, then the accounts would 
soon be settled, the debt paid off, and no guilt would remain, let alone the fact that love 
would be assured and the Other guaranteed. With the arrival of the super-ego, however, 
things become more complicated and the question arises: why does the sense of guilt linger 
on despite the fact that some of the drive-satisfactions have been jettisoned? 
This is how Freud prepares us for the return of one of the chief motifs in his work. 
am referring here to his theory of the death drive whose early version, starting with 
Narcissism, as I pointed out in chapter 1, he reelaborates in Civilisation. Secondly, the 
answer to the question above reinvites, if only briefly, the theme, also already discussed, 
namely the work of identification. It is identification with the castrating father that allows 
for the formation of the super-ego whose formation comes down to a deployment of the 
Other of law in the structure of desire. Finally, it is a question of jouissance with which 
Freud will have to deal in a more decisive way. Indeed, the renunciation of drive-
satisfactions, and subsequently the practice of temperance and virtue, that underlined 
Aristotelian ethos and religious ascesis, is not only insufficient to lift guilt but also 
amplifies its imaginary resonances. 
To repeat then the rudimentary fact from Freud's second topography, let us state 
that the deployment of the super-ego, the second theory of origin of the sense of guilt, is 
directly dependent on the identification with the father. We also recall how Freud created 
t he myth of the primal or real father who had unrestrained access to women's jouissance, 
less likely to love, and was eventually killed by his sons. The myth of the real father, as 
Freud discusses it in Totem and Taboo, served in a twofold way to represent the order of 
fiction in the unconscious structure but, which is more important, this did not happen 
without a relation to the real. The legacy of guilt has therefore two sources, the myth and 
the dynamic development, which converge upon structure and castration that renders the 
structure, namely the symbolic Other incomplete. Although guilt is not suffered in mythical 
terms, no longer suffered in relation to feeling guilty for committing a particular deed (to 
\\'hich Freud gives a specific term Reue [remorse or repentance]), and which bears some 
resemblance to Heidegger's position, and no longer suffered in relation to external 
authority (Freud's first theory of origin of guilt), it is suffered and enjoyed in subject's 
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identification with the father, for such identification can only be consummated, and super-
ego installed, in the symbolical murder of the Big Castrator that does not exist. Once the 
Oedipus complex has been dissolved, and once conscience, the voice of conscience, has 
been assumed as a substitute for the killed father, the renunciation of drive-satisfaction has 
not, as we have said above, diminished but increased. Thus, with Oberlch becoming 
situated both within me and outside me "every renunciation of drive now becomes a 
dynamic source of conscience and every fresh renunciation increases the latter's severity 
and intolerance". 28 
How are we to understand this "renunciation of drive" if not as a giving in of desire 
to the imaginary other and its deadly force, which is how Lacan speaks of it in Ethics of 
P~ychoanalysis? How else could we conceive of renunciation if not on the basis of 
procuring an alienating ideal in the name of which this renunciation could be executed and 
enjoyed, and which would only require, as in the case of Heidegger's vox populi, further 
renunciation on the side of the subject thus divided or barred? The myth of the (real) father 
is valuable not only because it presents us with the work of symbolical fiction as generated 
between the letter and masochistic jouissance (punishment/enjoyment) but also because it 
stresses another important strand in the work of identification, and in the work of Freud, 
namely that of ambivalence of love and hatred. This would perhaps be Freud's "solution". 
To the extent that love is inseparable from castration anxiety, hatred satisfies the drive, the 
death drive operating at the heart of the super-ego, to the point at which aggressive action, 
whether it is called bad or not, is directed against the imaginary constructions of the ego. 
Hence love, which plays a crucial part in identification, always has a counterpart in hatred 
which unleashes aggressivity, as developed by Lacan, towards the other. When the 
metaphor, namely a symptomatic satisfaction of the drive fails to cheat the super-ego the 
latter retaliates and guilt ensues. That is why, as Freud always stressed, love and guilt are 
of similar breed, for to the extent that they rely on jouissance what gives their rise is 
anxiety. And this would point to Freud's final theory of the drive, namely Eros and 
Thanatos as two opposing forces sustained in the jouissance of repetition. 
With Freud's markers of conscience and guilt as fear of loss of love, need for 
punishment, renunciation of drive-satisfactions, identification with father and ambivalence 
of love/hatred, we can now return to the "other Heidegger" only to reiterate the question 
about the origins of alienation of Dasein. This also implies that we reiterate the conditions 
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that allow him to question, ontologically, the "phenomenon of guilt which IS not 
necessarily related to 'having debts' and law-breaking". For as Heidegger insists 
The ide~ of guilt must not only be raised above the domain of that concern in which we reckon things 
u~, b~t It must als~ be de~hed fro~ relationship to any law or 'ought' such that by failing to comply 
'nth It one loads hImself WIth guile9 
In other words, the formulation of guilt requires a renunciation of the common 
interpretation according to which the dialectic of guilt is bound to come into collision with 
Law, and be implicated in the relation with another. But what is this "common 
interpretation", this vacuous chatter, or the vox populi from which Dasein, as entangled 
and perhaps ensnared, must separate itself to achieve its "goal" of potentiality-for-Being? 
What is this primordial Being-guilty outside law and debt, if not a solidified denouncement 
of what already constitutes one of the most crucial terms in Freudian ethics, namely 
neighbour? Is this perhaps how the real father of enjoyment of the Freudian myth makes 
its ghostly appearance in Heidegger's work? 
It is to the common voice, the imaginary other as Lacan distinguished it, that 
Heidegger opposes his existential analysis of the call of conscience. Its function is not only 
to address Dasein's potentiality-for-Being, i.e. to address its own understanding of itself as 
Being-guilty, but also to ensure that we are "free from indebtednesses" that always refers 
to a particular deed. Freedom, however, is not a state but an impulse whose function, as 
Freud outlined it, is always directed at the persecutory ghost of the real father who is dead, 
or, from a slightly different angle, at the one-like-me, my neighbour. 
Let's explore it a bit further. If there is indeed a resemblance between Heidegger's 
existential analysis and Freud's analysis on the point of origin of guilt with relation, or 
without a relation, to a particular deed, there is also a distinction we should bring to the 
fore. For in so far as Freud's concern lies with subject's desire and the Other of law, and 
therefore includes the problematic of debt, obligation and fault, Heidegger's attempt is 
oriented towards silencing of the fantasmatic creditor as a remainder of guilt, as deriving 
from a particular action, on the basis of the ontological Being-guilty. We will never hear 
from him about the genesis of "wanting-to-have-conscience" which would "call forth to 
Being-guilty, as something to be seized upon in one's own existence, so that authentic 
existentiell Beillg-guilty"~o would disclose Dasein's Being. We will hear instead about 
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renunciation of jouissance as debt, that, as Freud observed, fails to lift guilt and plunges 
the subject even further into anguishing tussles with its alienation. It is tIus lack-of-
enjoyment that, according to Freud's schema, makes him into a saint of ontological virtue. 
Not only does this renunciation of debt not acquit rum of being implicated in "ontological 
patricide", but it also makes him guilty, i.e. indebted at the level wruch he wishes to set 
free from "vulgar" interpretations of conscience and, therefore, from libidinal relations or 
simply exchanges of signifiers of which one, the phallic one, the one of the desire of the 
Other, is missing. That is why Miller says that for the prulosopher of Being the Other is 
"consistent". But the subject has no access to the Other except for the bar or lack, wruch is 
how the signifying exchange functions. Leclaire, too, in discussing a clinical case, sums up 
the relation of debt to debt, as a fiasco of imaginary construct to wruch Heidegger's 
testimony bears fruit: 
We live in a situation of insolvency: our conscience urges us to payoff our debts, while our 
unconscious gives us evidence that we cannot free ourselves from them for lack of an identifiable 
creditor. The story never ends. The account is never closed. Nothing will enable us to settle up with 
the missing creditor. Say what you like about the death of God, having killed father and mother and 
done av .. ay with the tyrant we are still burdened with an account to settle. But with whom3f 
If Dasein is fundamentally guilty, this guilt, to which the voice of conscience 
testifies, should not, according to Heidegger, be understood in the ordinary sense of "being 
responsible for", 32 which merely refers to the common interpretation of conscience, but in 
an essential manner of Being-guilty, the term being discussed especially in sections 58 and 
60 of Being and Time. The "essential" means here "primordial", namely that wruch 
precedes all interpretations as they are given in a present-at-hand manner, and which in this 
instance includes that of the debt to the "missing creditor": 
the 'sununons to Being-guilty' signifies a calling-forth to that potentiality-for-Being which in each 
case I as Dasein am alreadv. Dasein need not first load a 'guilt' upon itself through its failures or 
omissions: it must only be -~uilty' authentically - 'guilty' in the way in which it is?3 
Nor will we hear from Heidegger what '''guilty' authentically" implies, what the "properly 
own" [eigentlich] guilt is subject to save Being as such. No "failures or omissions" or lack 
are necessary for consideration of schuldig. This crucial passage in section 59 echoes in a 
distance Nietzsche's genealogy of Schuld in terms of the relation of debit and credit, and 
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shows that the German term Schuld or schuldig appears as far less enigmatic than the 
English guilt. But this does not mean that Heidegger dispenses, or wants to dispense, with 
the signifying weight that Schuld or schuldig carries for him. It does not mean that he 
dispenses with debts, that he pays them in advance, that he does not owe to the Other, or 
that having dispensed with the "vulgar interpretation" he is in any way in the position to 
disregard "the debt of jouissance" and its possible reimbursement. 34 
Ifby saying that "Being-guilty as having debts is a way of Being with Others in the 
field of concern", 35 Heidegger persistently refuses to take up his analysis of guilt as a debt 
in relation to the Other - the complete Other to which nothing can be owed save 
everything - this is precisely how it would be possible to follow Heidegger's inquiry, as a 
symptom of the desire of the Other, from which the debt to the Other emerges as formed 
in effect of a certain refusal, a refusal of the loss, for which he can only substitute the 
ontological, i.e. the jouissance of being or a failure of love. But is it a failure or a fear of 
loss (of love, of the other of love)? There is not much difference between the two, for the 
relation of lack, privation, theft, borrowing, infringement or owing are taken to mean 
something "present-at-hand", i.e. are within reach of consciousness. That is why, as Freud 
says, guilt is always an "unconscious feeling of guilt", what on the conscious level appears 
as remorse [Reue]. Does not Heidegger's analysis appear at times as an attempt to empty 
the remorse or repentance precisely of the kind of traces of subjectal singularity that he 
then wishes to assign to every Dasein? 
Heidegger is at pains to enumerate all the "inauthentic" instances of guilt that 
merely muddy the waters of pristine primordiality of Being-guilty that remains reticent, 
nonrelational, "for the most part undisclosed" and "more primordial than any knowledge 
about it". 36 Now, this is more or less where Freud started, although he did not refrain from 
pursuing it at the level where the guarantee of the Other takes on a form of a punishing 
super-ego, Oberlch. we recall. For Freud this "basis of Being", this "for most part 
undisclosed" state reveals, partly at least, the inexistence of the Other in the form of a 
persecutory voice of the superego. 
Thus for Heidegger conscience, a voice of conscience makes itself heard - and 
implicates the subject in the production of discourse, i.e. statements, where the voice is !lot 
voiced, can only be voiced elsewhere as enunciation - when guilt is established as 
primordial dimension of Dasein, namely as successfully separated from "its lostness in the 
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"one''': 
Cons~ien~ is the call of care from the uncanniness of Being-in-the-world - the call which sununons 
DaSel? to Its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-guilty. And corresponding to this call, wanting-to-haye-
conscIence has emerged as the way in which the appeal is understood. These two definitions cannot 
be brought i~to ~armony at once with the ordinary [Vulgar] interpretation of conscience. Indeed they 
seem to be III dIrect conflict with it. We call this interpretation of conscience the 'ordinary' one 
I Vulgar] because in characterising this phenomenon and describing its "function', it sticks t~ what 
. they' know as the conscience, and how 'they' follow it or fail to follow if? 
The call of care is the response to the other to which because of the call somethina is 
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owed, even if there is no one to pay it back to. The debt to this impossible creditor 
constitutes an impossible debt, which is not to say that Heidegger does not struggle with it, 
does not try to situate it outside law, does not try to close the loop in, emerging from the 
call of Dasein, on the kind of potentiality-for-Being that is called "Being-guilty". Not only 
does bringing of these definitions in the face of vulgar interpretation fall short of 
"harmony", but also the ensuing conflict, the disharmony or discontinuity, on the level of 
discourse, between the barred subject and the lack of the Other, is to be avoided in favour 
of working out the authentic relation between Dasein and its potentiality-for-Being-Self 
But this relation is precisely what betrays, what reveals the relation of indebtement, that is 
to say "the debt ofjouissance". For Schuldigsein is no other but a signifier that carries, as 
I have said above, the signifying weight and the Other that marks it, and, therefore, an 
excess that cannot be disposed of save situating it in relation to that which allows for 
Heideggerian considerations of the conflictual dialectic between the vulgar and the 
existential, the neighbour and the lack of jouissance that Dasein experiences. The 
testimony of the voice of conscience, or what could now be called the voice of the other 
Cit comes from me and yet from beyond me"), is what for Heidegger comes to 
supplement, as a lack of conscience, or, what Lacan called the lack of being. And this 
supplement or supplementation orients the whole of Heidegger' s meditation on conscience 
and guilt around the question of indebtement to the Other. What we still need to define, 
and what will bring us to the end of this work, is the terms in which this Being-indebted 
takes place, and how the symbolic register comes to play such a significant role in 
Heidegger's attempt to resist to make a payment outside the dialectic of guilt that such a 
resistance nevertheless reveals. 
Pursuing the question why Dasein, as thrown into the world and wanting-to-have-
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conscience is essentially guilty, indicates that, as Miller notes, it lacks possibilities, that its 
existence in the anticipation of death bears all the marks of debt and fault, and therefore of 
the Other. That is why Heidegger's appeal to conscience, to the voice of conscience as 
that which calls as desire to have conscience in the face of the alienating vox populi, has to 
be considered as marked by the salvational trait Heidegger seems to attribute to the call. 
The voice of conscience brings and gives to understand cutting loose him who, lost in the 
midst of neighbours speaking all alike, wants to be brought back, we assume, to himself, or 
to the Self [das Selbst], or saved from the generalised likeness of those who surround me, 
as the core or cradle of Dasein's ownmost potentiality-for-Being-whole, and therefore to 
the Other and its jouissances. Could we not take this appeal as an appeal to the real, that 
real, obscene, shameless and "perverse" father who, were it not for the fact of his mythical 
existence, would occupy just that primordial position Heidegger designed for him, i. e. the 
ontological place of Schuldigsein prior to, and outside of, any relation to law, sin, murder, 
indebtement, infringement, guilt or shame? How can this primordial being be subject to any 
obligation or responsibility if the relation of debt, obligation (drive) and responsibility 
preserves this Schuld in the heart of the dialectic it wants to avoid? Is not Heidegger's 
attempt to salvage some predialectical real as a symbolical articulation of Schuldigsein a 
reformulation of Freud's myth ofa general fornicator? 
To have conscience would no doubt have a liberating power, as the renunciation of 
the drive-satisfactions did for Freud, to give Dasein back to its authenticity, give it the 
singularity it has always already lost. But how are we to consider this authenticating, to the 
extent that it is anxious and death-facing, voice of conscience, given that, as Heidegger 
says, it is already one of Dasein's possibilities, one of its impossibilities? How is this 
movement, this project Dasein undertakes towards itself to be analysed if it is grounded in 
the fundamental lack, namely Being-guilty or Being-in-debt? 
As it is clear by now, Dasein's ownmost potentiality, as revealed to it in the truth 
of conscience, has to do with what Miller called "jouissance of Being": 
,\'Chllidigsein is already constituted at the level of speech whose structure entails for the subject that 
his being be always elsewhere, and can only at any point be inscribed in it under the fonn of a lack a 
failure or a stwnbling block But the signifying Schllidigsein is placed in the essential relation to 
.lollissance, which is the cash-reserve out of which "debit" and "credit" are calculated, of \\hich 
sc/7uldig is a precise expression. For us it is not a 'factical' or contingent indebtmcnt. On .the 
contrary_ this debt ofjouissance is so necessary that it does not cease to be inscribed, so imposslble 
that it does not cease not to be reimbursecf.8 
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In other words, the symbolical relations which play out the ambivalence of difference 
between the imaginary neighbour and the real father, are illustrative of the lack - which has 
nothing to do with a sign of imperfection, or something that is "present-at-hand" - of 
jouissance as an objet a, as a necessity constituting indebtement. 
If Miller links the debt of jouissance [manque-iI-jouir] of Dasein to the lack-of-
being [manque-iI-etre] , it is to show that the voice of conscience the voice as desired is , 
already linked to the lack-of-being. The voice is desired as lacking for the subject, and it is 
in this sense that this voice will have for Heidegger a quality of both an imperative of the 
caller as "nothing at all", and of a liberating, even salvational agent. The promise of 
separating from the alienation amidst neighbours can only be solved by resorting to the 
possibilities of jouissance of Being (potentiality-for-Being) except this is precisely the very 
impossibility, as stressed by Miller after Lacan, namely, this jOllissance is forbidden for the 
speaking subject. And further that since jouissance is essentially masochistic, is it not the 
case that the successful jouissance is "the jouissance of the one who places himself in the 
hands of the Other, who places back in the Other the voice with power, and the more so 
the less valuable the Other is". 39 That is to say, the more one's relations with the neighbour 
- and all that this term neighbour implies, i.e. not only vulgar, empty and imaginary but 
also sexual, ethical, political - bear the sign of alienation, the more significant and 
omnipotent the Other appears to be. The more the Other is jouit the more barred the 
subject is from accessing it. Since the dead father cannot be killed twice over, the question 
of guilt will always resurface as a satisfaction in suffering, an enjoy-meant in the 
philosopher's symptom or as a problem of the drive at the centre of psychoanalysis. 
That is why in Seminar Encore, Lacan calls ontology a "'world view". The 
discourse of ontology, despite an attempt to separate Dasein from its alienating other, 
universalises Being and stirs up its jouissance. By this virtue it promotes the discourse of 
being, the non-dialectical, the metaphysical, with every signifier that commands from the 
hand of being, to the level of the master of being-myself or m 'etre. The question of the 
master, and of the master discourse, although singular in the way in which Lacan posed it 
is not without a signifying value when it concerns the problems I have tried to discuss 
above whether in relation to Heidegger or others. -+0 It is with respect to the place, 
functioning and position of the master, assumed by ontology, that Lacan asked, in a variety 
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of ways throughout his teaching, but here in a way that echoes the voice of Heidegger: 
"what would have been if you had understood what I ordered you to do"? ·H 
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PART I 
CHAPTER 1 
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famous. The beginning of the end of their friendship, which is not an isolated event in the history and 
shows that "there is only room for one", came during their morning walk in 1912. Later Freud 
confessed, with his usual honesty, in the letter to Jones (December 8, 1912) "a piece of unruly 
homosc~ual feeling at the root of the whole matter" (Phyllis Grosskurth, The Secret Ring and the 
Poli !io' (~tPsJ'choana~,'sis, Jonathan Cape, London 1991, p. -+9), 
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14. S. Freud,On Narcissism: An Introduction., p. 81, 
15. "Sexual d)namics is only one particular instance in the total field of the psyche. This is 
not to deny its existence, but merely to put it in its proper place. [ ... ] As early as 1912 I pointed out 
that my conception of a general life instinct, namely libido, takes place of the concept of 'psychic 
energy' [ ... J I was, however, guilty, of a sin of omission in presenting the concept wholly in its 
psychological concreteness and leaving out of account its metaphysical aspect, which is the subject of 
the present discussion. But by leaving the libido concept wholly in its concrete form, I treated it as 
though it were hypostatized, [ ... ] 'The libido with which we operate is not only not concrete or knm\n, 
but is a complete X, a pure hypothesis, a model or counter and is no more concretely conceivable 
, -
than the energy known to the world of physics'" (c. G. Jung, On Psychic Energy in The Structure 
and Dynamics of the Psyche, Trans. R. F. C. Hull, Vol. 8 of The collected works of Jung, Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, London 1981), p. 30, 
16. S. Freud, On Narcissism: An Introduction, p. 81, (Das Ich und Das Es _ 
Metap.sychologische Shriften, Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, Frankfurt am Main 1994, p. 64), 
17. Ibid., p. 78, 
18. Ibid., p. 75, 
19. Ibid., p. 77, 
20. Ibid., p. 78, 
21. Ibid., p. 79, 
22. Ibid., p. 81, 
23. Freud's translator 1. Strechey, who stirred so much confusion by introducing the 
Latinised and Hellenised names for the German terms in the second topography, explains that the 
English term anaclitic is analogous to enclitic, the latter referring to the linguistic particles which in 
order to function in a sentence must be appended to, or "lean up against" a word. It is interesting that 
the anaclitic function will thus have a broader meaning as that which is added or supplemented to that 
\\'ithout which it could not exist (J. Strachey, Note on p. 81). The anaclitic will also have a resonance 
of the clinical space, <iVUKlvtVCD meaning to lean one thing against another. Thus the relation to the 
object. to the body-image, as we will see later, the drive to the instinct, as Laplanche tried to 
demonstrate, and the clinical procedure are all based on the concept of support, the leaning on, which 
is also a supplement to that which is insufficient, incomplete, or which lacks, 
24. In the topographical model the various points in the formation of the subject are 
subsequently the marks of the gap between the object and the libido, and, of the lack of satisfaction 
of the desire which, for Lacan, has not so much to do with the object but with the (neurotic) 
impossibility of reducing the desire of the Other into an object, desire of the mother into the breast of 
the mother, and, on the other hand, of ascribing the object a to the Other rather than to where it 
"belongs", namely, the dynamic of separation between the subject and the Other. 
25.1. Lacan,Seminar I, p. 79, 
26. Freud's stmcture of the drive, which Lacan examines in Seminar Xl, seems to point to the 
limits of the imaginary construction which is why Lacan situates within it, at the same time adding to 
it. the specular and invocato~' drives, each, as it is by now obvious, describing the sexual vicissitudes 
of the perceptual apparatus. The death drive has a "privileged" position in that it constitutes the \cr: 
function of cvery drive undermining its economical potential and pointing to the limits of life itself, 
27. In 1931 paper on Libidinall)pes, Freud distinguishes and characterises three types: the 
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erotic-obsessional, the erotic-narcisstic, and the narcisstic-obsessional., 
28. S. Freud,On Narcissism: An Introduction, p. 88, 
29. Freud reserves a very special place for sublimation granting its power to transcend the 
labyrinths of sexuality, and even situating it, usually in the process of speaking about libidinal 
mechanisms, on the end of the road called "sexual development", a position not easd\ to be 
associated with the nonideal one , 
30. M. Heidegger, What is Called Thinking, Harper and Row, 1968, p. 33, 
31. Freudian definition of an object is much closer to what Lacan called "the thinG" that 
0' 
\\hich does not change places, 
32. S. Freud,On Narcissism: An Introduction, p. 90, 
33. J. Lacan,5eminar I, p. 136, 
34. The move beyond the evolutionist idea of successive stages of development is more 
evident in Lacan's structuralism than in Freud' theory. As Carlo Vigano writes: "it is not a child that 
prolongs himself into the adult (the unconscious), but it is already at conception and during foetal life 
that we can track back the "adult" structure of human desire, inasmuch as it constitutes the child" 
(Journal of the Centre for Freudian Analysis and Research,Winter 92/93, p. 11). The question that 
could be asked at this point is this: is not a determination of the structure of foetal life on the side of 
the psychologising master of knowledge? 
35. S. Freud, On Narcissism: An Introduction, p. 91-2, 
36. There is no doubt that somewhere along the alley of inquiry which has dra\\lTI Freud to 
recognise and explicate the processes at work, there is a distinction "between a speculative theory and 
a science erected on empirical observation. The latter will not envy speculation its privilege of having 
a smooth, logically unassailable foundation, but \\-ill gladly content itself with nebulous, scarcely 
imaginable basic concepts [vorstellbaren Grundgedanken], which it hopes to apprehend more clearly 
in the course of its development, or which it is even prepared to replace by others. For these ideas are 
not the foundation of science, upon which everything rests: the foundation is observation alone", p. 
69. 
CHAPTER 2 
1. S. Freud,On Narcissism: An Introduction, p. 82-3, 
2. R. Girard "defends" the narcisstic position by pointing out that since the subject lacks self-
sufficiency it is perfectly legitimate and logically justified for him to desire such self-sufficiency. 
Using an example of Proust, Girard sees narcissism as a convergence of self-oriented and other-
oriented positions. Since one lacks, as for example an artist such as Proust, Girard tells us, one 
desires to "acquire the richer self' and "become self-sufficient". But in renouncing Freud's position 
and putting into question his notion of object-seeking desire, Girard asks: "Could it be that Proustian 
desirc is really 'narcisstic' in Freudian tenns, in other words that it focuses on objects 'too similar' to 
the subject too much like mirror images to deserve the badge of 'true love"'? This distinction. one 
could \cnture to respond to the question, is no doubt at the roots of the Freudian position, given that 
it concerns the real-object choice as an indication of the lack that cannot be sutured in the signifying 
chain of a \\Titer, precisely because the narrative is always a substitute which blocks the object-libido. 
(R. Girard. NarCissism: 771e Freudian Myth Demythified by Proust, in Psychoanalysis, Creatn'lfy 
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and Literature, ed. A. Roland, Columbia University Press, 1978), 
3. This theme \\i11 be again taken up in the Beyond the Pleasure Principle \yhere the child 
attempts to master mother's absence/presence in relation to the extimate object that Lacan calls o~jecf 
petit a, 
4. It is worth noting that for some the notion of the object is the point where the discourses of 
philosophy and psychoanalysis come apart. In re-examining the prejudices of philosophy Merleau-
Ponty speaks about the object as occupying the borders of the visual field in relation to the perceiving 
1. This leads to two kinds of bond with the object. One says: "When I do concentrate my eyes on it, I 
become anchored in it", the other kind involves a higher degree of intimacy: "To see is to enter a 
universe of beings which display themselves, and they would not do this if they could not be hidden 
behind each other or behind me. In other words: to look at an object is to inhabit it [my ital.], and 
from this habitation to grasp all things in terms of the aspect which they present to it, [ .. ] thus every 
object is a mirror of all others" (Phenomenology of Perception, p. 67-8). If the debunking of the 
Cartesian prejudices leads to the intimacy of dwelling in the object or finding in it the specular 
universe, then this is how Lacan will propose such specular "habitation" to be nothing else but an 
imaginary identification of the me [Ie moil with the body-image, which assumes unity outside the 
symbolic term on which it rests, 
5. O. Rank,The Double, a Psychoanalytic Study, p. 78, 
6. Ibid., p. 79, 
7. O. Rank, The Double, a Psychoanalytic Study, p. 84. It is not certain if Rank refers here 
to Nietzsche's insight in Human, all too human, where we read: "All illnesses, death itself, are the 
result of magical influences. There is never anything natural about becoming ill or dying (p. 81), 
8. O. Rank, The Double, a Psychoanalytic Study, p. 85. KieVlowski's film Double Life of 
veronique illustrates the existence of the double in its tendency to immortalise the image which it is. 
At some point a Polish woman Veronique says to her father: "I am not alone". Soon after, as if in 
silent premonition of her death, but also in anticipation that the other, her double, live on, she dies 
during a concert performance on the stage. The double Veronique, this time a French woman, is on a 
visit to Poland and takes some photographs of \vhich she later forgets while carrying them in her hand 
bag. When going through the contents of her bag a marionette artist (he who gives life) discovers the 
photographs she had forgotten about he recognises Veronique and shows them to her. At first glance 
she denies her identity but then realises something and begins to cry. It is a cry of mourning over the 
loss of her other her double in which she sees herself in realisation of her own death to come or to , , 
havc come. It is the image of a dead other that she as a double has now assumed to live, 
9. M. Heidegger,Being and Time, Basil Blackwell 1983, p. 283, 
1 O.Ibid., p. 282, 
11. It would be somewhat presumptuous to impose the "historical event" of Heidegger's 
father's death on the nature of Martin's thinking. But it is worth noting that the subsequent deaths of 
his father, then mother, are reflected in a profuse way in Heidegger's early theoretical preoccupations 
"ith death, anxiety, nothingness, whereas his later works mark gradual distantiation from the 
thanatos, \\'hich still bears the insignia of melancholia and mourning. We \yilliook more closely at 
thc passions of death in the penultimate chapter of this work, 
12. M. Heidegger,Being and Time, p. 284, 
13. Ibid., p. 287-8, 
200 
14. In Freud's schema of Narcissmustypus, the phantom of the dead exemplifies the third 
component of the narcisstic object, namely, what I have called the futural-projectional object 
towards which the "actual" I projects itself. The immortalised dead secure the futural being of the one 
the I would like to be. 
CHAPTER 3 
1. The object is what Lacan calls a semblance [un semblant] \yhich has a temporal existence 
as no object is indestructible. In assuming such object for himself the subject adheres to the 
"intermediary of the name". In other words, "the name is the time of the object" (1. Lacan, Seminar 
11. 195./-55, p. 169), 
2. J. Lacan,Ecrits, p. 260, 
3. Lacan uses in fact the term objectality to distinguish it from objectivity by ,iltue of the 
"affective substance" [s'ubstance d'a..{fect] of the latter. Cf-crits, p. 243), 
4. There is a considerable underestimation of the degree to which Lacan's return to Freud 
produced a radically new fabric of conceptions that cannot be found in Freud's text. To say, for 
example that Freud did not arrive at the theory of language, as developed by Lacan, because he was 
not equipped with the terminology of modem linguistics, certainly does not answer the question of 
Lacan's new constructions (the objecta, the other and the Other, real, s)mbolic, imaginary_ etc.). 
5. J. Lacan, The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I as Revealed in 
Psychoanalytic Experience, English translation by Alan Sheridan (Ecrits - A selection),p. 4, 
6. That this "itself' does not deserve in its primordial, i.e., imaginary form any attention as 
already a difference in part responsible for theoretical reflections on this illusory formations, is one of 
the guiding features of Lacan's article, 
7. J. Lacan,Ecrits, p.2, 
8. What seems to echo in this primary relation with the mirror is child's encounter with the 
mirror that is designed to produce a highly distorted image of elongated or broadened shape of the 
body _ which always provokes an outburst of laughter, 
9. P. Julien, Jacques Lacan's Return to Freud - The Real, the Symbolic, the Imaginary, 
New York University Press, 1994, (Trans. Devra Beck Simiu) p. 32, 
10. A. Quinet, The Gaze as an Object in Reading Seminar Xl (ed. R Feldstein, B. Fink, M. 
Jaanus), State University of New York Press, 1995, p. 140, 
11. In virtual reality it is the body, the bodily me, that follows the movement of the visual 
image. In this following, which is takes on a form of a pursuit of the double, the me/self of the body 
identifies \\lth the visual image and assumes unity with it. History ceases to exist. Or rather it 
culminates at the moment of closure or reciprocal latching of the body to the image and conversely. 
The imaginary locks the subject in virtual reality of its own dialectic, 
12. 1. Lacan,Ecrits, p. 2-3, 
13. In fact. in both 1949 article on the mirror stage and 1951 paper Some Reflections on the 
l::t;o. Lacan refers to the morphic resemblance amongst the species of pigeons and migratory locust 
thus pointing to genetic resemblancelidentification via visual image, 
14.1. Lacan. Some Rejlections on the Ego, The International Journal of Psychoanalysis. Vol. 
XXXV. 1953, p. L'_ 
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15. Ibid., p. 13, 
16. Ibid., p. 15, 
17. 1. Lacan, Ecrits, p. 19, 
18 P J r '11 '. 
. . u len] ustrates the case of Jealousy VIa mirror and extends its function first to a 
moment of paranoia and then to homosexuality: "jealousy is directed not toward the one who loves 
(his wife), but toward the one who is loved (the rival loved by his wife). However, at a certain 
moment there is a trans-position (Versetzung) by means of projection in the optical sense: in the 
other as mirror, the jealous husband sees himself as loved by the one who loves (his \\ife). He then 
abandons his rivalry. The same thing occurs in paranoia: the subject's original rivalry - a rivalry as yet 
uns) mbolised - appears outside in the real in the person of the persecutor. Finally, in homosexuality 
there is an abandonment of fraternal competition and conversion of the rival into a loved object". 
(Jacques Lacan's Return to Freud, p. 23-4), 
19. R. Boothby, Death and DeSire - Psychoanalytic Theory in Lacan's Return to Freud, 
Routledge, London, 1991, p. 39, 
20. J. Lacan,Ecrits, p. 15-16, 
21. M. Marini, Jacques Lacan - The French Context, Trans. A. Tomiche, Rutgers University 
Press, 1992, p. 157, 
22.1. Lacan,Ecrits, Function and Field o/Speech and Language, p. 42, 
23. J. Lacan,Ecrits, p. 5, 
24. Ibid., p. 6, 
25. Ibid., p. 25-6, 
26. Ibid., p. 28-9, 
27. Lacan argues elsewhere against Merleau-Ponty's notion of primacy of consciousness. 
ll1ere are in the world two simultaneous productions of forms, one on the eye's retina, the other, in 
the outer, physical world. Consciousness is merely the place of convergence of the two, therefore a 
machine, that synthesises and regulates exchanges between the two. This, however, is not yet an 
experience of the unconscious, but what Lacan calls the first moment of the dialectic of Ie moi. 
(Seminar II, p. 78), 
28. In the narcisstic gaze there can already be found the imago of the mother. The 
idealisation of the imago is in fact the idealisation of the pre-natal bond immersed at the moment of 
fatal speculation in the recess and excess of the biological pit. Although Freud's exposition stresses 
presence of an object, in fact renders it indispensable in the narcissistic formation of the Ichideal, 
Lacan does not stop at an object and goes further. What is at stake in the narcisstic love of the image 
is that which looms in its depths, the mirage of unity, the fatal vanity of being-whole. From this 
phantom comes no less imaginary, though now armed with projectional tendency, notion of 
potentiality for being whole, - death of the one, 
29. M. Marini, Jacques Lacan - The French Contex~ p. 39, 
30. Ibid., p. 39, 
31. Such moment of horror is described by Blanchot in Au moment voulu quoted by 
Rapaport in Heidegger and Derrida - Some Reflections on Time and Language. Blanchot captures 
here the moment of the love of semblant \vhen things "come out of themselves into a res~mblancc in 
\\hich they hm e neither the time to corrupt themselves nor the origin to find themselves and \\here, 
eternally their own likenesses, they do not affirm themselves but rather, beyond the dark flux and 
202 
reflux of repetition, aftlnn the absolute power of this resemblance, which is no one's and which has 
no name and no face That· h·t . ·bl I .. 
. IS W Y 1 IS tern e to ove and we can only love what IS most temble", 
32. 1. Lacan, Le savoir et la verite in Seminaire .IT, Encore, -Editions du SeuiL Paris, 1975, 
33. M. Borch-Jacobsen, Lacan - The Absolute Master, trans. D. Brick, Stanford University 
Press, Stanford, 1991, p. 200-1, -
34. M. Marini,Jacques Lacan - The French Contex( p. 39, 
35. It is not a question of separating the imaginary from the s)mbolic, nor even the s~mbolic 
from the semiotic as Kristeva did, but of differentiating, on the one hand, the imaginary and the 
specular, the source of speculatio, to which cannot testify the signifier of "the invisible" body, and, 
on the other hand, the visual image from other images, 
36. 1. Derrida, Plato's Pharmacy in Disseminations, trans, B. Johnson, The Athlonc Press, 
1981. 
CHAPTER 4 
I. In a short paper on Negation, Freud showed that negation is essentially repression, a 
division of the subject that always sends us back to what has been foreclosed. On the other hand, this 
returning manifests a different order of things which has to do with the ethics of psychoanalysis, 
namely, that I must re-·turn to where it was [Wo es war sol! Ich werden]. Thus, the subject, whose 
suffering as the unspeakable real prompts him to mediate his suffering through signification of his 
symptoms, in a certain sense re-turns to the unconscious body. It is the time of this re-turning that re-
marks his lack as a singular event, the negation and nonnegation at the same time, hence the structure, 
2. 1. Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, p. 193, 
3. According to such chronology, Lacan notes, the child undergoes the mirror stage between 
6 and 18 months of its life, 
4. Regarding the scientific pretences of his time Nietzsche responded: "One should not 
\\Tongly reify 'cause' and 'effect', as the natural scientists do (and whoever, like them, now 'naturalises' 
in his thinking), according to the prevailing mechanical doltishness which makes the cause press and 
push w1til it 'effects' its end; one should use 'cause' and 'effect' only as pure concepts, that is to say, as 
conventional fictions for the purpose of designation and communication - not for explanation 
Ih'rkldrung]" (Beyond Good and Evil in Basics Writings of Nietzsche, trans. and ed. W. Kaufinann, 
Modem Library, New York, s. 21), 
5. Ecce Homo would be a good example of a conversation with the image - mirror, mirror on 
the wall who is the \-visest, the most clever of them all? The mirror, however, does not say_ 
6. When Lacan mentions the invocatory drive [fa pulsion invocante], despite, but perhaps 
also because of, the scant description of it, he says that of all drives it is "closest to the experience of 
the unconscious". Seminar Xl, p. 104, 
7. F. Nietzsche,Ecce Homo, s. 3, 
8. Ibid.. s. 4. 
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CHAPTERS 
1. P. Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, trans. K. Blamey, The University of Chicago Press, 
London. 1994, p. 11, 
2. In an already mentioned Encyclopaedia article Family Complexes, Lacan says that the 
structure of the imago (of the mother) could be described as "a perfect assimilation of totality to 
being. In this formula, a bit philosophical in appearance, will be recognised the nostalgi~ of 
humanity: the metaphysical mirage of universal harmony: the mystical abyss of affective fusion: the 
social utopia of totalitarian dependency - all derived from the longings for a paradise lost before birth 
and from the most obscure aspirations of death", p. 13. It has become possible to trace the 
metaphysical notion of "totality", "unity", "wholeness" to the imaginary construction of hysteros to 
which leads the itinerary of repetition as if, as Kierkegaard remarked, \ye forgot something there, 
3. F. Nietzsche,Beyond Good and Evil, s. 20, 
4. Lacan mentions seven objects, in contrast to Freud's two, and we find among them the 
gaze, the voice, the nothing (as in anorexia). The list includes the breast, the faeces, the phallus 
(imaginary object) and the urinary flow, "the unthinkable list" as Lacan calls it, given that they do not 
constitute the body as a whole but "represent only partially the function that produces them" [po 315 j. 
The function is the drive, hence the invocatory drive which has a voice as object, 
5. I am referring to Nietzsche's controversial autobiography My sister and 1 that describes 
the tonnents of his last years, although he was imputed to have remained mute for eleven years prior 
to his death. We will never know whether this book was written by him or not. (F. Nietzsche, My 
sister and I, trans. O. Levy, Amok Books, 1990, 
6. BGE s. 3. It is worth noting, which should shed some light on the postFreudian tradition 
both philosophical and psychoanalytical, that Nietzsche does not oppose being-conscious [BewuC'~/t­
scin] to the instinctive, but rather, by separating it from consciousness, includes it in the operation of 
\\hat in this section appears aslnstinkt and what in section 6 will becomeTrieb, 
7. This has perhaps to do with the position and function of the "I" to which I have already 
alluded. In other words, every time Nietzsche lashes philosophers for abusing and misusing the I as a 
core of mistakes and prejudices, he does so in the first person. It is not earlier than when Nietzsche's 
"privileged" dialectic engraved itself in the discourse, that enabled us to take certain strategic steps 
tmvards examination of the unconscious function of the drive, the economy of narcisstic relation 
between the I and the specular other, and the ethics of desire with respect to the Other and desire's 
object, 
8. This debt is commonly accepted on the basis of Freud's equally laconic and reluctant 
acknm\'ledgement of Nietzsche's influence on him. Freud's relation to Nietzsche is nevertheless is 
complex and pervasive, and I shall not explore it here. To the remark in the note 29 of Introduction 
abon: we could mention another reference to Nietzsche that Freud makes in the letter to Flicss of 1 st 
Fcbmary 1900: "I have just acquired Nietzsche, in whom I hope to find words for much that remains 
mute in me, but have not opened him yet. Too lazy for the time being" (The Complete Tetters of 
Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess 1887 - 190-1. trans. and ed. Jeffrey M. Masson, The Belknap Press 
of Harvard University Press. 1985, p. 398), 
q. P. Ricoeur,Onese?f as Another, p. 11-13, 
10. F. Nietzsche, BGE, s. 6, 
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11.Ibid., s. 16, 17, 
12. F. Nietzsche Thus Sn k Za h '" 
, 1"0 e rat ustra, trans. R. 1. Hollmgdale, Pengum ClassIcs, 198-1-, 
p.67, 
13. BGE, s. 5, 
14. Briefly speaking, objectivity is a an impossible referent of the subject's enunciation, 
\\hereas objectality refers to the subject's object -object a - the outside of languaoe 
;:" 
15. F. Nietzsche, Will to Power, trans. W. Kauffman and R. J. Hollingdale, Vintage Books, 
1968, p. 229, 
16. G. Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. H. Tomlinson, The Athlone Press, London. 
1983,p.125, . 
17. Ibid., p. 127. 
PART II 
CHAPTER 6 
1. The superego, as Mannoni remarked, is the seat of the death drive~ its gna\\ ing effects are 
all the more persecutory, the more the mimetic imaginary is put out of action or pacified. O. Mannoni. 
Freud: The Theory of the Unconscious, Pantheon Books 1971, p. 161, 
2. S. Freud, Mourning and Melancholia (1917) in On Metapsychology - The Theory of 
l\vchoanalysis, Vol. 11, P.F.L. 1984, p. 252, 
218, 
3.1. Lacan,Ecrits, A selection and trans. A. Sheridan, p. 81, 
4. Ibid. p. 82, 
5.1. Lacan, Seminar III (1955-1956), The Psychoses, Routledge 1993, Trans. R. Grigg, p. 
6. B. Fink, The Lacanian Subject, Princeton University Press, 1995, p. 70, 
7. In a somewhat amusing passage in The Freudian Thing, Lacan muses about the subject's 
aspirations for knowledge of the objects which remain in the proximity to their nose, only to express 
the disappointment in such a limitation and extend their search beyond it. And yet, not sooner do the 
humans see this nose in the mirror than "they fall in love with it, and this is the first signification by 
\\hich narcissism envelops the forms of desire" Ecrits, p.137 
8. Mourning and Melancholia, p. 254, 
9./bid., p. 254, 
10. As far as the \\Titing according to Blanchot takes its existence from the Other, its marks, 
spacing, distance remain in the closest proximity to the body of the Other. An impossibility of 
appropriating, assimilating the Other is nevertheless attached to a certain imaginarization of an 
impossibility of writing the "ideal" by virtue of which this writing has been spurred to practice a form 
of self-erasure. This impossibility is therefore from the start a melancholic re-marking on the loss 
\\hich the '-ideal" helps to maintain within the horizon of writing as neither mournable nor 
forgettable. What such writing, such reiteration (that stems from the ideal of ct~ mological meaning) 
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has inevitab1v enabled to ffi . 1 
'. . a nn IS a p ace of the real as that "which does not change place". a 
JOUlssance on the grave of writing th th· . 
. ,on e crypt at IS empty for It mereh "conceals" the corpse of the 
subject and therefore a metaphori ·t· f' . " . 
. CI ) 0 Its O\\-TI creatIon. What IS deSIgnated here by the tenn '"ideal" 
should be simply called J'ouis th -hi h . . -
sance, at \\ c can neither be \\TItten nor spoken \Ve must wait, 
however, before we develop this theme in the next chapter, 
11. If one thinks here, among other examples, of Heidegger's meditation on anxiety in What 
is Metaphysics, then, it should be noted that Lacan undertook to alter its significance by' declaring 
that "it is not without an object" (LacanSeminar X, 1962-1963, session 7), Unpublished. 
12. Mourning and Melancholia, p. 257, 
13. B. Fink, The Lacanian Subject, p .. 75, 
14. R. Samuels,Between Philosophy and Psychoanalysis, Routledge 1993, p. 35. 
15. Mourning and Melancholia, p. 258, 
16. Ibid., p. 260, 
17. Ibid., p. 261, 
18. When, for example, some unexpected fortune befalls the subject who, feeling relieved 
from his everyday problems, plunges into euphoria as if that was to crown his victory over the 
problems he has been wrestling withMourning and Melancholia, p. 263, 
19. Lacan speaks of the reversed message in articulating the locus of the Other as the place in 
which the I hears itself reply to the message received from the other, and chooses to hear it or not to 
hear it. J. Lacan,Ecri Is, p. 141, 
20. The correspondence spans over nineteen years, but its most relevant fragments appear 
between 191 C the year of Abraham's publication of the Notes on the Psycho-Analytical 
Investigation and Treatment of Manic-Depressive Insanity and Allied Conditions, and 1924 when 
F rcud's reply to Abraham's remarks on the melancholia paper still did not make the fonner change his 
mind about exclusion of the latter's concept of incorporation. Their disagreement, although 
throughout correspondence expressed in cordial and friendly fonn, concerned also the place of mania 
in melancholia. According to Abraham the time of loss is taken over by a sudden emergence of a 
hightened sexual jouissance and would account for a lapse into mania. (Berlin-Grunewald, 13 March 
1922). For Freud, however, mania is not an indispensable ingredient of melancholia and, as he noted 
in the Group Psychology (1921), "we are without insight into the mechanism of the displacement of a 
melancholia by a mania" (Vol. 7, PFL, p. 164-5). To sum up, we should note that these are the two 
main axes of contention, although the main focus seems to rest on the concept of incorporation, 
\vhich Freud scmpulously avoided, refusing perhaps for the relation with the object-loss to be 
tcnninated in the enclosure of the Abrahamian, not Freudian, oral stage whose importance Freud 
nevertheless acknowledges throughout. See: A Psychoanalytic Dialogue - The Letters of Sigmund 
!','cud and Karl Abraham 1907-1926, Ed. H C. Abraham and E. L. freud. Trans. B. Marsh and H. 
e. Ahraham. Hogarth Press 1965, 
21. "As I hope to be able to make quite clear, the introjection of the love-object is an 
incorporation of it, in keeping with the regression of the libido to the cannibalistic Ie\ cl " (A Short 
Sfl{(~1' of the Development of the Libido, Viewed in the Light of Mental Disorders in ,"'dected 
J>apcrs on Psychoanalysis. Maresfield Reprints, London 1979, p. 420). 
22. Mourning and Melancholia. p. 259, 
23. S. Freud, Groltp Psychology and the Analysis of the Ega, Vol. 12, P.F.L 1985, p. 135. 
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" 2.4 .. In"his earliest study on melancholia, approximately dated at 1895. Freud speaks of the 
loss of hbido and examines fo f h' di .. . 
rms 0 anaest eSIa as a rect predIspOSItIOn rather than a cause of 
melancholia As a result of giving th" . 1" . 
. ' up e somatIC sexua eXCItatIOn" the "psychIcal sexual group gets 
mto a state of longing" and "in view of the low level [of tension] in the E. [end-organ] that state is 
easily transformed into melancholia" (Standard Edition, Vol. 1, Draft G - Melancholia, The Hogarth 
Press, London 1966, p. 200-6), 
25. O. Mannoni,Freud: The Theory of the Unconscious, p. 143, 
26. That the metaphor is an intervention in the order of metonymy which, according to 
Lacan, precedes metaphorical constructions, shows that identification operates on the level of desire. 
In classical terms, the relation between the whole and the part is in question here and what governs 
the metonymical function allows for a substitution of the former for the latter. The metom mic 
function seems to operate from the position of disidentification whereby the lack-of-being [manque-
B-etre] is installed in the place of substitution of one signifier for another. Thus desire aims at the 
lack which it at the same time sustains £crits, p. 164), 
27. J.-A. Miller, Commentary on Lacan's "On Freud's 'Trieb' an the Psychoanalyst's 
Desire" in Reading Seminars 1 and 11, Ed. R. Feldstein, B. Fink, M. Jaanus, State University of New 
York Press, 1996, p. 422-4, 
28. Ibid., p. 423, 
29. S. Freud, The Unconscious (1915) in Metapsychological Papers, Vol 11, P.F.L., 1984, 
p.204, 
30. Ibid., p. 207, 
31. In melancholia the "supplementary libido" is what Freud calls frei Libido \vhich enables 
identification with the object overshadowing the me. Should incorporation take place prior to the 
rcIease of the supplementary libido, identification with the object-loss would not come into effect, 
namely would not, phenomenologically at least, "translate" psychosis into neurosis. But does that 
mean that mania is a kind of "cure" of melancholia? 
32. Ibid. , p. 209, 
33. Freud extends his topographical discoveries to mention three types of aphasic disorders 
of speech: the second disorder, called "the asymbolic aphasia", consists in the disturbance of 
association between the thing-presentations and word-presentations, rather than concerns the relation 
between objects and object-presentations. Could this early use of the term symbolic, which Freud 
borrowed anyway, have become an inspiration for Lacan's employment of the term? The third 
aphasiac disorder is termed by Freud as agnostic to the extent that it concerns misrecognition of 
objects. S. Freud,Aphasia (1891), ibid,. p. 221-2, 
34. J. Lacan, Seminar VII (1959-1960) - The Ethics of PsychoanalYSiS, Ed. J.-A. Miller, 
Trans. D. Pottee Routledge, 1992, p. 52-3, 
35. Mourning and Melancholia, p. 265, 
36. Ibid.. p. 266, 
37. One need not take as extreme "example" as that of Joyce to realise that writing enjoys the 
Icttee that \\riting never misses or lapses but, so to speak, hits the letter \\;th the body spot on. See J. 
Lacan,Seminaire .\XIll (1975-1976) - Le Sinthome, Unpublished, 
38. It is doubtful. for example, if Derrida's critique of Lacan's phallogocentrism does justice 
to the problematic imohed. to the question of the father, the place and the history of the patron~111, 
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except for placing it in the ruins oftranscendentalism to criticise it for falling short of "signs of lit~". 
CHAPTER 7 
1. M. Torok and N. Abraham, The Illness of Mourning and the Fantasy of [he Exquisite 
('orpse in The 5,'hell and the Kernel, Vol I, Ed. and Trans. N. T. Rand, The University of Chicago 
Press. London 1994, p. Ill, 
2. S. Freud, The Economic Problem of Masochism in The Metapsychological Papers, Vol 
I L P.F .L, 1984, p. 422-3, 
3. M. Torok & N. Abraham, Mourning or Melancholia: Introjection versus Incorporation 
in The Shell and the Kernel, p. 126, 
4. Ibid., p. 127, 
5. Torok writes: "Incorporation may operate by means of representations, affects or bodily 
states, or use two or three of these means simultaneously. But, whatever the instrument, incorporation 
is invariably distinct from introjection (a gradual process) because it is instantaneous and magical. 
The object of pleasure being absent, incorporation obeys the pleasure principle and functions by way 
of processes similar to hallucinatory fulfilments" (Ibid.. p. 113). Although \\~ find here a 
eonfinnation of the fact that incorporation acts on the verge of a psychotic delirium, it is not at all 
clear why the mechanism of introjection, as throughout Torok & Abraham's work, is to serve as 
some "authentic" alternative. What is clear is that their critique of incorporation extends onto an 
elaboration of the introjection as Ferenczi's "extension to the external world of the original auterotic 
interests. by including its object into the ego" and is therefore solely concerned ",ith the structure and 
economy of the me, 
6. Ibid., p. 114, 
7. Ibid., p. 121, 
8. Ibid., p. 128-9, 
9. M. Heidegger,Being and Time, p. 212-3, 
10. It is interesting to note, as M. Borch-Jacobsen points out, that ybertragung translates 
Aristotle's metaphora, and which shows that the order of metaphorical identification is operative in 
transference neurosis. ([he Emotional Tie, Stanford University Press, 1992, p. 68), 
11. Torok & Abraham,The Shell and the Kernel, p. 129, 
12.1. Derrida, Foreword in N. Abraham and M. Torok The WolfMan'S Magic JVord, Trans. 
N. Rand, The University of Minnesota Press, 1986, p. xvii, 
13. As B. Fink comments on Lacan's work "the tenn 'object (a)' is obviously a signifier 
"hich si<mifies the Other's desire insofar as it serves as cause of the subject's desire: but object (a), 
:;, 
considered to playa role 'outside of theory', that is, as the real, does not signify an)thing: it is the 
Other's desire. it is desirousness as real, not signified. The phallus, on the other hand, is ne\ cr 
al1)thing but a signifier: in theory, just as in everyday language, it is the signifier of desire. Object (a) 
is thus the real, unspeakable cause of desire, while the phallus is 'the name of desire' and thus 
pronounceable". B. Fink,The Lacanian Subject, p. 102, 
14. I anl refening here to the theory of M. Klein "ho. having follO\ved the footsteps of K 
Abraham's doctrine of incorporation, brings, as Lacan remarked, to the place of the "lhing the 
mother's body and no doubt her jouissance ,vith it. Hence the famous "depressive position" 
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theoretically takes over from th '. .... . 
. e mcorporatlOn of the lost object fixmg It to this SIgnificant place of 
the mother (J. Lacan,Ethics o/Psychoanalysis, p. 117), 
15. J. Derrida,Foreword in The WolfMan's Magic Worq p. xiii, 
16. Ibid.. p. xiv, 
17. Ibid., p. xiv, 
18. Ihid.. p. xxi, 
19. J. Lacan,Ecrits, p. 319, 
20. Ibid.. p. 288, 
21. J. Derrida,Foreword, p. xvii, 
22. In writing, it seems, there is always a room for secrecy and for the jouissance of the letter, 
that may well have a therapeutic effect without the problem of castration ever being raised. This is 
\\hat Lacan said of Joyce in his attempt to "represent" by means of the Borromean topology the 
Joyce's psychotic aspirations to make himself a name to be studied for the nex'! few centuries (J. 
Lacan, Le Sinthome, Seminaire XXlIL unpublished). 
CHAPTER 8 
1. J. Lacan, L'envers ,de la psychanalyse - Le Seminaire XVII, Editions Du Seuil. 1991, 
untranslated, p. 38, 
2. P. De Man, Impersonality in the Criticism 0/ Maurice Blanchot in Blindness and 
Insight, Routledge, London 1996, p. 64, 
3. De Man shows us how not to read Blanchot in the sense of enticing us to remain under the 
"spell" of Blanchot's statements. Instead of situating the place of ambiguity at the level of 
commentary on Blanchot's texts De Man tries to situate it on the level of the production of statements 
whose poetical obsession, more in the case of the latter than in the former, would thus have nothing 
to say v.hen the question about desire of the other is posed and where the imaginary ambiguity lies, 
4. In a remarkable note in the opening to his reading of Blanchot Krell writes: "I am not yet 
ready for a though(ful reading of Blanchot: the backlog of Blanchotian texts, texts which I have not 
read, does not cease to amaze me - the more I read the more it grows". (D. Farrell Krell, The Lunar 
Voices, The University of Chicago, 1995, p. 117). When is one ready to read Blanchot? Is reading of 
the unread texts a necessary condition for an intervention that is already excessive and insufficient in 
so far as it can only intervene in a fragment, in what is only a fragment irrespective of the volume of 
\\ork. Such at least is my point of departure here, to read Blanchot despite, and perhaps to some 
extent against, the amazement, that his reading arouses, 
5.1. Lacan, Television, trans. J. Mehlman, W. W. Norton, 1990, p. 110, 
6. Of the two translations available, I will mostly, although \vith occasional modifications, 
"rely" on A. Smock's version in The Space 0/ Literature, but sometimes, as in this case, the reference 
\\ill be to L. Davis' translation in the collectionThe Gaze o..fOrpheus, p. 87, 
7. 11mt is what Blanchot calls "black magic": a transformatory force \vhich retains a unitary 
rclation between the image and the thing, where continuity floods the succession of int,~rvals and 
cements the tom fragments. In order to act upon the world, Blanchot says. the magician or shaman. 
places himself outside the world thus making his actions impossible. He speaks from eternity, but 
\\hat he addresses is nothing more and nothing less than eternity. (Is it to this "quality" in the study 
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of psychology that Freud alluded in lecture xvn of his Introductory Lectures when he referred to 
Jung as "a psychoanalyst before he became a prophet"?), 
8. A lost writing would designate a presence of an "archecryptic" absence that is sought on 
the trajectory of this presence as a lost object. To this extent the phallic signifier signifies nothing. for 
nothing signifies it. Such practice of writing will therefore become what Blanchot called a tale that, 
following self-resemblance, establishes the law of self-signification that would \yish to be read, in the 
talc. as such. But even if it is possible to write in the night that signifies nothing, is it possible to 
write without love? Can reading ever claim ever claim that the Other does not exist (which already 
raises the question of the place of the subject) if this claim betrays the other of reading? 
255, 
9. M. Blanchot - The Space of Literature, trans. A. Smock, University of Neb ras ca. 1982, p. 
10. The Space of Literature, p. 256, 
II. Ibid., p. 255, 
12. Ibid. , p. 255, 
13. Ibid., p. 256, 
14. Ibid., p. 257, 
15. Ibid., p. 257, 
16. Ibid., p. 257,. 
17. Ibid., p. 258, 
18. Ibid., p. 258, 
19. R. M. Rilke - Duino Elegies in The Selected Poetry, trans. S. MitchelL Picador Classics, 
1987. p. 151, 
20.1. Lacan -Seminar 11-1954-55, p. 98, 
21. Ibid. p. 98" 
22.1. Lacan -Seminar 11, p. 254, 
23. Ibid., p. 2)5, 
24. The Space o.fLiterature, p. 260, 
25. Ibid., p. 260, 
26. Ibid., p. 259, 
27.1. Lacan -Seminar 111- Psychoses, 1955-56, p. 269, 
28. Plato -Republic, trans. D. Lee, Penguin Books, 1987, p. 215-6, 
29. We should also consider the fact that although in L'Espace the chapter on Orpheus 
appears before The two versions, it is in the former that the latter echoes in. the mode of 
rl'lrospection as if the imaginary versions, especially in the section on signification, tned to name the 
image of a woman. The post-mortem examination of the feminine la depouille, the co~se or the 
lifeless carcass bears some resemblance to, but is not necessarily a meaning of, the m)thlcal figure 
\\"ho is on I\' a s'hadow, a veil or a film in which is wrapped up that which says "I", \\ithout knowing 
\\hat it is. woman as a symptom of man, as Lacan once remarked, 
30. The Space o.f Literature, p. 226, . 
31. M. Blanchot - The Narrative Voice in The Gaze o.f Orpheus, trans. L. DaVIS. StatlOn 
HilL Il)X L p. 135. . 
. . S H on University of ~hnnesota 32. M. Blanchot - The InfinIte ConversatIOn. trans. . ans , . 
Press. 1993. p. 184. 
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33. The Space of Literature, p. 179, 
34. Ibid.. p. 179, 
35. The Gaze of Orpheus, p. 135, 
36. The ,Space of Literature, p. 91. This is not the most adequate translation. But what can 
disposer de la mort read like here? To take advantage of her, to have her at one's disposal. to manage 
death? The sudden shift fromelle to soi does not receive attention either 
, 
37. The Space of Literature, p. 173, 
38. Ibid., p. 262. 
CHAPTER 9 
1. P. Klossowski, Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, trans. Daniel W. Smith. The University 
of Chicago Press, 1997, p. 97, . 
2. J. Lacan,Ecrits, p. 40, 
3. This problem is in particular discussed in chapter 6 of Derrida's Speech and Phenomena, 
Northwestern University Press, 1973, 
4. M. Heidegger,Being and Time, p. 315, 
5. Heidegger certainly avoids throughout Being and Time to thematise and problematise the 
Other. Instead he only mentions the other in relation to that familiae neighbourly being that is my 
resemblance, my imaginary partner no doubt, and which Lacan designated as "little other", 
6. Being and Time, p. 314, 
7. Perhaps the difference between Kant and Heidegger is that for the latter the voice can only 
be heard "after" Dasein has been found guilty and in opposition to the vox populi, which is the 
"vulgar" manifestation of universality that, in tum, draws Kant's sole attention, 
8. 1. A. Miller, A Discussion of Lacan 's "Kant avec Sade" in Lacan, Discourse, and 
Politics, ed. B. Fink, p. 230, 
9. 1. Lacan, Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, Seminar XI, trans. A. 
Sheridan, p. 188, 
10. Being and Time, p. 329. Further down on the same page Heidegger states: '-The basis 
nced not acquire nullity of its own from that for which it is the basis [seinem Begrundeten r What an 
cxtraordinary attempt to fill in what in this statement is so patently missing! What a dubious excuse 
to justify what will practically fill in the remainder of Heidegger's analysis on the "basis" of guilt if 
one takes the above statement as the basis for the one that follows: "Being-guilty does not first result 
from indebtedness [Vershuldung] but, on the contrary, indebtedness becomes possible only 'on the 
basis' of a primordial Being-guilty" [ibid], 
11. It should be noted in the margin, albeit not marginally, and what Miller's article alludes 
to. that this denial of confession about jouissance serves as a ground for Heidegger's antisemitic 
affiliations. The refusal to speak about what is unspeakable is therefore a way of speaking what is 
prohibited, thejouissance of the Other as real, which can only give a dubious support to nationalistic 
games of segregation. 
12. Being and Time, p. 329, 
13. J. A. Miller, Sur Ie Shuldigsein, untranslated, in Quarto Nr 3';, Bruxelles, 1988. p. 96-
l)l) 
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14. Signifier as a purely differential element that constitutes an --acoustic image" should also 
not be confused with voice , 
15. G. Agamben, Language and Death: The Place o..f Negativity, trans. K. E. Pinkus \\ith 
M. Hardt, University of Minnesota Press, 1991, p. 33-4, 
16. Augustine, The Trinity, trans. S. McKenna, The Catholic University of America Press. 
1970, p. 292-3, 
17. Being and Time, p. 322, 
18. Ibid., p. 343, 
19. Ibid., p. 316, 
20. It is interesting to note that Heidegger places psychoanalysis on the side of empirical 
knO\vledge in the best philosophical tradition to his time. His pessimism can thus seem justitied when 
he says, sharing paradoxically the constructual concerns the psychoanalysists like Freud never tried to 
conceaL that "in the end there is nothing at all to be found by observation - no matter hO\v astute, 
even if it were to call upon psychoanalysis for help" (M. Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of 
Metaphysics, trans. W. McNeill and N. Walker, Indiana University Press, 1995, p. 60), 
21. Being and Time, p. 318, 
22. Ibid. , p. 31. 9, 
23. S. Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, trans. J. Riviere, The Hogarth Press. 1979. p. 
60, 
24. J. Lacan,Ethics of Psychoanalysis, Seminar VII, p. 219-221, 
25. Civilization and its Discontents, p. 61, 
26. S. Leclaire, Psychoanalyzing: On the Order o..fthe Unconscious and the Practice of the 
LeIfer. trans. P. Kamuf, Stanford University Press, 1998, p. 115-6, 
27. Civilisation and its Discontents, p. 64, 
28. Ibid. , p. 65, 
29. Being and Time, p. 328, 
30. Ibid., p. 337, 
31. S. Leclaire, A Child is Being Killed: On Primary Narcissism and the Death Drive, 
trans. M.-C. Hays, Stanford University Press, 1998, p. 30, 
32. Being and Time, p. 327, 
33. Ibid., p. 333, 
34. In his article, Miller notes that despite Heidegger's effort to situate shuldig outside the 
relation to fundamental guilt, Lacan's chief concern was always to analyse "the ontic of jouissance" 
thus leaving "'the ontology of Da-sein" behind. For it is precisely the debt of jouissance that can be 
found at the core of neurosis, which constitutes the analytic experience, and which Heidegger leaves 
untouched. His silence, however, it should nevertheless be said, is not without echo to catholic guilt, 
35. Being and Time, p. 327, 
36. Ibid.. p. 332, 
37. Ibid.. p. 335, 
38 .. SlIr Ie Shuldigsein, Quarto Nr 34, untranslated, p. 98. 
38. Ibid.. p. 99, 
-+0, It could be said that this also concerns the relations Heidegger maintained outside his 
theoretical work at home and outside it. but which is certainly crucial for the analytical reading. I am 
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referring to his life-long relationship with Hannah Arendt, a relationship that would allow us to read. 
through the correspondence that is yet to be published, and interpret the "other Heidegger ", 
41. J. Lacan, On Feminine Sexuality. The Limits of Love and Knm ... ledge. Seminar X,X 
h-'ncore. trans. B. Fink W.W. Norton & Company, 1998, p. 31. 
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